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Glama

breach_check

Check an authorized email, domain, or username for breach exposure across providers, returning counts, source names, dates, and data classes without leaking passwords or raw records.

Instructions

Check one email, domain or username for breach exposure across several providers.

Aggregates LeakCheck public metadata, HIBP account breaches (only if an HIBP key is configured), Hudson Rock infostealer telemetry for email/username, and HIBP catalogue matches for domains. Returns counts, source names, dates, data classes and recommendations only. It never returns passwords, hashes, cookies or raw leaked records.

kind is auto/email/domain/username. Auto treats an @ value as email, a dotted value as a domain, and everything else as a username. Personal identifiers require authorized=True: the caller attests they own the identifier or have permission to assess it. LeakCheck/Hudson Rock are keyless; HIBP account search needs a key.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "identifier": "<identifier>"
    },
    "name": "breach_check"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kindNoauto
refreshNo
authorizedNo
identifierYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.0

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations present, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it enumerates which providers are queried and under what conditions, defines exactly what is returned (counts, source names, dates, data classes, recommendations) and what is never returned (passwords, hashes, cookies, raw records), and states the caller-attestation requirement for authorized=True.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then provider scope, return contract, and parameter semantics in a logical order. Dense but every sentence carries information; only the provider-by-provider enumeration borders on more detail than selection requires.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 4-parameter aggregation tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers provider behavior, return shape, safety limits, and two of three optional parameters. The unexplained refresh flag and the absence of sibling routing are the only meaningful gaps.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does for the key parameters: it defines the kind enum values and the auto-detection heuristic (@ = email, dotted = domain, else username) and explains that authorized is a permission attestation. It does not explain the refresh flag, leaving one of four parameters undocumented in both schema and description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Check one email, domain or username for breach exposure') plus the exact provider aggregation scope. An agent knows precisely what the tool does, though it never names which sibling (e.g. stealer_log_check, domain_breach_exposure) handles a narrower or overlapping case.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides real operating context: HIBP account search only works with a configured key, LeakCheck/Hudson Rock are keyless, and personal identifiers require authorized=True. However there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not-to-use guidance relative to the other breach-related siblings, so selection between them is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.