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verify_cosigned_anchor

Verifies an anchor's signed head by counting valid cosignatures from distinct allowlisted witnesses, returning success only when the count meets the threshold and split-view forks are detected.

Instructions

CLIENT-side k-of-n trust on a TAMPER-EVIDENT MEMORY head: how many DISTINCT allowlisted WITNESSES validly co-signed this anchor's signed head? This is the gossip layer that upgrades tamper-evidence (which catches a rewrite on ONE timeline) into SPLIT-VIEW detection: a compromised operator cannot show divergent histories to different clients without getting threshold independent witnesses to co-sign the fork — and honest witnesses refuse. Pass cosignatures as [[pubkey_hex, sig_hex], ...] and witnesses as the allowlist [pubkey_hex, ...]. Returns {ok, count, threshold, signers, covers_history[, limits, error]}; ok = count >= threshold. Read-only; needs no access to the log.

Three things it refuses to report as success. The anchor's sth_hash is re-derived from the head's own fields before any signature is counted, so genuine signatures over a SUBSTITUTED n_writes/writes_tip come back with error rather than as co-signed. threshold below 1 is rejected — a quorum of zero is met by an anchor no witness ever signed. And a head over a store with no receipt chain reports covers_history=false plus limits, because a valid co-signature over an empty history is evidence about no stored data at all. Verify-yourself quickstart: docs/TRANSPARENCY.md.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
anchorYes
thresholdNo
witnessesYes
cosignaturesYes
Install Server

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it discloses a great deal: read-only behavior, no log access, return shape, and three concrete false-success failure modes (substituted fields, threshold < 1, missing receipt chain). It even explains the security rationale (honest witnesses refuse), which goes well beyond a minimal description.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The text is long but front-loaded: the purpose, input formats, return shape, and read-only nature appear first, followed by the necessary edge-case semantics. The threat-model prose is relevant, not filler, though it could be tightened; the third refusal paragraph is dense but valuable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given no output schema, no annotations, and 0% schema coverage, this description is unusually complete: an agent knows what to pass, what to expect back, which failures are not success, and that the operation is side-effect-free. There are no obvious missing facts required to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does: cosignatures are specified as [[pubkey_hex, sig_hex], ...], witnesses as an allowlist [pubkey_hex, ...], and threshold's edge case is explicitly covered. It also clarifies what the anchor contributes (signed head fields from which sth_hash is re-derived), adding meaning the schema's empty properties do not.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies a specific operation: verifying how many distinct allowlisted witnesses validly co-signed an anchor's signed head and comparing that count against a threshold. It also states the broader goal (split-view detection) and the return contract, so an agent can distinguish it from generic 'verify' tools at a glance.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear context for when the tool applies: client-side verification, gossip-layer/split-view scenarios, and no log access required. It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives like verify_witness or detect_split_view or state when to prefer them, so the 'versus alternatives' guidance is implied rather than explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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