selection_integrity
Audits selection integrity by diffing retrieved top-k memories against trust-anchored records, surfacing displaced authentic facts and untrusted entries occupying top-k slots.
Instructions
Make SELECTION-LEVEL manipulation auditable (read-only, no LLM). Provenance/tamper-evidence check that retrieved records are authentic, but are blind to an attacker who injects authentic-looking UNTRUSTED writes that REROUTE which trusted facts reach the top-k. This diffs the top-k the agent ACTUALLY gets against the top-k of only trust-anchored memories, and surfaces any qualified fact that untrusted writes displaced, plus the untrusted records occupying top-k slots. Returns {stable, displaced, untrusted_in_topk, k}. Needs a trust root (trust_seeds / attested writes); without one it says so. Flags, never rewrites.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| k | No | ||
| query | Yes |