List access-control grants and revocations, newest first, to audit who could read what and when access was removed.
EVERY access-control act -- grants, revocations, and the ones a later act retired -- newest first. The auditable answer to "who could read this, and when was it taken back". Read-only.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v2.20.1Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it states the key safety behavior (read-only), the inclusive scope (including retired/revoked acts), and ordering (newest first). It could add auth or limitation details, but it provides meaningful disclosure beyond what the schema shows.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences with no filler, front-loading the scope and ordering facts while placing the read-only safety note clearly. Every phrase contributes to selection and safe invocation.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The purpose, scope, ordering, and read-only nature are covered, and an output schema exists for return details. However, the definition is incomplete for a tool with one parameter and a large sibling set because it omits what agent means and does not explicitly route between this audit log and related access-control tools.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the only parameter, agent, is never mentioned in the description. An agent cannot tell whether agent filters the log, how it interacts with 'EVERY access-control act', or what the default empty string means.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description defines the tool as the full access-control audit log: every grant, revocation, and superseded act, newest first. This is a specific resource with a clear purpose, and it differentiates from siblings like grants or can_read by focusing on the historical/auditable record.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly frames the tool as the auditable answer to 'who could read this, and when was it taken back', which tells an agent when to invoke it for historical access questions. It does not name alternatives or exclusions, but the primary when-to-use context is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.