cve-intelligence
Server Details
CVE intelligence: exploitation (KEV/EPSS), detection coverage, fixed versions. All tools keyless.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 7 tools
Most tools target clearly distinct things (single-CVE record, EPSS trend, aggregate scoreboard, sensor sightings, change stream, package lookup, catalog search). However, search_cves overlaps with several others via its filters (sighted vs get_sightings, epss_gte vs get_epss_movers, pkg/eco vs query_package), which could cause misselection. Descriptions do help disambiguate in each case.
Five of seven tools use a clean get_ prefix (get_cve, get_epss_movers, get_scoreboard, get_sightings, get_updates), while query_package and search_cves deviate with different verbs. The pattern is still readable and predictable overall, just not perfectly uniform.
Seven tools is well-scoped for a read-only CVE intelligence surface, with each tool earning its place by covering a distinct query dimension. No redundancy or filler.
Covers the key access patterns: single-CVE depth, catalog search, package-scoped lookup, EPSS trends, field sightings, change stream, and an aggregate scoreboard. Minor gaps like no bulk/multi-CVE detail fetch or cross-CVE comparison, but these are workable around via search_cves plus get_cve.
Available Tools
7 toolsget_cveARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Full intelligence record for one CVE: per-scorer CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV/ransomware/SSVC, four remote-detection modalities (the checks that work over the network) plus a host-check tier (self-contained Nuclei templates and Metasploit local modules that run on the system itself) and the Sigma log-detection layer, both kept out of scannable coverage, per-product fixed versions (fixed = first patched build; affected_through = the last vulnerable build, so upgrade past it), news/community coverage, intelligence summary. No key required over MCP; an API key on the HTTP request (Authorization: Bearer cvs_live_…) is honored for attribution. Absence semantics: a null field means this dataset holds no such record. The source may still hold one.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | CVE id, such as CVE-2024-3400 |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already declare readOnlyHint and idempotentHint true, and the description adds useful behavioral context by noting that no key is required over MCP and that an API key is only honored for attribution. No side effects are described, and none are implied.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is overloaded with redundant parenthetical expansions and repeated clauses, such as the long explanations of remote-detection modalities and version semantics. It is front-loaded with the main purpose but is far from concise.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description compensates by enumerating the response contents, auth behavior, and null-field semantics. It provides enough context for an agent to understand what will be returned and how to interpret missing data.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The single required parameter 'id' is fully covered by the schema with a clear type and example. The description does not add additional meaning beyond what the schema already provides, so it meets the baseline but does not exceed it.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool returns a 'full intelligence record for one CVE' and enumerates the major data categories. It is obvious this is a read/retrieve operation for a specific CVE identifier.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use it: when a comprehensive record for a single CVE is needed. However, it does not explicitly contrast with sibling tools such as search_cves or get_updates, so usage guidance is mostly implicit rather than explicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_epss_moversARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
CVEs whose EPSS exploitation probability rose the most recently. window is "7d" (default) or "30d". Each rise is measured between same-EPSS-model-version scores, so a model release (which shifts the whole distribution) never appears as a mover. A rise raises the priority of a CVE; observed exploitation is recorded through CISA KEV. Returns cve_id, current score, the delta, KEV status and url, largest rise first.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | 1..100 (default 25) | |
| window | No | Rise window (default 7d) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint and idempotentHint annotations, the description discloses important behavioral nuances: rises are compared within the same EPSS model version so model releases never create false movers, and KEV status is included as observed-exploitation context. It also states the ordering (largest rise first), which is not derivable from annotations or the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded: the core purpose appears in the first clause, followed by parameter default, a key methodological caveat, output fields, and ordering. Every sentence contributes useful information; there is no filler or repetition of the tool name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only tool with only two optional parameters and no output schema, the description is fully self-sufficient. It tells the agent what is returned, the ordering, the available windows and defaults, and why the mover signal is reliable, leaving no critical gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already fully describes both parameters, including the enum for window, the range for limit, and defaults. The description adds contextual meaning for window by explaining that it is the rise window, but it does not materially expand on limit or introduce semantics beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states what the tool does: it returns CVEs whose EPSS exploitation probability rose most recently. It also lists the exact output fields (cve_id, current score, delta, KEV status and url), which is specific and unambiguous. However, it does not explicitly contrast itself with sibling tools like search_cves or get_updates, so the differentiation is implicit rather than stated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use the tool: when you want recent EPSS movers, and it explains the window choices (7d or 30d) and default. It does not explicitly state when not to use it or point to alternatives, leaving some routing inference to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_scoreboardARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
The Defender Scoreboard report (CC BY 4.0): exploited vs detectable vs patchable, every figure with its method, caveat and denominator, plus the corpus block and any method-change notes. Cite as "CVE Security Defender Scoreboard, cve-security.com/scoreboard".
