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CVEs for a product and version

check_technology
Read-only

Find vulnerabilities affecting a product across NVD (CPE) and OSV (package ecosystems), de-duplicated and ranked by priority/EPSS/CVSS.

Distinct products that share a name are kept distinct. If one name maps to several VENDORS' unrelated products (e.g. "Sentry" → sentry, mobileiron, apache; "Envoy" → envoyproxy, enphase), the result is flagged ambiguous with distinct_vendors — pass vendor= to disambiguate. Always check each result's match.products (vendor:product) before trusting a hit.

Distro builds: pass a banner or distro package version as-is ("OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u3", version="1:9.2p1-2+deb12u3", "nginx/1.22.1 (Debian)", "openssh (Alpine 3.20)" + "9.7_p1-r4", "OpenSSH_8.9p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.10", "nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)"). Each result then also gets distro_fix: Debian's / Ubuntu's / Alpine's own fixed build and, when your build is known, whether it is past it (distros backport fixes without changing the upstream version, so the upstream affected can say vulnerable on a patched host). Ubuntu banners don't name the release: distro_context.release_basis says how it was placed. Statuses: fixed / affected / unfixed / not_listed (the distro's record for the CVE lists other packages, not yours); CVEs the distro settled for your build rank after the rest.

Read with each verdict: affected.sources_disagree (records disagree on whether your version is in range), affected.ranges_belong_to (the ranges are a separate component's own versions, e.g. a provider package: unconfirmed for yours), and a top-level truncated when a big product matches more records than are considered (exploited ones are always kept).

Args: product: product or package name, e.g. "nginx", "Keycloak", "mlflow", "lodash", or a server banner. version: optional exact version (e.g. "1.18.0", or a distro package build) — filters to vulns whose affected range (CPE or package) includes it. ecosystem: optional package ecosystem filter, e.g. "PyPI", "npm", "Maven", "Go". vendor: optional CPE vendor filter to disambiguate a shared product name, e.g. vendor="sentry" (not mobileiron), vendor="envoyproxy". limit: max results (default 20).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "product": "<product>"
    },
    "name": "check_technology"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNo
vendorNo
productYes
versionNo
ecosystemNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Read-only status aside, the description discloses a lot that annotations do not: dedup across two sources, priority/EPSS/CVSS ranking, ambiguity flagging with distinct_vendors, distro backport handling and its four statuses, sources_disagree, ranges_belong_to, and top-level truncated. These are exactly the output-side quirks that would otherwise mislead an agent reading raw results. Minor tension: it queries external NVD/OSV services while openWorldHint is false, but that is a debatable annotation choice rather than a clear contradiction of the described behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Long but front-loaded: what it does, then disambiguation, then distro specifics, then read-with-verdict caveats, then args. Dense and useful rather than padded. It loses a point because the Args block duplicates structured parameter names and the distro paragraph is a wall of examples that could be trimmed.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 5-parameter, no-output-schema, multi-source lookup tool, this covers the behaviors an agent needs: ambiguity, distro backports, truncated results, and which result fields to distrust. Nothing material about correct invocation or interpreting a verdict is left unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the full burden and does so: every one of the five parameters is documented with accepted forms and examples (banner strings, distro versions, ecosystem names, vendor values). The version parameter's filtering semantics — matched against CPE or package affected ranges — is stated explicitly, which the schema cannot convey.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb and resource: "Find vulnerabilities affecting a product across NVD (CPE) and OSV (package ecosystems), de-duplicated and ranked." That is far more precise than the title alone. It stops short of naming a sibling alternative (e.g., search_vulns or verify_cve_claim), so an agent still has to infer which of the 12 siblings to prefer.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete conditions for the tricky cases: pass vendor= when a name maps to unrelated vendor products, pass a distro banner as-is, and check match.products before trusting a hit. However there is no explicit when-not-to-use or which sibling covers the adjacent need (raw CVE lookup, claim verification).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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