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get_cve

Read-onlyIdempotent

Full intelligence record for one CVE: per-scorer CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV/ransomware/SSVC, four remote-detection modalities (the checks that work over the network) plus a host-check tier (self-contained Nuclei templates and Metasploit local modules that run on the system itself) and the Sigma log-detection layer, both kept out of scannable coverage, per-product fixed versions (fixed = first patched build; affected_through = the last vulnerable build, so upgrade past it), news/community coverage, intelligence summary, and bod_26_04: the BOD 26-04 Table 1 read on both exposure branches (CISA's row numbers and timelines from KEV status and CISA's SSVC Automatable and Technical impact) with CISA's KEV due date, forensic triage flag and the KEV entry's action text (kev_required_action, CISA's requiredAction field); the agency's exposure tag decides the row. other_databases lists the CVE's records in ENISA's EUVD, BDU (FSTEC of Russia), CNVD (CNCERT/CC) and JVN iPedia (JPCERT/CC and IPA) with the address of each. No key required over MCP; an API key on the HTTP request (Authorization: Bearer cvs_live_…) is honored for attribution. Absence semantics: a null field means this dataset holds no such record. The source may still hold one.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesCVE id, such as CVE-2024-3400

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / id / description
      Previous value: -"CVE id, e.g. CVE-2024-3400"New value: +"CVE id, such as CVE-2024-3400"
  2. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish read-only, idempotent, closed-world behavior, and the description adds genuinely new context: no key required over MCP, the optional Authorization: Bearer attribution path, and explicit absence semantics ('a null field means this dataset holds no such record'). It stops short of stating rate limits, pagination, or latency, but the added auth and null-handling rules are substantive.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The scope statement is front-loaded, which is good, but the remainder is an extremely dense multi-clause block with nested parentheses and heavy jargon that is hard to parse. Information is substantive rather than filler, but the structure is not easily scannable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the full burden of explaining return values, and it does so exhaustively: per-scorer CVSS, EPSS, KEV/SSVC, detection tiers, fixed/affected_through semantics, and the bod_26_04 branch logic. Absence semantics and auth context round it out, leaving nothing an agent needs missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single 'id' parameter is fully documented in the schema as a CVE id. The description adds no format or edge-case detail beyond what the schema already provides, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource up front: 'Full intelligence record for one CVE,' followed by an enumeration of the exact record categories returned. However, it never names or contrasts against the obvious siblings (search_cves for lookup, table1_read for the BOD 26-04 view), so the agent must infer the boundary itself.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains what data comes back but gives no when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance, nor any pointer to alternatives like search_cves or table1_read. The single-CVE scope is implied by 'one CVE' but never framed as usage criteria.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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