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OpenCyber Harness
by mitkox

oc_hydra

Destructive

Runs parallel credential attacks with explicit argv tokens and no shell parsing, using an engagement-scoped workspace for authorized security testing.

Instructions

Run hydra from the OpenCyber credentials toolkit. The container executes hydra directly with the supplied argv tokens; shell parsing is never used. Runs from the selected engagement namespace; use relative paths for engagement artifacts.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "engagement_id": "<engagement_id>",
      "arguments": "<arguments>"
    },
    "name": "oc_hydra"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stdinNo
argumentsYes
engagement_idYes
working_directoryNo.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructive=true, openWorld=true, idempotent=false, readOnly=false, so safety framing is covered. The description adds genuinely new behavior: argv tokens are passed directly with no shell parsing, so metacharacters and quoting are not interpreted by a shell, and execution is scoped to the engagement namespace. It omits rate-limit/lockout risk and what the output schema returns, but the added disclosure is real.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the core action, no filler. Mild redundancy in repeating 'engagement namespace'/'engagement artifacts' across sentences.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Output schema exists, so return-value explanation is not required. However, for a destructive open-world credential-attack tool with an undocumented stdin parameter, the description leaves out authorization preconditions, expected risk (target lockouts), and stdin usage – enough gaps that it is only adequate.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 4 parameters, so the description has to compensate. It does partially: argv tokens map to 'arguments', relative paths map to 'working_directory', and namespace maps to 'engagement_id'. 'stdin' is never mentioned, and no parameter format examples are given, so gaps remain.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb+resource: it names hydra and the OpenCyber credentials toolkit, and states it runs the container binary. It distinguishes itself implicitly from sibling wrappers like oc_aircrack since hydra is the named tool, though it never states what hydra is for (credential brute-forcing) for an agent that doesn't already know.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives invocation context – runs from the selected engagement namespace, use relative paths for engagement artifacts – which is useful operational guidance. It offers no when-to-use/when-not guidance relative to alternatives, and gives no precondition such as requiring authorization for the target.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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