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OpenCyber Harness
by mitkox

oc_steghide

Destructive

Run steghide in an isolated engagement workspace to hide or extract data in image and audio files using explicit arguments and no shell parsing.

Instructions

Run steghide from the OpenCyber forensics toolkit. The container executes steghide directly with the supplied argv tokens; shell parsing is never used. Runs from the selected engagement namespace; use relative paths for engagement artifacts.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "engagement_id": "<engagement_id>",
      "arguments": "<arguments>"
    },
    "name": "oc_steghide"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stdinNo
argumentsYes
engagement_idYes
working_directoryNo.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=false and non-idempotent, so the safety profile is conveyed structurally. The description adds genuinely useful behavior: argv tokens are passed without shell parsing, and execution is scoped to the engagement namespace with relative-path expectations. It says nothing about how the binary's failures or exits are surfaced, nor what the destructive risk concretely means.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tightly written sentences with the execution model front-loaded and the namespace/path constraint second. No filler, though the shell-parsing note could be folded more economically into the argv sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be described, and annotations cover the safety profile. Still, for a destructive CLI passthrough wrapper the description omits stdin semantics, what steghide actually does, and any note on error/exit reporting — gaps an agent would want before invoking it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry parameter meaning; it partially does by explaining `arguments` as raw argv tokens with no shell interpretation and by implying engagement scoping (`engagement_id`) and relative paths (`working_directory`). The `stdin` parameter (default null) is never mentioned, leaving one of four parameters entirely undefined.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: it runs the `steghide` binary from the OpenCyber toolkit with supplied argv tokens. That is enough to distinguish it from differently-named tool wrappers among the siblings (e.g. oc_binwalk, oc_apktool), though it never says what steghide itself is for (steganography embedding/extraction), so an agent unfamiliar with the binary gets no functional hint.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives execution context — runs from the selected engagement namespace and relative paths should be used for engagement artifacts — which implies when this wrapper is appropriate. It offers no explicit when-to-use/when-not-to-use guidance and no routing to alternatives for steganography or other forensics tasks, so usage is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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