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gmail.users.settings.cse.identities.get

Retrieves a Gmail user's client-side encryption identity configuration so admins or users can inspect CSE identity and keypair settings; returns the configuration as JSON.

Instructions

Retrieves a client-side encryption identity configuration. For administrators managing identities and keypairs for users in their organization, requests require authorization with a service account that has domain-wide delegation authority to impersonate users with the https://www.googleapis.com/auth/gmail.settings.basic scope. For users managing their own identities and keypairs, requests require [hardware key encryption](https [HTTP GET]. Returns the requested resource as JSON — request bodies are built from the typed parameters (typed flags win over the params map), or read whole from body_file Siblings over the same resource: create, delete, list, patch.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`query`	No	Extra KEY=VALUE query pairs for endpoints whose parameters Discovery does not describe.
`params`	No	Parameter map merged into the request; typed parameters win.
`userId`	Yes	[URL path segment] The requester's primary email address. To indicate the authenticated user, you can use the special value `me`.	me
`dry_run`	No	Return the request that would be sent, without sending it.
`body_file`	No	Read the request body from this file ('-' for stdin) instead of building one from the parameters.
`cseEmailAddress`	Yes	[URL path segment] The primary email address associated with the client-side encryption identity configuration that's retrieved.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`emailAddress`	No
`primaryKeyPairId`	No
`signAndEncryptKeyPairs`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed4 schema fields changedOct 26, 2026

changedInput schema / properties / cseEmailAddress / description

Previous value: -"The primary email address associated with the client-side encryption identity configuration that's retrieved."New value: +"[URL path segment] The primary email address associated with the client-side encryption identity configuration that's retrieved."

addedInput schema / properties / userId / default
```
Added value: +"me"
```

changedInput schema / properties / userId / description

Previous value: -"The requester's primary email address. To indicate the authenticated user, you can use the special value `me`."New value: +"[URL path segment] The requester's primary email address. To indicate the authenticated user, you can use the special value `me`."

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "properties": {
+    "emailAddress": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "primaryKeyPairId": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "signAndEncryptKeyPairs": {
+      "properties": {
+        "encryptionKeyPairId": {
+          "type": "string"
+        },
+        "signingKeyPairId": {
+          "type": "string"
+        }
+      },
+      "type": "object"
+    }
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

First observedOct 26, 2026

TDQS

B3.3/5.0

Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full load, and it does add real behavioral value: it discloses the two authorization models and the scope required. However, the second paragraph is truncated mid-link ('hardware key encryption (https [HTTP GET]'), so the user-managed path is left incomplete and the sentence splices confusingly into HTTP metadata.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded, which is good, but the body is padded with two verbose auth paragraphs, a mangled link fragment, and a request-body paragraph that does not apply to a read operation. Several sentences do not earn their place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be described, and the auth model is covered. But the truncation leaves one authorization path unusable, and there is no mention of error behavior or scope-denied outcomes for an operation whose main risk is authorization failure.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% (userId, cseEmailAddress, params, body_file, query, dry_run all documented), so the baseline is 3. The description adds nothing parameter-specific — its 'typed flags win over the params map' / 'body_file' text is generic boilerplate, and is especially irrelevant for a GET with no request body.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource: 'Retrieves a client-side encryption identity configuration.' The closing sentence names the sibling operations over the same resource (create, delete, list, patch), so an agent can place this as the single-identity read in that family, though the differentiation is a bare enumeration rather than an explicit contrast.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied — retrieve when you have a specific cseEmailAddress. The two long paragraphs describe authorization prerequisites (service-account delegation with gmail.settings.basic, or hardware key encryption for self-managed users), which is context, but there is no explicit statement of when to pick this over list or patch.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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