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create_ingress_source

Create an admin-only signed inbound endpoint that turns external CI failures, alerts, or calendar events into Delega tasks with HMAC-SHA256 verification and fixed routing.

Instructions

Create an inbound connector: a signed public endpoint that turns external events (CI failures, alerts, calendars) into Delega tasks (admin only). The sender signs each POST body with HMAC-SHA256 (header X-Delega-Ingress-Signature: t=,v1=<hex of HMAC(secret, 't.body')>, 5-minute tolerance). Ingress can ONLY create tasks; routing (project/assignee) is pinned here and never payload-controlled; every created task carries the 'ingress' label and provenance marker, and automation rules ignore ingress tasks unless they explicitly opt in with a source=ingress condition. Hosted API only.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesShort human-readable source name, e.g. 'github-actions-ci'
activeNoSet false to create the source disabled
filtersNoOnly deliveries passing all filters create tasks
templateYesMaps payload paths to task fields — a closed vocabulary, no expressions
default_project_idNoProject for created tasks (pinned; payload cannot override)
default_assignee_agent_idNoAssignee for created tasks (pinned; payload cannot override)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.19.0
    • removedInput schema / properties / filters / items / properties / value / anyOf
      Removed value: -[
      -  {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "type": "number"
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "type": "boolean"
      -  }
      -]
    • addedInput schema / properties / filters / items / properties / value / type
      Added value: +[
      +  "string",
      +  "number",
      +  "boolean"
      +]
  2. Addedv1.18.2

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so exceptionally well: it discloses the HMAC-SHA256 signing scheme, exact header format with a 5-minute tolerance, that routing is pinned and never payload-controlled, the always-added 'ingress' provenance label, and the automation-opt-in behavior. These are precisely the operational traits an agent needs before invoking a security-sensitive endpoint.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose and security behavior, and every clause is informative. It is dense and packs multiple clauses into long sentences, but little is waste; a minor deduct for density over readability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a nested-object tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description is complete enough to invoke correctly: it covers auth requirements, signing contract, scope constraints, and side effects. Return values are not needed since the tool's job is creation and behavior is fully characterized.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, and the description adds genuine meaning beyond the schema: it explains that project/assignee are pinned and cannot be overridden by payload, and that the 'ingress' label is always added regardless of the labels parameter. These clarify behavioral semantics of the parameters rather than restating types.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Create an inbound connector') plus a concrete functional definition ('a signed public endpoint that turns external events... into Delega tasks'). The 'admin only' qualifier and examples (CI failures, alerts, calendars) let an agent distinguish it from siblings like create_webhook without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides real access conditions ('admin only', 'Hosted API only') and a key scope limit ('Ingress can ONLY create tasks'), which implies when it applies. However, it never explicitly routes the agent between this tool and the closely related create_webhook/create_automation siblings, so the when-to-use-vs-alternative guidance is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.