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already communicate read-only and idempotent behavior. The description adds value by disclosing the CC BY 4.0 license and the citation requirement, which is a genuine behavioral constraint beyond annotations. No contradiction exists with readOnlyHint=true.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
At roughly 30 words, the description is compact and every phrase carries information: license, report contents, and citation. It is front-loaded with the resource name. It is slightly dense as a single long sentence, but nothing is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a parameterless, read-only report getter, the description covers what the report contains and how to cite it, which compensates for the missing output schema. It does not specify the response format, but that is not essential for this tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, so parameter documentation is unnecessary; the baseline of 4 applies. The description appropriately focuses on report content rather than inputs.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the resource (Defender Scoreboard report) and details its contents: exploited vs detectable vs patchable, method/caveat/denominator, corpus block, and method-change notes. This distinguishes it from siblings like get_cve or search_cves. However, it lacks an explicit verb like 'returns' or 'fetches' and does not directly contrast with sibling tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The content description makes the use case clear: an agent should call this when the user needs scoreboard statistics with methodology, caveats, and denominators. It does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it falls short of full routing guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_sightingsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Field sightings: CVEs a named sensor network recorded in the last 7 or 30 days, most sighting days first. A field sighting is a day on which Shadowserver honeypots (cited by VulnCheck KEV and published as daily lists by CIRCL Vulnerability-Lookup) or VulnCheck canary sensors recorded traffic aimed at the CVE. Each row carries first and last sighting day, days sighted in the last 7 and 30, the sensors, and per-sensor detail including a 30-day presence strip. Presence per day, without volume; a sighting stays apart from the exploitation claims and from CISA KEV. Filters: window (7|30, default 7), kev (0|1), limit (1..500).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kev | No | Restrict to CVEs outside (0) or inside (1) CISA KEV | |
| limit | No | 1..500 (default 100) | |
| window | No | Sighting window in days (default 7) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already cover read-only and idempotent hints. The description adds behavioral context: presence per day without volume, sensor source details, and that it is distinct from CISA KEV – valuable beyond the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Information-dense and well organized: a one-sentence summary, then a definition, then output details, then filters. Front-loaded with the key concept. No fluff or repetition of annotation hints.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Comprehensive for a read-only list tool with no output schema: it explains what each row contains, the sensor sources, and the exact filter enumeration. An agent has everything needed to call it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% and describes all three parameters with defaults and enums. The description mentions the filters again but adds no new meaning beyond what the schema already provides, so baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Clearly states it returns CVEs recorded by a named sensor network, defines 'field sighting' precisely, and distinguishes it from exploitation claims and CISA KEV. The verb is implicit but the resource and scope are unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides clear context about what the tool returns and its filters, and explicitly separates it from exploitation/KEV data. However, it does not name alternative sibling tools or state when to use this vs. others, leaving some inference to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_updatesARead-onlyInspect
The publication change stream: what this site published, stamped with OUR publish time (first_published, kev_added, detection_added, remediation_added). Pass since (YYYY-MM-DD, strictly-after) on the first call, then the returned next_cursor to continue. Optional cve scopes the stream to one CVE's change history. Events for withdrawn CVE ids are omitted.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve | No | Scope to one CVE's change history, such as CVE-2024-3400 | |
| type | No | ||
| limit | No | ||
| since | No | ||
| cursor | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation, the description adds meaningful behavioral details: events are stamped with the site's publish time, withdrawn CVE IDs are omitted, and pagination uses a returned next_cursor. These details help the agent understand stream behavior without contradicting annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences cover the core concept, pagination flow, and scoping option with no wasted words. The most important usage instructions are front-loaded, making the description easy to parse.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is adequate for starting to use the tool: it covers purpose, pagination, and scoping. However, with no output schema, it does not describe the event shape or response fields beyond next_cursor, and it leaves 'limit' and 'first_sighted' unexplained, so an agent may still have to infer important details.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is low (20%), but the description compensates for 'since', 'cursor', and 'cve' by explaining their roles and format. However, it does not explain 'limit', and the list of event types omits 'first_sighted' even though it appears in the enum, leaving the parameter semantics incomplete.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies a publication change stream and states what the site published, which is distinct from sibling tools like get_cve or get_sightings. It is specific about the stream's nature but does not explicitly differentiate itself from siblings by name.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit usage guidance: pass 'since' on the first call, then use the returned 'next_cursor' to continue. It also explains the optional 'cve' scoping. However, it does not mention when to prefer this tool over alternatives or when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
