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OpenCyber Harness
by mitkox

oc_patator

Destructive

Executes credential testing attacks by running supplied Patator arguments in an isolated engagement workspace, avoiding shell parsing and using relative artifact paths.

Instructions

Run patator from the OpenCyber credentials toolkit. The container executes patator directly with the supplied argv tokens; shell parsing is never used. Runs from the selected engagement namespace; use relative paths for engagement artifacts.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "engagement_id": "<engagement_id>",
      "arguments": "<arguments>"
    },
    "name": "oc_patator"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stdinNo
argumentsYes
engagement_idYes
working_directoryNo.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint, openWorldHint and idempotentHint=false, so the safety profile is partly covered. The description adds real behavioral value beyond that: no shell parsing is ever used (so pipes, redirects and metacharacters will not work and args must be pre-tokenized), and paths resolve relative to the engagement namespace. It stops short of stating impact severity, rate concerns, or what a failed invocation looks like.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action, followed by the two operational facts that matter at call time. No filler or restatement of the name, though the toolkit label in sentence one adds little.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be described, and the main invocation gotchas (argv-only, no shell, relative paths, namespace scoping) are covered. What is missing for a destructive credential-attack tool is any statement of what the tool actually attacks or the consequences of misuse, plus documentation of the undocumented `stdin` parameter.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry parameter meaning, and it only partly does: 'supplied argv tokens' maps to `arguments`, 'engagement namespace' to `engagement_id`, and 'relative paths' to `working_directory`. The `stdin` parameter is never mentioned at all, and there is no format or example guidance for the argv array, leaving a real gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: it runs `patator` from the OpenCyber credentials toolkit, and clarifies that the container invokes the binary with argv tokens. An agent knows exactly what is being executed, though the description never explains what patator actually does (multi-protocol credential brute forcing), which is the key differentiator against the many other oc_* tool wrappers.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage context is implied by 'credentials toolkit' and the operational note to run 'from the selected engagement namespace; use relative paths for engagement artifacts,' which is genuinely useful call-time guidance. However there is no explicit when-to-use versus alternatives, no when-not, and no prerequisites or warnings about targeting authorization.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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