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remove group member

horizon_remove_group_member
DestructiveIdempotent

Removes a confirmed member from a group using the reviewed group revision, preventing accidental replay or stale-state changes. Use after explicit player confirmation and reconcile errors before retrying.

Instructions

Applies the explicit remove group member action using the reviewed group revision. Use when: the player explicitly confirms this group action. Not for: replacing reviewed revisions/request IDs, bypassing a leader's block, or retrying automatically after uncertainty. Requires: userId and the player's session: sign in with horizon_signin_email or horizon_signin_anonymous and pass its accessToken as sessionToken. Current group revision and the exact pending requestId where applicable. Side effects: Leader removes an officer/member; an officer can remove only a member. No automatic retry. Same-revision replay cannot create a second effect. Returns: {groups:MyGroupsView,group:GroupView|null}. groups is the actor's complete snapshot, never the target's private state. group is null after leave/delete; nonmembers never receive private data. Replace only the matching host/project/player cache. Errors: Use horizon_get_groups and horizon_get_group_pending to reconcile state. 409 REVISION_CONFLICT or uncertain response: read and reconcile intent, never refresh the revision and repeat automatically. Pending decisions require the original requestId; REQUEST_NOT_FOUND means it was removed/replaced. INBOX_FULL rolls back the entire action. 403 rejects group role, session or bilateral block violations. 429 is reported without automatic retry. 401 means the session is missing or expired: sign in again and retry with the new accessToken. 403 for a session means the token belongs to another user: pass the userId that signed in. Needs HORIZON_API_KEY. Every failure returns an error result (isError) with the HTTP status and body: a 401 that horizon_test_connection also returns means HORIZON_API_KEY is wrong, 429 means the account's per-minute rate limit was reached (wait a minute, then retry).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
userIdYesSigned-in player matching the Bearer session
groupIdYesExact group UUID in the current project; never an authorization credential
sessionTokenYesPlayer accessToken, sent only in Authorization
targetUserIdYesOther player in this project
expectedRevisionYesExact reviewed revision; never replace automatically after an uncertain response

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.9.1

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations: states the role hierarchy that governs who can be removed, that no automatic retry is performed, that a same-revision replay cannot create a second effect (concrete idempotency semantics), that INBOX_FULL rolls back the whole action, and that returned groups data is the actor's snapshot only. Auth provenance (signin accessToken as sessionToken) and 401/403/429 semantics are all disclosed without contradicting readOnly=false, destructive=true, idempotent=true.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Well structured with labeled clauses (Use when / Not for / Requires / Side effects / Returns / Errors) and front-loaded routing information, but roughly 350 words for a five-parameter call. The error block repeats generic account-level guidance (HORIZON_API_KEY wrongness, per-minute rate limiting) that applies to every tool in the family rather than to this one.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, revision-guarded mutation with no output schema, the description covers auth, authorization, rollback, idempotency, return shape and the 409/401/403/429 error paths, which is close to complete. The dangling requestId reference is the one inconsistency an agent could trip over.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning: sessionToken comes from horizon_signin_email/anonymous's accessToken, and expectedRevision is the 'reviewed' revision that must never be refreshed and replayed after an uncertain response. One gap: it refers to 'the exact pending requestId where applicable' although no requestId parameter exists in the schema, which could confuse the agent.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The verb+resource ('remove group member') is unambiguous, and the side-effects line distinguishes the two authority cases (leader removes officer/member; officer removes only member), which separates it from horizon_leave_group (self-leave) and horizon_set_group_member_role. The opening sentence, however, largely restates the tool name ('Applies the explicit remove group member action'), so the differentiation arrives later than it should.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit 'Use when' (player explicitly confirms this group action) and 'Not for' clauses (replacing reviewed revisions/request IDs, bypassing a leader's block, automatic retry) set hard boundaries. It also names the reconciliation alternatives, horizon_get_groups and horizon_get_group_pending, for the conflict path, leaving nothing to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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