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stealer_log_check

Check infostealer logs for a single email or username to reveal infection dates, OS, malware paths, and domain exposure without exposing passwords or IPs.

Instructions

Focused infostealer check for one email or username.

Uses Hudson Rock Cavalier and, when an HIBP key is configured, HIBP stealer logs (email only). Returns infection dates, operating system, sanitized malware path, website-domain exposure and counts. Passwords, logins, IPs and device names are never returned. Use domain_breach_exposure for a whole domain. Requires authorized=True.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "identifier": "<identifier>"
    },
    "name": "stealer_log_check"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kindNoauto
refreshNo
authorizedNo
identifierYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.0

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does substantial work: names the upstream sources (Hudson Rock Cavalier, HIBP when a key is configured), scopes the HIBP path to email only, enumerates returned fields, and gives a strong privacy guarantee that credentials, logins, IPs and device names are never returned. Gaps remain on rate limits, auth/plan requirements for the HIBP key, caching, and what an empty/error result looks like.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, followed by source, return-value, privacy, alternative-tool and prerequisite notes in a tight sequence. No filler sentences; every clause carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, yet the description adequately describes the return payload (infection dates, OS, sanitized malware path, domain exposure and counts) and its exclusions. The only real shortfall is the undocumented `kind` and `refresh` parameters for a 4-parameter tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate: it clarifies that `identifier` accepts an email or username and that `authorized` must be true to proceed. However, `kind` (default 'auto') and `refresh` are never mentioned, leaving half the parameters with no documented meaning anywhere.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete verb+resource ('infostealer check for one email or username'), gives the exact scope (single identifier), and explicitly contrasts with the sibling `domain_breach_exposure` for whole-domain queries. An agent can distinguish this from breach_check and domain_breach_exposure without inspecting schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly routes domain-wide lookups to `domain_breach_exposure` and states the hard prerequisite `authorized=True`. Missing an explicit 'when not to use' (e.g., no data found, or plain breach vs stealer logs distinction from breach_check), but the guidance is clear enough to act on.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.