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Free hosted CVE intel for bug-bounty agents: CVE fact-check, attack approaches from paid H1 reports

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Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
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vuln-intel
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TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Scored across 13 tools

Disambiguation4/5

The 13 tools map to mostly distinct workflow stages (recon, CVE lookup, prior-art retrieval, planning, verification, submission), and descriptions explicitly cross-reference one another. However, several tools retrieve CVE data (search_vulns, check_technology, enrich_cve, hunt_plan) and could still be confused by an agent skimming, though the routing guidance mitigates this.

Naming Consistency4/5

All names use snake_case and most are verb-led (check_technology, find_attack_approaches, verify_cve_claim), giving a predictable pattern. A few deviate into noun phrases (corpus_stats, program_outcome_prior, new_in_scope) or a bare verb (observe), so it is not fully uniform.

Tool Count5/5

13 tools is well within the appropriate range for a vulnerability-intelligence and bug-bounty workflow, and each covers a recognizable stage or retrieval layer. No tool appears merely duplicative at the count level.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers recon, CVE lookup/enrichment/verification, prior-art retrieval, planning, code search, and submission assistance — a fairly complete lifecycle. Minor gaps remain: search_public_code tells the agent to fetch and read hits but no fetch/read tool is provided, and there is no direct report-body or program-listing tool.

Available Tools

13 tools
assist_submissionStrengthen a bug-bounty submissionA
Read-only
Inspect

Submission & escalation co-pilot for a bug-bounty finding. Paste your DRAFT finding (and what you already tried / couldn't achieve) and get a grounded brief built from the closest REAL disclosed reports: (1) precedent & validity — is this an accepted class, with citable reports (ammunition if it was disputed/closed); (2) what's novel/stronger about yours — what to lead with; (3) an escalation playbook INCLUDING moves you may NOT have tried, each with honest feasibility; (4) submission-framing tips.

Every cited report URL is validated against the retrieved corpus — ungrounded citations are flagged in 'citations.ungrounded' with 'citations_grounded=false', so the brief can't smuggle in a fabricated precedent (this guards the citations only — never read it as a verdict on whether your finding itself is real). Optional 'query' overrides the retrieval text (default: the finding itself); limit (default 15) caps the prior-art reports. Complements find_attack_approaches (which returns the raw prior-art cards).

Inputs: finding (required), limit, query.

check_technologyCVEs for a product and versionA
Read-only
Inspect

Find vulnerabilities affecting a product across NVD (CPE) and OSV (package ecosystems), de-duplicated and ranked by priority/EPSS/CVSS.

Distinct products that share a name are kept distinct. If one name maps to several VENDORS' unrelated products (e.g. "Sentry" → sentry, mobileiron, apache; "Envoy" → envoyproxy, enphase), the result is flagged ambiguous with distinct_vendors — pass vendor= to disambiguate. Always check each result's match.products (vendor:product) before trusting a hit.

Distro builds: pass a banner or distro package version as-is ("OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u3", version="1:9.2p1-2+deb12u3", "nginx/1.22.1 (Debian)", "openssh (Alpine 3.20)" + "9.7_p1-r4", "OpenSSH_8.9p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.10", "nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)"). Each result then also gets distro_fix: Debian's / Ubuntu's / Alpine's own fixed build and, when your build is known, whether it is past it (distros backport fixes without changing the upstream version, so the upstream affected can say vulnerable on a patched host). Ubuntu banners don't name the release: distro_context.release_basis says how it was placed. Statuses: fixed / affected / unfixed / not_listed (the distro's record for the CVE lists other packages, not yours); CVEs the distro settled for your build rank after the rest.

Read with each verdict: affected.sources_disagree (records disagree on whether your version is in range), affected.ranges_belong_to (the ranges are a separate component's own versions, e.g. a provider package: unconfirmed for yours), and a top-level truncated when a big product matches more records than are considered (exploited ones are always kept).

Args: product: product or package name, e.g. "nginx", "Keycloak", "mlflow", "lodash", or a server banner. version: optional exact version (e.g. "1.18.0", or a distro package build) — filters to vulns whose affected range (CPE or package) includes it. ecosystem: optional package ecosystem filter, e.g. "PyPI", "npm", "Maven", "Go". vendor: optional CPE vendor filter to disambiguate a shared product name, e.g. vendor="sentry" (not mobileiron), vendor="envoyproxy". limit: max results (default 20).

