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Update share link

update_share_link
Destructive

Set the share link for a single media to control viewer access; if missing, create one with the chosen visibility.

Instructions

Updates the share link for a single media. If the media does not have a share link yet, one is created with the supplied visibility.

Requires api token with one of the following permissions

Read, update & delete anything

Tokens with the "Act with a team member's permissions" permission (all:delegate_to_contact_permissions scope) can also be used. Requests made with such a token are authorized using the permissions of the contact assigned to the token. Requires confirm=true for the requested mutation. May share access, notify people or incur provider charges.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
accountNoNamed private Wistia account; selects credentials, not a remote account ID.
confirmNoMust be true for the specific user-requested write.
payloadNoComplete JSON request body instead of body flags. Supports current nested customization, caption and nullable values.
media_idYesThe hashed ID of the media.
visibilityNoControls who can view the media via this share link. - `unlocked`: anyone with the link can view the media. - `account`: only signed-in members of the media's account can view. - `locked`: only contacts with access to the media's folder can view. - `domain_verified`: only viewers signed in with an email address at a domain verified on the media's account can view. Requires the account to be enrolled in the domain validation gate; otherwise setting this value returns 400.
payload_fileNoRegular local JSON body file, at most 5 MB. Cannot be mixed with body flags or payload.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.0

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations (destructiveHint=true, openWorldHint=true, idempotentHint=false) by stating the exact permission scope required, the delegate-to-contact authorization model, the mandatory confirm=true gate, and the side effects ('May share access, notify people or incur provider charges'). This is exactly the mutation context an agent needs before invoking a destructive write.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core action and upsert semantics in the first two sentences, then appends auth and safety constraints. The permission section is verbose boilerplate but directly relevant to a destructive write, so it earns its space.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent mutation with a nested payload and no output schema, the description covers auth, confirmation, and side effects adequately. It is silent on the response shape or what the resulting share link contains, which is a minor gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the visibility enum is documented in rich detail inside the schema, so the description adds little parameter meaning beyond noting that the supplied visibility is used when creating a missing link. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema carries the load.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Updates the share link for a single media') and adds the crucial upsert behavior: if no share link exists, one is created. This clearly separates it from get_share_link, delete_share_link and resolve_share_link, though it never names those siblings explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The upsert sentence implicitly tells the agent that a separate create call is unnecessary, and the permission block spells out the auth conditions required to call it. It does not, however, name alternative tools or state when not to use this one.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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