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OpenCyber Harness
by mitkox

oc_mfoc

Destructive

Recover MIFARE Classic keys via nested authentication attack on authorized tags within an engagement namespace, using relative paths for artifacts.

Instructions

Recover MIFARE Classic keys with the nested authentication attack. Only use on tags you are authorized to test. Runs from the selected engagement namespace; use relative paths for engagement artifacts.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "engagement_id": "<engagement_id>",
      "arguments": "<arguments>"
    },
    "name": "oc_mfoc"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stdinNo
argumentsYes
engagement_idYes
working_directoryNo.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, openWorldHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, and non-idempotence; the description adds the authorization requirement and the execution context (engagement namespace, relative paths for artifacts). It does not disclose what the attack does to the tag on partial failure, whether it writes to the card, or how long a run typically takes — relevant for a destructive, non-idempotent operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action and followed by the safety caveat and execution context. No filler, though the safety and path statements are packed together and could be separated more cleanly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a wrapper that requires a free-form 'arguments' array, the definition never explains what belongs in it, which is the single most important thing an agent needs to invoke the tool correctly. An output schema exists, so return values need no elaboration, but the argument contract and the destructive-failure semantics are missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% for four parameters, so the description carries the burden and only partly meets it: 'runs from the selected engagement namespace' and 'use relative paths' loosely map to engagement_id and working_directory. The required 'arguments' array — which appears to be a raw CLI passthrough — and 'stdin' are entirely unexplained, leaving the agent to guess the accepted argument format.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete verb and resource ('Recover MIFARE Classic keys') plus the specific technique ('nested authentication attack'), so the agent knows exactly what is performed. It does not contrast itself with any sibling, so it stops short of a 5, but the purpose is unambiguous on its own.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description supplies a prerequisite constraint — only use on tags you are authorized to test — which is genuinely useful gating for an offensive tool. It gives no guidance on when this attack is the right choice versus other approaches (e.g., when nested auth fails or is unavailable), so usage is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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