query_packageARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
CVEs affecting one open-source package, by purl (pkg:npm/lodash) or ecosystem + name (Maven names are group:artifact). Returns the CVE list KEV-first with each OSV version range VERBATIM: events plus one render-safe projection: fixed (the upgrade targets) or affected_through (the last VULNERABLE version, so upgrade past it). This tool does not evaluate version membership; compare versions on your side with your ecosystem’s own semantics. Covers CVE-linked, GitHub-reviewed OSS advisories via OSV.dev; absence is not evidence of safety.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | No | Package name, verbatim (for example @babel/core or org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core) | |
| purl | No | Package URL, such as pkg:npm/lodash or pkg:maven/org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core | |
| ecosystem | No | OSV ecosystem (npm, PyPI, Maven, Go, crates.io, Packagist, RubyGems, NuGet, …) or purl type (pypi, cargo, composer, gem, golang, …) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Even though annotations already indicate read-only and idempotent behavior, the description adds substantial behavioral context: KEV-first ordering, verbatim OSV range output, the events/fixed/affected_through projection, the explicit refusal to evaluate version membership, and the coverage caveat that absence is not evidence of safety. This goes well beyond what annotations provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: purpose, input modes, output format, version-range semantics, and an important coverage caveat. The main action is front-loaded and there is no filler or repetition of the schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description correctly takes on the burden of explaining return values. It covers what is returned (CVE list, KEV-first), how version ranges are represented (fixed vs affected_through), and what the tool does not do. For a read-only package advisory lookup, nothing critical is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful semantics beyond the schema by clarifying purl vs ecosystem+name usage, flagging Maven group:artifact format, and giving concrete examples like pkg:npm/lodash, which helps an agent construct correct parameter combinations.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'CVEs affecting one open-source package' and immediately distinguishes the query modes (purl vs ecosystem + name). It clearly separates this from siblings like search_cves and get_cve by emphasizing a single package's advisory list.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context for when to use the tool: when you need CVEs for one package, identified by purl or ecosystem + name. It does not explicitly name alternatives or exclusions, but the package-scoped scenario is unmistakable and no misleading guidance is present.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
search_cvesARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Search the catalog. Free text (q) and/or structured filters: vendor (slug), cwe (CWE-nnn), technique (ATT&CK id, such as T1190), year ("2024,2025"), sev ("critical,high"), kev (0|1), kev_from / kev_to (ISO days, half-open CISA listing window; imply kev=1), kev_vendor (the CISA vendorProject string verbatim, such as "Microsoft"), ransomware (0|1), detect (0|1, a detection signal we track), fix (0|1; fix=0 means the fix status was computed and this dataset holds no actionable vendor fix), automatable (0|1, CISA SSVC Automatable; 1=yes, 0=CISA assessed no, unassessed CVEs match neither), sighted (7|30: a named sensor network recorded the CVE in the last 7 or 30 days, a field sighting; presence per day, apart from the exploitation claims), malware (0|1: a published source ties a named malware family, tool, campaign or ransomware group to the CVE), watch (0|1: on KEV Watch at tier 1 or 2, reported exploited by trackers other than CISA and outside CISA KEV), epss_gte (0..1), eco (OSS ecosystem, such as npm or PyPI), pkg (pkg_key, such as npm/lodash; for ranges use query_package), page, limit (1..50). Filter-only queries return the /browse slice ordered KEV-first then EPSS.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | No | ||
| cwe | No | ||
| eco | No | ||
| fix | No | ||
| kev | No | ||
| pkg | No | ||
| sev | No | ||
| page | No | ||
| year | No | ||
| limit | No | ||
| watch | No | On KEV Watch at tier 1 or 2: reported as exploited by trackers other than CISA, outside CISA KEV | |
| detect | No | ||
| kev_to | No | ISO day, exclusive upper bound on the CISA listing date | |
| vendor | No | ||
| malware | No | A published source ties a named malware family, tool, campaign or ransomware group to the CVE | |
| sighted | No | Field sighting window in days: a named sensor network recorded the CVE within the last 7 or 30 days | |
| epss_gte | No | ||
| kev_from | No | ISO day, inclusive lower bound on the CISA listing date | |
| technique | No | ATT&CK technique id, such as T1190 or T1059.001 | |
| kev_vendor | No | CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (for example 'Palo Alto Networks') | |
| ransomware | No | ||
