Skip to main content
Glama
thenavidm

Kit MCP Server

by thenavidm

Update a webhook endpoint

update_webhook_endpoint
Destructive

Modify an existing webhook endpoint's URL, event subscriptions, or active/disabled status; require confirm=true for delivery, publishing, or signing-secret changes.

Instructions

Update a webhook endpoint. May affect delivery, audience membership, published data or irreversible state. Requires confirm=true. Webhook response secrets are redacted; new signing secrets are saved only to a private local file.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlNo
nameNo
eventsNoEvent types this endpoint subscribes to (e.g. `subscriber.created`). On update, the list supplied here replaces the endpoint's full subscription list.
statusNoEndpoint status. One of: `active`, `disabled`.
accountNoNamed private account from KIT_ACCOUNTS. Defaults to KIT_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT or the first configured account.
confirmNoMust be true for audience/delivery changes, publishing, destructive operations and signing-secret changes. Use only for an action requested by the user.
payloadNoComplete JSON body instead of individual body flags. Supports nullable fields and nested bulk structures. Cannot be combined with body flags or payload_file.
descriptionNo
payload_fileNoLocal JSON request body file, at most 5 MB. Contents are validated before the API call and are never logged.
webhook_endpoint_idYesPositive webhook endpoint id.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.1

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, so the safety profile is partly covered. The description adds real value beyond that: the confirm=true gate, the scope of possible impact (delivery, audience membership, published data, irreversible state), and the secret-handling behavior (responses redacted, new signing secrets written only to a private local file).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the verb+resource and immediately followed by the highest-risk consequences and the confirm requirement. No filler or repetition, though the secret sentences could be tightened slightly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent mutation with annotations and no output schema, the description covers the required confirm flag, the blast radius of the change, and secret handling. It is nearly complete, with the only gap being explicit routing against the secret-rotation siblings.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 70%, so the schema already documents the notable parameters (events replacement semantics, status enum, confirm, payload_file). The description reinforces the confirm requirement but adds little syntactic or format meaning beyond what the schema provides, making the 3 baseline appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Update') and resource ('a webhook endpoint'), so the agent knows exactly what operation this performs. It does not, however, distinguish itself from closely related siblings like rotate_webhook_secret or revoke_previous_webhook_secret, which also mutate the signing-secret side of an endpoint.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description supplies an actionable precondition ('Requires confirm=true') and warns that the operation may affect delivery, audience membership, and published data. It stops short of saying when to choose this tool versus rotate_webhook_secret or create_webhook_endpoint, leaving usage largely implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Deploy Server

Other Tools