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Rotate a webhook endpoint secret

rotate_webhook_secret
Destructive

Rotate a webhook endpoint's signing secret to replace a compromised or aging credential, saving the new secret to a private local file. Requires confirmation and expires the old secret once the overlap window closes.

Instructions

Rotate a webhook endpoint secret. May affect delivery, audience membership, published data or irreversible state. Requires confirm=true. Webhook response secrets are redacted; new signing secrets are saved only to a private local file.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
forceNo
accountNoNamed private account from KIT_ACCOUNTS. Defaults to KIT_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT or the first configured account.
confirmNoSet true only when the user asked for exactly this action.
payloadNoComplete JSON body instead of individual body flags. Supports nullable fields and nested bulk structures. Cannot be combined with body flags or payload_file.
secret_nameYesNew private filename under KIT_PRIVATE_DIR. Required before creating/rotating a signing secret; never overwritten.
payload_fileNoLocal JSON request body file, at most 5 MB. Contents are validated before the API call and are never logged.
webhook_endpoint_idYesPositive webhook endpoint id.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed8 schema fields changedv3.0.0
    • addedInput schema / $defs
      Added value: +{
+  "force": {
+    "description": "Rotating again while a previous rotation's overlap window is still open returns `409` (see the responses below). Pass `true` to rotate anyway, immediately expiring the older secret.",
+    "type": "boolean"
+  }
+}
    • changedInput schema / properties / confirm / description
      Previous value: -"Must be true for audience/delivery changes, publishing, destructive operations and signing-secret changes. Use only for an action requested by the user."New value: +"Set true only when the user asked for exactly this action."
    • addedInput schema / properties / force / $ref
      Added value: +"#/$defs/force"
    • removedInput schema / properties / force / description
      Removed value: -"Rotating again while a previous rotation's overlap window is still open returns `409` (see the responses below). Pass `true` to rotate anyway, immediately expiring the older secret."
    • removedInput schema / properties / force / type
      Removed value: -"boolean"
    • addedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / force / $ref
      Added value: +"#/$defs/force"
    • removedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / force / description
      Removed value: -"Rotating again while a previous rotation's overlap window is still open returns `409` (see the responses below). Pass `true` to rotate anyway, immediately expiring the older secret."
    • removedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / force / type
      Removed value: -"boolean"
  2. First observedv2.0.1

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, and non-idempotent, so the general warning 'May affect delivery, audience membership, published data or irreversible state' is boilerplate that doesn't specify what this particular rotation destroys. The useful concrete detail is that new signing secrets go only to a private local file and webhook responses are redacted – that is real value beyond annotations. However, the description concludes after this single concrete note and leaves the 409 overlap behavior almost entirely to the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, no rambling, front-loaded with the action. The private-file caveat is placed at the end where it matters most.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, 7-parameter mutation with no output schema, the description gives the essential confirm requirement and the local-file side effect, but it does not explain the 409 overlap window that force specifically addresses, nor what 'affect delivery' concretely means. Adequate but leaves important operational context to the schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 86%, so the schema already documents all 7 parameters thoroughly, including the force 409 semantics and secret_name pattern. The description repeats the confirm requirement but adds no parameter meaning beyond what the schema already states. Baseline 3 is correct.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'Rotate a webhook endpoint secret.' Clear what it does, though it doesn't explicitly differentiate from the sibling revoke_previous_webhook_secret, which handles the earlier secret.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Mentions 'Requires confirm=true,' which is implied usage guidance, but there is no explicit when-to-use vs. when-not or alternative tool routing. The condition for confirm is left to the confirm parameter's schema description.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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