Inputs: product (required), limit, vendor, version, +1 more.

corpus_statsCorpus size and freshnessA
Read-only
Inspect

Corpus size and data freshness (CVE / KEV / EPSS counts and latest timestamps).

Inputs: no named parameters.

enrich_cveEnrich a CVEA
Read-only
Inspect

Full intelligence for a single CVE: CVSS, KEV status, EPSS, CISA SSVC (exploitation/automatable/technical_impact), P1-P4 priority with rationale, affected products/versions, Debian/Ubuntu/Alpine fixed builds per release (distro_fixes), and (live) public-exploit signal.

For a LIST (a scan's findings, a vulnerability review): pass cve_ids (up to 50) instead and get one compact card per CVE with the exploitation evidence only: KEV (+ date added, ransomware use), SSVC, EPSS, Metasploit modules, the danger signal when KEV is silent, CVSS vector. Whether each applies to a given host is a separate verify_cve_claim with that host's product/build.

Args: cve_id: e.g. "CVE-2025-12345". include_poc: also query GitHub for public PoC/exploit repos (live; single CVE only). cve_ids: a list of CVE ids for compact list mode (max 50).

Inputs: cve_id, cve_ids, include_poc.

find_attack_approachesFind attack approaches from disclosed bounty reportsA
Read-only
Inspect

Find how bugs like this were actually FOUND — retrieve real disclosed bug-bounty report mechanic-cards whose approach is closest (by mechanism) to your query or a seed CVE.

The "what approach worked on a bug like this, on which program, and what did it pay" layer: grounded in real publicly-disclosed, paid HackerOne reports, each distilled to a transferable mechanic (bug_class / source / sink / trigger / impact) and embedded in the same space as the corpus. Use it to BORROW a proven attack approach for a target or CVE you're working — especially to get UNSTUCK: results are novelty-ranked to surface non-obvious moves over the common playbook.

Give EITHER: query: a free-text approach/bug description, e.g. "SSRF via webhook URL to cloud metadata", "IDOR swapping an object id to read another tenant's data". cve_id: a seed CVE you're working — returns the human attack approaches that transfer to it. Optional: limit (default 10) caps the cards; bug_class filter (e.g. "SSRF") sharpens precision; days filters by disclosure recency; tried=["IDOR","XSS","SSRF"] = bug-classes you've ALREADY attempted: cards of those classes (and their common aliases, IDOR = object-level auth) are left out and near-synonyms pushed down, so you get the nearest approaches you HAVEN'T thought of (the "I've exhausted the obvious, what else?" move). capec="CAPEC-664" = constrain to a canonical attack-pattern class (CAPEC). Pass it ALONE (no query/cve) to pull the real disclosed mechanics for that pattern, ranked by bounty — the coverage-driven "give me proven moves for this attack class" retrieval. Each result carries its canonical 'capec' class(es), the transferable 'trigger', the program, the bounty paid, and whether that program is still active/in-scope. Complements search_vulns (CVEs by mechanism).

Inputs: days, capec, limit, query, +3 more.

find_continuationsNext moves from a hunt positionA
Read-only
Inspect

When you're STUCK mid-hunt: describe your POSITION — the attacker state/capabilities you hold, stripped of product names — and get the CONTINUATIONS that worked from positions like it, matched against the full disclosed-report BODIES (the concrete step/payload/precondition), not just the distilled card. This is the "I have a messy pile of capabilities, what are my legal moves?" layer.

position: a product-free statement of what you can already do, e.g. "a backend fetches a user-supplied URL during import/webhook and I can't read the response (blind)", or "I hold a low-priv token and can store config that is later rendered to an admin". The richer/sharper the position, the better — vague positions retrieve generic moves. Optional program: restrict to one program's reports (substring match on handle); limit (default 10) caps the moves.

Returns concrete 'move_step' techniques from real reports — including non-obvious cross-class moves the by-card layer can't surface (e.g. credential-leak-on-redirect, request-smuggling desync). HARD CONTRACT: every result is status=UNVERIFIED — a LEGAL MOVE, never a confirmed bug. Each carries a 'decisive_check' you must verify against the target (read its code / fire a test) before claiming anything; the corpus generates the move, the TARGET decides if it survives. Complements find_attack_approaches (by-card mechanism) — this is the by-step, full-body layer.

