handshake-mcp
The server provides MCP tools to check a Handshake vault’s status and, with a session token, list, read, write, and audit stored credentials.
Check whether the vault is open, how much session time remains, and how many secrets exist, with no token required.
List credential names only, never credential values, using a session token.
Read one credential by exact name, with a required reason that is written to an append-only audit log.
Store or update a credential, optionally with a note and category, using a session token.
View a recent access log showing who read which credential, when, and from where, with an optional result limit.
It does not provide an unlock tool, so it cannot open a locked vault or retrieve credentials without a valid session token.
Allows using Cloudflare D1 as the encrypted backend storage for the Handshake credential vault.
Allows using a local SQLite database as the encrypted backend storage for the Handshake credential vault.
Allows using Supabase as the encrypted backend storage for the Handshake credential vault.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@handshake-mcpshow me the available credentials and the last time each was accessed"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Handshake
An encrypted credential vault with a small, local setup interface and a CLI for trusted tools. Built by ZeroAI Technologies.
Start
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zeroai-tech/handshake/main/install.sh | bash
handshake guiThe interface opens in your browser, served only on this device. It guides you through local or cloud storage, a passphrase, an optional separate security key file (recommended), authenticator enrollment, recovery shares, and selected tool connections. No analytics or external UI assets are loaded. Use Quit Handshake to stop the local server and end its session.
On macOS the installer creates ~/Applications/Handshake.app for double-click launching. From a checkout, run python scripts/create-launcher.py to create it.
Existing vaults open locked. Changing an existing vault's passphrase upgrades its key envelope without rewriting credentials, and preserves its original recovery shares. Opening the interface alone does not migrate your vault.
Related MCP server: Passbolt MCP
Protection and recovery
Use a long, unique passphrase. For protection against someone who knows that passphrase and obtains a database copy, enable the separate security key file and keep it on another device or USB drive, with a separate backup. Keeping it beside the database weakens this protection.
The authenticator code verifies the application's unlock flow. It is not an independent encryption factor: someone with a password-only vault and its passphrase can decrypt the data outside the application. A separate key file adds independent random material to the encryption key.
Save the three recovery shares in separate safe locations. Any two grant full vault access, bypassing the passphrase, authenticator, and key file. Never give them to an AI assistant. Recovery shares rebuild a key; they cannot rebuild a deleted database. Keep an encrypted database export off-device too. Recovery cards for remote storage also contain its connection settings and must be treated as sensitive.
The interface supports storing credentials, listing names, locking, encrypted backups, password changes, recovery, access history, and optional agent connections. Credential values do not appear in the list.
CLI
handshake keyfile --out /path/on/separate-device/handshake-key.json
handshake init --key-file /path/on/separate-device/handshake-key.json
handshake unlock --key-file /path/on/separate-device/handshake-key.json
handshake put work/openai --value - # provide the value on stdin
handshake list
handshake run -e OPENAI_API_KEY=work/openai -- your-command
handshake export --out encrypted-backup.json
handshake passwd --key-file /path/on/separate-device/handshake-key.json
handshake lock
handshake --helpUnlock produces a bearer session token. Follow the command's instructions to set HANDSHAKE_SESSION in your shell. An authorized token grants access to the whole vault; give it only to trusted tools. The MCP bridge has no unlock tool, passes tokens through subprocess environment variables, and supplies new credential values on stdin rather than command-line arguments. It requires Node.js.
Use handshake agents to register CLI integrations, or choose individual integrations in the interface. Supported integrations include Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor and Windsurf. Registration alone does not unlock a vault.
Storage
SQLite works without an account. Cloudflare D1, Supabase and Postgres are also supported. Storage credentials are saved locally with restrictive permissions; they grant database access and should be protected. Supabase requires the repository's setup SQL. Postgres requires the optional dependency:
python -m pip install '.[postgres]'Use handshake setup --help for terminal storage configuration. Remote storage contains encrypted credential values, but names, notes, categories and access logs are visible to its operator. Encryption does not prevent deletion or modification of the database.
