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OpenCyber Harness
by mitkox

oc_audit_log

Read-onlyIdempotent

Read a tamper-evident engagement audit trail of tool executions, HTTP requests, browser actions, workspace writes, and hardware sessions, returned in append order with hash-chain fields.

Instructions

Read the tamper-evident engagement audit trail (tool executions, HTTP requests, browser actions, workspace writes, hardware sessions). Events are returned in append order with hash-chain fields.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "engagement_id": "<engagement_id>"
    },
    "name": "oc_audit_log"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
eventNo
limitNo
offsetNo
engagement_idYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=false, so safety is covered. The description adds genuine behavioral context — tamper-evidence, append ordering, hash-chain fields — but says nothing about pagination behavior, result size, or whether verification requires a separate call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences, front-loaded with the verb and resource, with no filler. The second sentence on ordering and hash-chain fields is useful but partially overlaps what the existing output schema can convey.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present and annotations covering the safety profile, the description does not need to explain return values. The main gap is that none of the four undocumented parameters (especially limit/offset paging) are explained anywhere, which matters for an audit-trail reader that can be large.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across four parameters, and the description adds no meaning for engagement_id, event, limit, or offset — notably, whether 'event' filters by category name. However, the parenthetical event list hints at the filter domain, keeping this above the floor.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Read the tamper-evident engagement audit trail") and enumerates the event categories covered (tool executions, HTTP requests, browser actions, workspace writes, hardware sessions). This clearly separates it from verify-style siblings, though it never names an alternative to reinforce the distinction.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance, and no mention of when an agent should prefer oc_audit_verify or oc_log_timeline instead. The agent must infer the use case purely from the noun phrase "audit trail".

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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