Inputs: position (required), limit, program.

hunt_planRank a recon'd stack into a dig orderA
Read-only
Inspect

Turn a recon'd stack into a ranked dig-order for a pentest or bug-bounty hunt.

For each discovered component, returns its top high-risk CVEs (KEV / CISA-SSVC- active / high-EPSS first) AND its recurring_loci — the bug classes (CWE) this product family repeatedly fails at, ranked by real in-the-wild exploitation — i.e. WHERE to look first and WHAT shape to expect. Components are ordered by their most-exploitable bug (dig_rank). Grounded in exploitation data, not model guesses; lays out facts for triage/where-to-look, never a payload.

Banners go in verbatim ("OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u3", "Apache/2.4.62 (Debian)"): a Debian/Ubuntu/Alpine build adds distro_fix, and CVEs the distro already fixed in that build rank below the rest.

Args: technologies: discovered stack, e.g. ["craftcms 4.4", "nginx", "keycloak"]. per_tech: how many top CVEs to surface per component (default 4).

Inputs: technologies (required), per_tech.

new_in_scopeWhat newly entered bug-bounty scopeA
Read-only
Inspect

Find FRESH attack surface: bounty-eligible assets that entered a public bug-bounty program's scope in the last days (HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack, mirrored daily), the least-hunted surface there is.

Raw scope additions are mostly not new (in one week 57 of 80 were re-added after a removal), so each asset is checked against its program's own scope history: you get new_asset (never in this program's scope before) and new_program (the whole program first appeared in the window: a launch or a first public listing) assets; re-added, renamed and redacted ones are only counted in filtered_out. Additions only: removals are not listed. Per asset: in_scope_since, max severity, the host and its cached stack if observe has fingerprinted it (else a stack_note saying to call observe), and for a single GitHub repo its repo_advisories (advisories found under the repo name: a name match, check match.products; recent ones are variant-hunting seeds). Per program: platform, max bounty, safe harbor, and its HackerOne disclosed-report history (top classes, last disclosure; null on other platforms, where we hold none).

Facts, not a ranking: you decide what is worth hunting. Hunt only programs you are enrolled in and follow each program's rules. Then: observe(host) for the stack, program_outcome_prior(program) for what lands there.

Args: days: look-back window, 1-90 (default 7). platform: hackerone | bugcrowd | intigriti | yeswehack. asset_type: url | wildcard | api | source (code repositories) | mobile | other ... program: program handle or name, substring match (e.g. "openai", "cloudflare"). limit: max assets returned (default 50); count says how many qualified.

Inputs: days, limit, program, platform, +1 more.

observeScan a host's exposed stackA
Read-only
Inspect

Scan a host's exposed stack and join it to the CVE corpus — the recon workhorse. Fingerprints the homepage + JS bundles (recovering the backend identity and API endpoints homepage detection misses on SPAs), then ranks against live KEV / SSVC-active / high-EPSS into a dig-order. Fetches only public pages.

NON-BLOCKING: a scan takes ~1-4 min, so observe() never waits on it. A recent scan (<24h) returns status="ready" instantly. A cache miss KICKS a background scan and returns status="scanning" immediately — POLL by calling observe() again with the same host until it returns status="ready". Returns:

  • status="ready": host stack + endpoints + dig_order + top_across_stack (the scan result), plus bounty_programs: public programs whose current scope lists this host.

  • status="scanning": retry_after_seconds + last_scanned_at (call again after that delay).

  • status="error": a guard/validation error.

Args: host: hostname or URL, e.g. "auth.example.com". fresh: force a re-scan (kicks a new background scan even if a recent one exists). per_tech: top CVEs to surface per component (default 4).

Inputs: host (required), fresh, per_tech.

program_outcome_priorWhat lands on a bounty programA
Read-only
Inspect

At the START of an engagement on a bug-bounty PROGRAM, get a grounded prior over what bug classes have historically LANDED there — to decide what to look at first and what to skip.

Built from real HackerOne disclosed reports: the class distribution for this program, each with LIFT over the global base-rate, sample size, and cited example reports; plus lands_rarely — the classes that land broadly across programs but almost never here (where NOT to spend the first hour).

