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thenavidm

Kit MCP Server

by thenavidm

Rotate a webhook endpoint secret

rotate_webhook_secret
Destructive

Rotate a webhook endpoint's signing secret when a credential leaks or expires. Requires confirm=true; the new secret is saved to a private local file, not returned.

Instructions

Rotate a webhook endpoint secret. May affect delivery, audience membership, published data or irreversible state. Requires confirm=true. Webhook response secrets are redacted; new signing secrets are saved only to a private local file.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
forceNoRotating again while a previous rotation's overlap window is still open returns `409` (see the responses below). Pass `true` to rotate anyway, immediately expiring the older secret.
accountNoNamed private account from KIT_ACCOUNTS. Defaults to KIT_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT or the first configured account.
confirmNoMust be true for audience/delivery changes, publishing, destructive operations and signing-secret changes. Use only for an action requested by the user.
payloadNoComplete JSON body instead of individual body flags. Supports nullable fields and nested bulk structures. Cannot be combined with body flags or payload_file.
secret_nameYesNew private filename under KIT_PRIVATE_DIR. Required before creating/rotating a signing secret; never overwritten.
payload_fileNoLocal JSON request body file, at most 5 MB. Contents are validated before the API call and are never logged.
webhook_endpoint_idYesPositive webhook endpoint id.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.1

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, so the description goes beyond them by warning that rotation 'may affect delivery, audience membership, published data or irreversible state', that confirm is required, and that webhook responses are redacted while new secrets are written to a private local file. These are genuinely useful behavioral facts not derivable from the structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, front-loaded with the action and consequences, with no filler. The confirm sentence lightly duplicates the schema but earns its place as a safety callout.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation tool with rich annotations, 100% schema coverage, and no output schema, the description covers the important agent-facing concerns: consequences, the confirm gate, and where the new secret is stored. Little relevant information is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so parameters like force, secret_name, and payload are already fully documented in the schema. The description largely restates the confirm requirement and adds no syntax or format detail beyond it, so a baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Rotate a webhook endpoint secret') matching the title, and adds the key consequence that new signing secrets land in a private local file. It does not, however, distinguish this from the very close sibling 'revoke_previous_webhook_secret', which an agent must disambiguate on its own.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'Requires confirm=true' gives a concrete precondition for invoking the tool. But there is no explicit when-to-use versus the near-identical 'revoke_previous_webhook_secret' sibling or guidance on overlap-window/force usage, so the usage context is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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