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portkey-admin-mcp

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Hybrid

delete_guardrail

Destructive

Delete a guardrail by UUID or slug. Irreversible: removes checks from any configs that reference it, so review dependent configs first.

Instructions

Delete a guardrail by id or slug. This is irreversible and removes the check from any configs that reference it, so review dependent configs first.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
guardrail_idYesThe guardrail UUID or slug to delete

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okYesWhether the tool call succeeded and returned structured data
dataNoStructured success payload when ok is true
errorNoStructured error payload when ok is false

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv1.0.11
    • addedInput schema / properties / guardrail_id / minLength
      Added value: +1
  2. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.0.9
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedOutput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  3. Addedv1.0.1
  4. Removed
  5. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description adds genuinely new context: the deletion is irreversible and cascades to remove the check from referencing configs. It does not mention permission requirements or what happens to already-in-flight traffic, but the cascade warning is the critical behavioral fact.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, zero waste, with the irreversible/cascade warning front-loaded immediately after the action statement. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need no explanation, and the description covers the destructive blast radius that matters most for a delete tool. Only auth/permission preconditions are absent, which is a minor gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single parameter is documented as 'guardrail UUID or slug'. The description's 'by id or slug' restates the schema without adding format, validation, or resolution-order details, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (delete) and resource (guardrail) plus the identifier forms accepted (id or slug). This is trivially distinguishable from get_guardrail, update_guardrail, and the other delete_* siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides an explicit prerequisite: review dependent configs first, since the check is removed from any configs referencing it. It does not name an alternative tool (e.g. update_guardrail to disable instead), so it stops short of full when/when-not routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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