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atlas_technique_lookup

Read-onlyIdempotent

Retrieve detailed information on MITRE ATLAS adversarial techniques targeting AI/ML systems, including prompt injection and model theft. Ideal for LLM red-teaming and threat analysis.

Instructions

Look up a MITRE ATLAS technique — the AI/ML adversarial attack catalog. ATLAS catalogues TTPs targeting machine learning systems: prompt injection, model evasion, training data poisoning, model theft, etc. Roughly 80% of ATLAS techniques are AI/ML-specific (no ATT&CK bridge); 20% mirror an enterprise ATT&CK technique via attack_reference_id — use that to pivot to D3FEND defenses (d3fend_defense_for_attack) and CVE search. Sub-techniques inherit tactics from the parent (inherited_tactics=true flag) when ATLAS upstream leaves them empty. Use this tool when the user asks about AI/ML threats, LLM red-teaming, or adversarial ML; for multiple techniques in one call (e.g. drilling into a case study's techniques_used), prefer bulk_atlas_technique_lookup. Returns 404 when the id is not in the synced ATLAS catalog. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {technique_id, name, description, tactics, inherited_tactics, maturity (demonstrated|feasible|realized), attack_reference_id, attack_reference_url, subtechnique_of, created_date, modified_date, next_calls}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
technique_idYesMITRE ATLAS technique id, format 'AML.T####' or 'AML.T####.###' for sub-techniques (e.g. 'AML.T0000', 'AML.T0051' LLM Prompt Injection, 'AML.T0000.000').

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already indicate readOnly, non-destructive, idempotent. Description adds sub-technique inheritance (inherited_tactics), 404 on not found, rate limits (30/hr free, 500/hr Pro), and return structure. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is relatively long but every sentence adds critical information. It front-loads the purpose and progressively adds context. Minor redundancy could be trimmed, but overall efficient.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers all essential aspects: purpose, usage, alternatives, behavioral details, return fields (even though output schema exists), error handling, rate limits, and inherited tactics. No gaps given the tool's complexity.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with one well-described parameter. Description adds examples of technique ID formats and explains sub-technique IDs, providing value beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states it looks up a MITRE ATLAS technique, explains what ATLAS is, and distinguishes it from siblings like atlas_technique_search and bulk_atlas_technique_lookup by specifying use cases.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit usage scenarios: use when user asks about AI/ML threats, LLM red-teaming, or adversarial ML. Recommends bulk_atlas_technique_lookup for multiple techniques. Provides pivot guidance via attack_reference_id to D3FEND and CVE.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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