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portkey-admin-mcp

portkey-admin-mcp

by CodesWhat
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
TypeScript
Hybrid

delete_access_policy

Destructive

Permanently deletes an access policy by UUID, removing its allow or deny rule and changing access permissions; inspect first as this cannot be undone. Returns acknowledgement or 404 if missing.

Instructions

Delete an access policy by UUID, removing its allow or deny rule and changing access permissions. This cannot be undone by this tool. Inspect get_access_policy first; returns Portkey's acknowledgement, or HTTP 404 when the policy is missing.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_access_policy"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesAccess policy UUID from list_access_policies or create_access_policy

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okYesWhether the tool call succeeded and returned structured data
dataNoStructured success payload when ok is true
errorNoStructured error payload when ok is false

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.0.9
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedOutput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Addedv1.0.8

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, and the description adds real value on top: the concrete side effect (allow/deny rule removed, access permissions changed), irreversibility ('cannot be undone by this tool'), the acknowledgement return, and the HTTP 404 behavior for missing policies.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action and effect, followed by the irreversibility warning, the prerequisite, and the error contract. No sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present and rich annotations, the description covers what an agent still needs: motivation for the prerequisite read, the destructive effect's scope, irreversibility, and the 404 failure mode. Nothing material is missing for a single-parameter destructive tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema already states the id is an access policy UUID sourced from list_access_policies or create_access_policy. The description only restates 'by UUID', adding no format or sourcing detail beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete an access policy by UUID') and describes the concrete effect ('removing its allow or deny rule and changing access permissions'). This clearly separates it from siblings like get_access_policy, update_access_policy, and list_access_policies.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly directs the agent to inspect get_access_policy first, which is a concrete pre-condition for safe invocation. It does not, however, name the alternative for non-destructive modification (update_access_policy) or state when deletion is the wrong choice.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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