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thenavidm

Kit MCP Server

by thenavidm

Create a webhook

create_webhook
Destructive

Create a Kit webhook to deliver event data to a target URL; confirmation is required and signing secrets are saved locally.

Instructions

Create a webhook. May affect delivery, audience membership, published data or irreversible state. Requires confirm=true. Webhook response secrets are redacted; new signing secrets are saved only to a private local file.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
eventNo
accountNoNamed private account from KIT_ACCOUNTS. Defaults to KIT_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT or the first configured account.
confirmNoSet true only when the user asked for exactly this action.
payloadNoComplete JSON body instead of individual body flags. Supports nullable fields and nested bulk structures. Cannot be combined with body flags or payload_file.
target_urlNo
payload_fileNoLocal JSON request body file, at most 5 MB. Contents are validated before the API call and are never logged.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed12 schema fields changedv3.0.0
    • addedInput schema / $defs
      Added value: +{
      +  "event": {
      +    "additionalProperties": false,
      +    "properties": {
      +      "custom_field_id": {},
      +      "form_id": {},
      +      "initiator_value": {},
      +      "name": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "product_id": {},
      +      "sequence_id": {},
      +      "tag_id": {}
      +    },
      +    "required": [
      +      "name",
      +      "form_id",
      +      "tag_id",
      +      "sequence_id",
      +      "product_id",
      +      "initiator_value"
      +    ],
      +    "type": "object"
      +  }
      +}
    • changedInput schema / properties / confirm / description
      Previous value: -"Must be true for audience/delivery changes, publishing, destructive operations and signing-secret changes. Use only for an action requested by the user."New value: +"Set true only when the user asked for exactly this action."
    • addedInput schema / properties / event / $ref
      Added value: +"#/$defs/event"
    • removedInput schema / properties / event / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • removedInput schema / properties / event / properties
      Removed value: -{
      -  "custom_field_id": {},
      -  "form_id": {},
      -  "initiator_value": {},
      -  "name": {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  "product_id": {},
      -  "sequence_id": {},
      -  "tag_id": {}
      -}
    • removedInput schema / properties / event / required
      Removed value: -[
      -  "name",
      -  "form_id",
      -  "tag_id",
      -  "sequence_id",
      -  "product_id",
      -  "initiator_value"
      -]
    • removedInput schema / properties / event / type
      Removed value: -"object"
    • addedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / event / $ref
      Added value: +"#/$defs/event"
    • removedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / event / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • removedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / event / properties
      Removed value: -{
      -  "custom_field_id": {},
      -  "form_id": {},
      -  "initiator_value": {},
      -  "name": {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  "product_id": {},
      -  "sequence_id": {},
      -  "tag_id": {}
      -}
    • removedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / event / required
      Removed value: -[
      -  "name",
      -  "form_id",
      -  "tag_id",
      -  "sequence_id",
      -  "product_id",
      -  "initiator_value"
      -]
    • removedInput schema / properties / payload / properties / event / type
      Removed value: -"object"
  2. First observedv2.0.1

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description adds substantive context beyond them: the concrete impact surface ("delivery, audience membership, published data or irreversible state"), the confirmation requirement, and the non-obvious secret-handling behavior (redacted response secrets, signing secret written only to a private local file). That is real value the annotations cannot convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the action and its impact, then the confirmation gate, then the secret-handling note. Every sentence earns its place; only the abrupt jump between impact and secrets slightly interrupts flow.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a no-required-param, nested-object mutation tool with no output schema, the description covers the destructive consequence, the confirmation requirement, and the surprising secret side effect. It is complete enough to call safely, though it omits any relationship to the endpoint/secrets siblings.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 67% and the schema itself documents account, confirm, payload and payload_file. The description adds only the confirm=true requirement (which the schema already implies) and says nothing about the undocumented target_url and event parameters or the mutual exclusivity of body flags vs payload vs payload_file, so it does not compensate for the gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"Create a webhook" states a specific verb and resource, so the basic intent is unambiguous. However, the sibling list contains create_webhook_endpoint, and the description does nothing to distinguish creating a webhook from creating a webhook endpoint, leaving the agent to infer the difference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description supplies one real prerequisite ("Requires confirm=true"), which is genuine usage guidance. It offers no when-to-use context relative to alternatives (endpoint creation, list_webhooks, rotate_webhook_secret), so an agent must infer selection from names alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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