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Fact-check a CVE claim

verify_cve_claim
Read-only

Fact-check a claim about a CVE against the corpus — catch hallucinations before they ship. Verifies: does the CVE exist; does it affect the claimed product at the claimed version; is the severity right; is it actually KEV-exploited. Returns per-assertion verdicts (supported / refuted / unverifiable) with cited evidence.

Use it to check what another agent (or a draft report) asserted, e.g. "Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) is critical, actively exploited, and affects Spring 5.3.18" → verify_cve_claim("CVE-2022-22965", product="spring framework", version="5.3.18", severity="critical", exploited=True) (the version claim is refuted: fixed in 5.3.18). A distro build as product/version ("OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u3", or version "1:9.2p1-2+deb12u3") adds a second assertion with the distro's own verdict for that build. A CNA-rejected id comes back exists=true with rejected=true: treat any claim citing it as unsupported.

Args: cve_id: the CVE/GHSA/PYSEC id being claimed about. product / version: optional — checks the affected-version claim in range. severity: optional — a CVSS number ("9.8") or label ("critical"/"high"/…). exploited: optional bool — the "actively exploited / in KEV" claim. claim: optional free text — returns evidence (summary, CWE) for you to judge.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "cve_id": "<cve_id>"
    },
    "name": "verify_cve_claim"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
claimNo
cve_idYes
productNo
versionNo
severityNo
exploitedNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=false, and the description adds meaningful behavior on top: per-assertion verdict vocabulary (supported/refuted/unverifiable), the special rejected=true case for CNA-rejected ids, and the extra distro-build assertion. It could go slightly further on how ambiguous or unverifiable claims are handled, but the disclosure is well above the annotation baseline.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose and the verification list before the example, and the args block is scannable. The inline example and distro-build aside are long, but they carry real disambiguation value rather than filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must describe return values, and it does: per-assertion verdicts with cited evidence, the rejected flag, and the extra distro assertion. Combined with full parameter coverage, an agent has enough to call this correctly and interpret the result.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 0% schema description coverage, the description carries the full burden and does so: each optional argument is explained (product/version check range, severity accepts a CVSS number or label, exploited is the KEV claim, claim returns summary/CWE evidence), and cve_id is documented as accepting CVE/GHSA/PYSEC ids. This adds semantics the schema wholly lacks.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Fact-check a claim about a CVE against the corpus') and then enumerates exactly the four assertion classes it verifies (existence, affected product/version, severity, KEV status). This clearly separates it from siblings like search_vulns or enrich_cve, which retrieve rather than adjudicate.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly names the usage context ('to check what another agent (or a draft report) asserted') and supplies a concrete worked example with arguments and expected outcome. It does not explicitly route the agent away from alternatives such as enrich_cve when the goal is enrichment rather than verification, so it stops short of full when/when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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