Threat model
Situation | Limit or protection |
Database or encrypted backup stolen | Values are encrypted; guessing the passphrase remains possible. Separate key-file mode additionally needs that file. |
Passphrase and password-only database stolen | The phone-code check cannot prevent offline decryption. |
Two recovery shares stolen | Full vault access, given the database. |
Token deliberately given to a tool | Whole-vault access for normal application calls until expiry or lock. |
A process running as your user | Can inspect local files, process memory and environment, or alter application code. Handshake is not a security boundary against it. |
Tool retains a credential or key | Locking cannot revoke material already copied or invalidate a provider's API key. Rotate that credential at its provider. |
Network changes | Best-effort public-IP binding rejects detected changes. Lookup failures do not lock you out. This is not strong identity verification. |
Storage deleted | Restore an encrypted database backup; recovery shares alone are insufficient. |
The session timer governs cooperative application access. The session file and bearer token together can expose the master key to a same-user process. Do not describe the timer or authenticator as protection against a malicious local agent. Audit logs are best-effort and can be altered by someone controlling storage.
Development
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/python -m pip install -e .
.venv/bin/python tests/test_vault.py
.venv/bin/python tests/test_hardening.py
.venv/bin/python tests/test_gui.py
.venv/bin/python tests/e2e.py
node tests/verify_gui.cjs /absolute/path/to/playwrightBrowser tests use an isolated temporary vault and disable keychain changes. See SECURITY.md for cryptographic details and reporting. This project has not undergone an independent security audit.
Available Tools
5 toolshandshake_getA
Read ONE credential by name. Requires an open session token. Every read is written to an append-only audit log with the reason given, so always pass a truthful reason.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | exact secret name, from handshake_list | |
| reason | Yes | why it is needed — recorded permanently | |
| session | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It discloses a critical non-obvious behavior: every read is written to an append-only audit log with the reason, and warns users to pass a truthful reason. This goes well beyond a simple 'read' and reveals the side-effectful nature of the operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences with no wasted words. The core action is front-loaded ('Read ONE credential by name'), followed immediately by the prerequisite and the behavioral caveat. Every clause earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-by-name tool with three required parameters and no output schema, the description covers the essential contextual basis: what it does, the session prerequisite, the audit-log side effect, and how to supply the reason. Combined with the schema's parameter descriptions, an agent has enough information to invoke this tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%: name and reason are described in the schema, but session is not. The description adds important semantics by stating it 'Requires an open session token' and re-emphasizing that the reason is recorded permanently. This compensates for the schema gap on session and reinforces the meaning of reason.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Read ONE credential by name.' The emphasis on 'ONE' clearly distinguishes this from handshake_list, which would be the sibling for reading multiple credentials. This makes the tool's purpose unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context for using the tool: read a single named credential, requiring an open session token and a truthful reason because of audit logging. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use this tool or name alternatives like handshake_list for enumeration, leaving some routing to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
handshake_listA
List the NAMES of stored credentials (never values). Requires an open session token.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| session | Yes | token from `handshake unlock` |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the behavioral disclosure burden. It does disclose that values are never returned and that an open session is required, which is useful. It does not address side effects, failure behavior, or whether the operation is strictly read-only, though 'List' strongly implies a read operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single sentence that front-loads the core purpose ('List the NAMES of stored credentials') and immediately warns about the critical limitation ('never values'), followed by the required precondition. No wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter list operation, the description conveys the return content (names only), the security boundary (no values), and the invocation precondition (open session token). It could be improved by describing the error case for an invalid or expired session, but the tool is otherwise adequately specified.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and the only parameter, session, is already documented as 'token from `handshake unlock`'. The description adds the nuance that the session must be open, but otherwise does not meaningfully extend the schema's parameter documentation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('List') and resource ('stored credentials'), and clarifies the scope to names only, explicitly excluding values. This distinguishes it from sibling tools like handshake_get, which likely retrieves credential values.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives a clear precondition ('Requires an open session token') and the 'never values' caveat implies that value retrieval belongs to another tool. However, it does not explicitly name alternatives such as handshake_get or state when this tool is preferred over handshake_status or handshake_log.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
handshake_logC
