The Defender Scoreboard report (CC BY 4.0): exploited vs detectable vs patchable, every figure with its method, caveat and denominator, plus the corpus block and any method-change notes. Cite as "CVE Security Defender Scoreboard, cve-security.com/scoreboard".
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must disclose behavioral traits. It adds value by detailing the report's license (CC BY 4.0) and the citation requirement, which are behavioral expectations. However, it does not explicitly state that the operation is read-only or safe, nor does it describe any side effects or prerequisites. For a 'get' tool, the read-only nature is implied but not explicitly confirmed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise, consisting of two sentences. The first sentence packs detailed information about the report's contents into a list, and the second states the citation. It front-loads the resource name and avoids fluff, though the first sentence is a bit dense and could be structured as a clearer action statement (e.g., 'Returns the...'). Overall, every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simplicity (zero parameters, no output schema, no annotations), the description is quite complete. It thoroughly explains what the report contains, its license, and how to cite it. However, it does not explicitly mention the return format (e.g., plain text, JSON, HTML) or whether the citation is mandatory for execution, but the core purpose and expected output are well covered.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, and the input schema is empty. The baseline for zero parameters is 4, and the description appropriately provides no parameter-specific details since there are none to describe.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly specifies the resource ('The Defender Scoreboard report') and its content (exploited vs detectable vs patchable, figures with method, caveat, denominator, corpus block, method-change notes). The verb 'get' is provided by the tool name, making the action obvious. It distinguishes this tool from siblings like get_cve, get_updates, and search_cves by focusing on the scoreboard report.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use this tool—if you need scoreboard statistics or the report—but it does not explicitly state when to prefer it over alternatives, nor does it mention any exclusions or contraindications. Sibling tools are not referenced, so the usage guidance is only inferred from the content description.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Each tool serves a clearly distinct purpose: get_cve retrieves a single CVE record, get_scoreboard returns a fixed report, get_updates streams publication changes, query_package filters by package, and search_cves provides full-text/structured search. There is no meaningful overlap or ambiguity in their intended use cases.
The naming follows a consistent lowercase verb_noun pattern (get_*, query_*, search_*). Three tools use 'get_' while two use 'query_' and 'search_', which are semantically distinct actions but still predictable. The deviation is minor and does not impair usability.
With 5 tools, the set is well-scoped and each tool earns its place for a CVE intelligence server. It covers retrieval, search, package-specific queries, a status report, and an update feed without redundancy or unnecessary bulk.
The tool surface covers the core workflows for CVE intelligence: single-record lookup, generalized search with filters, package-specific vulnerability queries, a high-level scoreboard report, and a change stream. No obvious gaps are visible for the stated domain.
