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portkey-admin-mcp

portkey-admin-mcp

by CodesWhat
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
TypeScript
Hybrid

delete_egress_allowlist_entry

Destructive

Removes an organisation egress allowlist entry, revoking trust in its outbound destination and potentially breaking integrations that rely on it. Deletion cannot be undone; inspect the entry first.

Instructions

Remove an organisation egress allowlist entry, revoking trust in its outbound destination and potentially breaking integrations that use it. Inspect get_egress_allowlist_entry first. Deletion cannot be undone by this tool. Returns Portkey's acknowledgement or HTTP 404; requires organisation permission.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_egress_allowlist_entry"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesEgress allowlist entry UUID from list_egress_allowlist or create_egress_allowlist_entry

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okYesWhether the tool call succeeded and returned structured data
dataNoStructured success payload when ok is true
errorNoStructured error payload when ok is false

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.0.9
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedOutput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Addedv1.0.8

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructiveHint/idempotentHint annotations by naming the blast radius (integrations that use the destination break), stating irreversibility ('Deletion cannot be undone by this tool'), the required organisation permission, and the response contract (acknowledgement or HTTP 404). These are exactly the operational facts an agent needs before committing to a destructive call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tightly packed sentences ordered by importance: what it does and its risk, the prerequisite inspection, then irreversibility/permissions/response. No filler or restatement of the tool name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter destructive tool with an output schema and full annotation coverage, this covers the remaining gaps: prerequisite, permission requirement, blast radius, reversibility, and the error case. Nothing material is missing for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single `id` parameter has 100% schema description coverage, including its UUID format and the two sibling tools that produce valid values, so the schema already does the work. The description adds nothing about the parameter, which is the correct baseline-3 outcome when coverage is complete.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (Remove) and resource (organisation egress allowlist entry), immediately followed by the consequence of the action (revoking trust in the outbound destination). This is unambiguously distinct from the create/get/update/list egress siblings in the toolset.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly routes the agent to run get_egress_allowlist_entry before deleting, which is a concrete pre-call prerequisite, and warns that integrations using the destination may break. It lacks an explicit statement of when not to delete or which sibling handles the safer alternative (update vs delete), so it falls just short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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