keymaster-mcp

Keymaster is a local, encrypted credential vault with an MCP server built in. Tell your agent "check the last build on ci.example.com" and it finds the right login from the URL, a name or an alias, then uses it. You don't paste passwords, you don't say where they're kept, and in most cases the secret never enters the conversation.

you    ─► "why did the deploy-api job fail on https://ci.example.com/job/deploy-api/412?"
agent  ─► find_credentials("https://ci.example.com/job/deploy-api/412")  → jenkins-ci  (host match)
agent  ─► http_request(ref="jenkins-ci", url=".../412/consoleText")      → auth injected, output scrubbed

Install

Script: macOS and Linux, one line, nothing else needed:

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kiraa06/keymaster/main/install.sh | sh

It installs uv if you don't have it and installs km and keymaster-mcp from the latest release, checksum-verified and with their own Python (your system Python is left alone). It registers the MCP server with Claude Code and offers to create your vault. Re-run it any time to upgrade.

uv:

uv tool install git+https://github.com/kiraa06/keymaster
km init && km install-mcp

pipx:

pipx install git+https://github.com/kiraa06/keymaster

From source:

git clone https://github.com/kiraa06/keymaster && cd keymaster
uv tool install --editable .

Requirements

• macOS 12+, or Linux with a Secret Service keyring (GNOME Keyring / KWallet)

• Any MCP client: Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, …

• Optional: Touch ID (macOS), zenity for approval dialogs on Linux, xclip / wl-clipboard

Related MCP server: keywarden

Use it

km init                                   # master passphrase + one-time recovery code
km add jenkins-ci -t token -u ada --url https://ci.example.com -a jenkins -a ci
km add aws-prod  -t aws -u AKIA… -f region=eu-central-1 -p sealed
km add orders-db -t database -u app -f host=db1.internal -f port=5432
km add github    -t ssh_key --from-file ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 --url github.com
km add okta      -u ada --url '*.okta.com' --totp       # with its 2FA seed
km touchid setup                          # approve with your fingerprint 👆

Then ask your agent to do things. It checks Keymaster whenever a task needs a login (see below).

What it does

Finds the right login from whatever the agent has

A credential can be looked up by its name, aliases, URLs (full URLs with path prefixes, bare hosts, *.wildcards), a host field, tags or username, and typos are tolerated. https://ci.example.com/job/deploy-api/412 finds jenkins-ci, and so do jenkins, ci, and jenkns. When two credentials fit equally well, the agent is told to ask you instead of guessing.

Makes sure the agent checks it first

MCP server instructions alone are easy to miss. With many servers configured, Claude Code defers their tools, so the model sees only tool names, and it truncates long instructions. So km install-mcp sets up three layers:

1. The MCP server. Its instructions and tool descriptions lead with "check Keymaster first".

2. A UserPromptSubmit hook (keymaster-hook, about 0.15s). When a prompt mentions creds, passwords, tokens, keys, logins or 2FA, or matches a stored credential's name, alias or host, it adds a reminder to the agent's context, naming the credentials that match. It only ever prints names, never secrets.

3. A short rule in ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md, between <!-- keymaster:start/end --> markers.

You can opt out of either extra layer with --no-hook / --no-claude-md, and km uninstall-mcp removes all three. Other hooks in settings.json are preserved, and the file is backed up first.

Uses secrets without showing them

Asks you first

Every credential has a policy:

Approval is a native dialog or Touch ID, shown to you and not the agent. The agent can't loosen a policy or purge a credential without your approval. Running km through the agent's shell doesn't get around this, because without a real terminal km treats the caller as the agent.

You type secrets, not the agent

add_credential defaults to secret_source="prompt": a secure dialog pops up, you type, and the agent only hears "stored". It can also read the secret from the clipboard (then wipe it), from a file (SSH keys, service-account JSON), or generate one it never sees. generate_secret(store_in=…) rotates a password the same way.

Keeps receipts

Every find, reveal, use, approval and change goes into an HMAC hash-chained audit log. km audit --verify pinpoints any edited or deleted line. km health grades the vault A–F: weak, reused, expired, stale and unused secrets, plus breached passwords via HaveIBeenPwned (with k-anonymity, so only 5 hash characters leave your machine).

Is hard to lose

It keeps version history per credential with rollback, a trash can, 20 rolling encrypted snapshots, a recovery code, and a separately-encrypted km export. It can import from Chrome, Bitwarden and 1Password CSVs or .env files, and it works as a git credential helper: git config --global credential.helper '!km git-credential'.

Security

• Encryption: AES-256-GCM under a random data key, wrapped by Argon2id (64 MiB) from your passphrase, with a second key slot for a 150-bit recovery code.

• Integrity: tampering with the file, splicing an old copy under a new header, or rolling back to an older copy are all detected.

• While unlocked: the key lives in the macOS Keychain / Secret Service, never in a file or on a command line. km lock / km panic drops it, and you can set auto_lock_hours.

• Brute force: wrong passphrases trigger a backoff. Everything is written atomically and file-locked, with 0600 permissions.

Threat model: Keymaster protects secrets at rest and keeps them out of AI transcripts by default. It does not stop malware already running as you while the vault is unlocked, and the agent isn't sandboxed. A determined prompt injection could get run_with_credential to print a secret in a form the scrubber misses. Use sealed / strict for crown jewels. Details: docs/DESIGN.md. To report a vulnerability, see SECURITY.md.

Other MCP clients

km install-mcp does it for Claude Code. For anything else (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, …):

{ "mcpServers": { "keymaster": { "command": "~/.local/bin/keymaster-mcp" } } }

Use the absolute path that which keymaster-mcp prints.

Troubleshooting

The agent looked for creds somewhere else (~/.aws, gh auth, env vars). Run km install-mcp again: it adds the prompt hook and the CLAUDE.md rule if they're missing. Then start a new Claude Code session, since hooks and CLAUDE.md load at startup.

The agent says the vault is locked. Run km unlock, or let it call unlock_vault, which asks you for the passphrase in a dialog. If you set auto_lock_hours, this is expected.

No approval dialog appears. On macOS, check that the dialog isn't hiding behind other windows. Approvals time out after 90s and count as denied. On Linux, install zenity. On a headless box, run km config set approval deny and use open / sealed policies.

Keychain unavailable on Linux. Keymaster needs a Secret Service provider. Install and start GNOME Keyring (gnome-keyring-daemon) or KWallet in your session.

command not found: km. ~/.local/bin isn't on your PATH:

echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc && exec zsh

I forgot my passphrase. Run km unlock and paste the recovery code. Then km passwd sets a new passphrase and km recovery mints a fresh code.

Everything else. Run km doctor.

Uninstall

km uninstall-mcp               # MCP server + prompt hook + CLAUDE.md rule
uv tool uninstall keymaster
rm -rf ~/.keymaster            # ⚠ deletes your vault — `km export` first if you want it

Contributing

Issues and pull requests are welcome; see CONTRIBUTING.md.

License

MIT