| automatable | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already mark the tool readOnly and idempotent, and the description goes well beyond that: it discloses the /browse slice and KEV-first/EPSS ordering, the half-open kev_from/kev_to window with implied kev=1, the nuanced meaning of fix=0, the unassessed-CVE behavior of automatable, and the distinction between sighted field sightings and exploitation claims. There is no contradiction with the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but justified for 22 parameters, and the first sentence front-loads the purpose before the filter list. Nearly every parenthetical carries semantic weight, so there is no padding. A bit of line-breaking or sectioning would improve scannability, but it is appropriately sized for the tool's complexity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no output schema, 22 parameters, and only 32% schema coverage, the description is remarkably complete: it covers all filters, explains special behaviors, and even states the response ordering for filter-only queries. It still omits the response shape/fields and default pagination behavior, which an agent would need to interpret results, so it stops just short of a 5.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 32%, so the description carries the burden, and it does so thoroughly: it defines formats inline (CWE-nnn, ATT&CK IDs, '2024,2025', ISO days, 0..1, 1..50) and clarifies tricky semantics such as fix=0, automatable, sighted, watch, and malware. It even routes pkg range queries to query_package. Only page and limit get minimal treatment, but their meanings are self-evident from their names.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Search the catalog,' a specific verb+resource, and enumerates the full set of free-text and structured filters, so an agent can tell what the tool does. However, it never explicitly differentiates itself from sibling tools like get_cve or query_package, so it does not earn a 5 for sibling differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context: it can be used with free text (q) and/or structured filters, and filter-only queries return a defined slice. It also includes one explicit routing rule ('for ranges use query_package'). It does not, however, state when to prefer search_cves over get_cve, get_sightings, or other siblings, so the guidance is not exhaustive enough for a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- Changed
search_cves2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / malwareAdded value: +{ + "description": "A published source ties a named malware family, tool, campaign or ransomware group to the CVE", + "enum": [ + "0", + "1" + ], + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / watchAdded value: +{ + "description": "On KEV Watch at tier 1 or 2: reported as exploited by trackers other than CISA, outside CISA KEV", + "enum": [ + "0", + "1" + ], + "type": "string" +}
3 tool updates
- Added
get_sightings - Changed
get_updates1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / type / enumPrevious value: -[ - "first_published", - "kev_added", - "detection_added", - "remediation_added" -]New value: +[ + "first_published", + "kev_added", + "detection_added", + "remediation_added", + "first_sighted" +]
- Changed
search_cves1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / sightedAdded value: +{ + "description": "Field sighting window in days: a named sensor network recorded the CVE within the last 7 or 30 days", + "enum": [ + "7", + "30" + ], + "type": "string" +}
4 tool updates
- Changed
get_cve1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / id / descriptionPrevious value: -"CVE id, e.g. CVE-2024-3400"New value: +"CVE id, such as CVE-2024-3400"
- Changed
get_updates1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / cve / descriptionPrevious value: -"Scope to one CVE's change history, e.g. CVE-2024-3400"New value: +"Scope to one CVE's change history, such as CVE-2024-3400"
- Changed
query_package2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / name / descriptionPrevious value: -"Package name, verbatim (e.g. @babel/core, org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core)"New value: +"Package name, verbatim (for example @babel/core or org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core)" - changed
Input schema / properties / purl / descriptionPrevious value: -"Package URL, e.g. pkg:npm/lodash or pkg:maven/org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core"New value: +"Package URL, such as pkg:npm/lodash or pkg:maven/org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core"
- Changed
search_cves2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / kev_vendor / descriptionPrevious value: -"CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (e.g. 'Palo Alto Networks')"New value: +"CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (for example 'Palo Alto Networks')" - changed
Input schema / properties / technique / descriptionPrevious value: -"ATT&CK technique id, e.g. T1190 or T1059.001"New value: +"ATT&CK technique id, such as T1190 or T1059.001"
1 tool update
- Changed
search_cves3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / kev_fromAdded value: +{ + "description": "ISO day, inclusive lower bound on the CISA listing date", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / kev_toAdded value: +{ + "description": "ISO day, exclusive upper bound on the CISA listing date", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / kev_vendorAdded value: +{ + "description": "CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (e.g. 'Palo Alto Networks')", + "type": "string" +}
1 tool update
- Changed
get_updates1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / cveAdded value: +{ + "description": "Scope to one CVE's change history, e.g. CVE-2024-3400", + "type": "string" +}
1 tool update
- Added
get_epss_movers
1 tool update
- Changed
search_cves2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / automatableAdded value: +{ + "enum": [ + "0", + "1" + ], + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / techniqueAdded value: +{ + "description": "ATT&CK technique id, e.g. T1190 or T1059.001", + "type": "string" +}
2 tool updates
- Added
query_package - Changed
search_cves2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / ecoAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / pkgAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +}
4 tool updates
- First observed
get_cve - First observed
get_scoreboard - First observed
get_updates - First observed
search_cves
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