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OpenCyber Harness
by mitkox

oc_checksec

Destructive

Run checksec to inspect binary hardening protections in a selected engagement namespace, passing arguments directly without shell parsing.

Instructions

Run checksec from the OpenCyber binary toolkit. The container executes checksec directly with the supplied argv tokens; shell parsing is never used. Runs from the selected engagement namespace; use relative paths for engagement artifacts.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "engagement_id": "<engagement_id>",
      "arguments": "<arguments>"
    },
    "name": "oc_checksec"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stdinNo
argumentsYes
engagement_idYes
working_directoryNo.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations already declare the safety profile (not read-only, destructive, not idempotent, closed-world), so the description's extra detail matters. It adds real operational context: argv is passed as discrete tokens and 'shell parsing is never used,' which tells the agent exactly how to shape arguments and that shell metacharacters won't be interpreted. It stops short of saying what gets modified or how the result is returned.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the identity of the tool before execution semantics and path rules. Almost every clause earns its place; 'from the OpenCyber binary toolkit' is slightly redundant framing but cheap.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema and full annotations available, the description needn't explain return values, and the safety profile is covered structurally. However, an agent still lacks the meaning of `stdin`, guidance on argument formatting for checksec specifically, and any note on whether the destructive hint relates to the target file or the engagement workspace.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description has to carry the burden. It partially does: 'arguments' are framed as argv tokens, 'working_directory' is implied by relative-path/'runs from' language, and 'engagement_id' is implied by the engagement namespace. The `stdin` parameter is never mentioned, and no argument or path format examples are given, so the compensation is incomplete.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: run the `checksec` binary from the OpenCyber toolkit. That is far clearer than a generic wrapper name, though it never contrasts this tool with sibling wrappers such as oc_binwalk or oc_bash, so an agent must infer which binary-appropriate tool to pick.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a path convention (relative paths, engagement namespace) but no guidance on when checksec is the right choice versus other oc_* binaries. There are no exclusion criteria or prerequisites for a tool that mutates state (destructiveHint=true).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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