DESCRIPTIVE, not predictive: it reports what landed, never claims what you will find. It's a disclosure-selected sample, HackerOne-only (~379 programs with public disclosures), models bug-class not payout, and withholds a prior when the program has too few reports (an anecdote isn't a distribution). Pass a program handle or name, e.g. "gitlab", "shopify". Complements find_attack_approaches (mechanism transfer) and hunt_plan (CVE dig-order) — this is the minute-zero "where to start" prior an agent has no tacit target knowledge to form on its own.

Inputs: program (required).

search_public_codeFind public copies of a code stringA
Read-only
Inspect

Search public repositories for an exact code string; return WHERE it appears.

Use it to hunt vendored / copy-pasted copies of known-vulnerable code: search a distinctive symbol or short fragment from the vulnerable function (a function name, a constant, one call), then FETCH AND READ the hits to judge which copies are still unpatched, reachable, or just fossils/forks. Returns RAW search results only -- it makes no vulnerability judgment; that reasoning is yours. A long line rarely matches exactly and is slow; the shortest distinctive token works best. Searches are capped at about 10 s: partial: true means the cap was hit with fewer than limit hits.

Args: code: an exact code string, e.g. "VP8LBuildHuffmanTable" or "yaml.load(". lang: optional language filter, e.g. "c", "python", "javascript" (default: all languages). limit: max hits to return (default 50).

Inputs: code (required), lang, limit.

search_vulnsSearch CVEs by concept, keyword or seed CVEA
Read-only
Inspect

Search the CVE corpus — one entry point, three retrieval modes picked from your arguments:

  • query= a concept / technique / weakness (e.g. "SSO SAML assertion replay", "deserialization gadget chain", "server-side request forgery cloud metadata"). By default it FUSES full-text keyword search AND semantic mechanism-search, so you don't have to guess whether your phrasing is lexical or conceptual. order='relevance' = keyword only; order='similarity' = semantic only; order='severity' = fuse then rank P1>P4.

  • cve_id= a seed CVE (e.g. "CVE-2021-44228") -> its mechanism-siblings across OTHER products (the "what else looks like this?" move).

  • days= and/or product= (with NO query) -> the recent high-risk window (KEV / P1-P2 / high-EPSS); product= is CPE-name-resolved and each hit carries match.products. "Recent" = published in the window OR added to CISA KEV in it (an old CVE newly confirmed exploited counts); each hit says which (in_window / kev_added).

A recency phrase inside query ("this week", "in the last 30 days", "today") is read as days=; interpreted_as says how the query was read.

Returns ranked cards (each with priority/KEV/EPSS/CWE) + total_matches for coverage; the 'mode' field reports which retrieval ran. You decide which matches matter. (For one product's version-resolved vulns use check_technology, for a whole stack hunt_plan; for how bugs like this were FOUND in disclosed reports use find_attack_approaches.)

Args: query: free-text concept / keyword / CWE. cve_id: seed CVE for semantic mechanism-sibling search. cwe: optional weakness filter, e.g. "CWE-502" or "502". days: window in days: published OR added to CISA KEV within it. product: product filter for the recent-window mode (CPE-name-resolved, carries provenance). order: relevance | similarity | severity (default: fused when query is text). limit: max results (default 20).

Inputs: cwe, days, limit, order, +3 more.

verify_cve_claimFact-check a CVE claimA
Read-only
Inspect

Fact-check a claim about a CVE against the corpus — catch hallucinations before they ship. Verifies: does the CVE exist; does it affect the claimed product at the claimed version; is the severity right; is it actually KEV-exploited. Returns per-assertion verdicts (supported / refuted / unverifiable) with cited evidence.

Use it to check what another agent (or a draft report) asserted, e.g. "Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) is critical, actively exploited, and affects Spring 5.3.18" → verify_cve_claim("CVE-2022-22965", product="spring framework", version="5.3.18", severity="critical", exploited=True) (the version claim is refuted: fixed in 5.3.18). A distro build as product/version ("OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u3", or version "1:9.2p1-2+deb12u3") adds a second assertion with the distro's own verdict for that build. A CNA-rejected id comes back exists=true with rejected=true: treat any claim citing it as unsupported.

Args: cve_id: the CVE/GHSA/PYSEC id being claimed about. product / version: optional — checks the affected-version claim in range. severity: optional — a CVSS number ("9.8") or label ("critical"/"high"/…). exploited: optional bool — the "actively exploited / in KEV" claim. claim: optional free text — returns evidence (summary, CWE) for you to judge.

Inputs: cve_id (required), claim, product, version, +2 more.

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