Recent access log — who read which credential, when, from where.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| session | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, but it only states what the log contains and that it is recent. It does not disclose whether the operation is read-only, how the session filter behaves, whether results are paginated or ordered, or any authentication expectations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a compact single line that front-loads the purpose and contains no redundant words. However, its brevity contributes to the lack of parameter and usage details.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no annotations, no output schema, and 0% parameter description coverage, the description is too sparse for safe invocation. It doesn't explain the required 'session' parameter, the meaning of 'limit', or what the returned log looks like.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description adds no meaning for the two parameters. Neither 'session' nor 'limit' is explained, leaving the agent without a way to know what values are valid or what each parameter controls.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the tool as an access log for credential reads and specifies the content dimensions (who, which credential, when, from where). This distinguishes it from sibling tools like handshake_list and handshake_get, though it lacks an explicit action verb such as 'list' or 'retrieve'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance about when to use handshake_log instead of siblings like handshake_status, handshake_list, handshake_get, or handshake_put. No contexts, exclusions, or prerequisites are mentioned, so the agent must guess the appropriate scenario.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
handshake_putB
Store or update one credential. Requires an open session token.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | ||
| note | No | ||
| value | Yes | ||
| session | Yes | ||
| category | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are present, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It mentions the session-token requirement and that the operation can create or update, but does not explain overwrite semantics, permissions, return value, or idempotency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences with no wasted words; the key auth requirement is front-loaded and the operation is described clearly. Might be slightly richer with more behavior detail, but the prose itself is well-structured.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
This is a 5-parameter write operation with no annotations, no output schema, and 0% schema coverage, so the description needs to carry more weight. It omits return behavior, overwrite semantics, and parameter details, leaving an agent under-informed for reliable invocation in varied cases.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description only hints at session/name/value ('credential', 'session token'), leaving note and category unexplained. The parameter names are somewhat self-evident, but the description does not compensate for the missing schema documentation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Store or update') with a clear object ('one credential'), making the operation's purpose unmistakable. This clearly distinguishes it from the sibling read/list/status/log tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'Store or update one credential' implies a write operation distinct from handshake_list/get/log, but there is no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. No exclusions or scenarios are mentioned.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
handshake_statusA
Is the vault open? Shows whether a session is live, how long is left, and how many secrets exist. Needs no token — call this first when a credential is needed.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It conveys that this is a read-only session check, requires no token, and reports session liveness, remaining time, and secret count. It does not cover exact response formatting or error cases, but it is sufficient for a zero-input status tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two short, information-dense sentences. The opening question immediately conveys intent, and the second sentence provides output details, auth requirements, and usage ordering without wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with no parameters, no output schema, and low complexity, the description explains what the tool returns, that it needs no token, and when to call it. It is largely complete, though it could slightly clarify the format or units of 'how long is left.'
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has no parameters, so the schema is trivially complete. The description adds relevant context by stating that no token is needed, reinforcing that no input is required. This meets the baseline for zero-parameter tools.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: checking whether the vault/session is live, with time remaining and secret count. It distinguishes itself from sibling data-access tools by being a status-only check and by saying to call it first when a credential is needed.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit situational guidance: 'Needs no token — call this first when a credential is needed.' This tells the agent when to invoke it and establishes ordering relative to credential access, though it does not explicitly name alternative tools or when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
5 tool updates
v1.0.0- First observed
handshake_get - First observed
handshake_list - First observed
handshake_log - First observed
handshake_put - First observed
handshake_status
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: session status, listing names, reading a single credential, writing a credential, and viewing the audit log. There is no meaningful overlap or ambiguity between them.
All tools share the handshake_ prefix and use lowercase snake_case, which is predictable. However, status and log are nouns while list, get, and put are verbs, so the naming pattern is not perfectly uniform.
Five tools is a well-scoped set for a credential vault with auditing. Each tool serves an essential function without redundancy or bloat.
The set covers status checking, listing, reading, writing, and audit logging, which handles the core workflow. However, there is no delete/remove operation for credentials, which is a notable lifecycle gap for a secrets vault.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Encrypted secret store and rotation for autonomous agent credentials
- FullmaktOAuthai.fullmakt
Credential broker for AI agents: scoped, revocable API access with policy enforcement and audit.
A secret store for AI agents: the agent never sees the plaintext.
Give your AI hands. Identity, credential vault, and API gateway for autonomous agents.
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