detect_split_view
Audit fork proof: detect split-view by verifying if a witness co-signed divergent anchor heads.
Instructions
AUDITOR-side FORK PROOF: given two co-signed anchors (e.g. the head shown to client A vs client B), is
there a witness that validly co-signed BOTH over an INCONSISTENT pair of heads (same log size, different
tip)? One such witness is cryptographic proof of a split-view — an honest witness refuses the second
signature, so a valid double-sign means the operator presented divergent histories. This is the check behind
"prove my agent's memory store showed one history to one reader and a different one to another". Returns
{fork, inconsistent, at, evidence, both_cosigned, malformed}. Honest limit: decidable from head commitments only
at a shared size; different-size logs need verify_consistency (reported inconsistent=False = undetermined).
malformed names any side whose sth_hash does not bind its own fields — that is a head no witness could have
signed, not merely an unproven fork. Worked example: docs/TRANSPARENCY.md.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| anchor_a | Yes | ||
| anchor_b | Yes | ||
| cosigs_a | Yes | ||
| cosigs_b | Yes | ||
| witnesses | Yes |