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Glama

breach_providers

Check which breach and leaked-data providers are available without exposing keys. Returns only booleans showing key presence or keyless availability and what each provider can search.

Instructions

Show which breach/leaked-data providers are available, without exposing keys.

Reports booleans only: HIBP key present/format-valid, LeakCheck public keyless availability, Hudson Rock keyless availability, and what each provider can search. Never returns a key or any part of a key.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "breach_providers"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.0

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses the exact return nature ('Reports booleans only'), enumerates the specific facts returned (HIBP key present/format-valid, LeakCheck and Hudson Rock keyless availability, provider search scope), and gives a strong safety guarantee that no key or key fragment is ever returned. It omits anything about authentication needs, rate limits, or side effects (none expected for a status probe), which keeps it short of a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Short, multi-line, front-loaded with the purpose and then the return shape. The key-safety point is stated twice ('without exposing keys' and 'Never returns a key or any part of a key'), which is mild redundancy but reads as deliberate emphasis on a security-critical guarantee rather than padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a no-param, no-annotation, no-output-schema status tool, the description supplies the return contract (booleans per provider) that the missing output schema would otherwise have to cover. Only minor gaps remain: no example fields or indication of what an agent should do with the result when a provider is unavailable.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Zero-parameter tool, so the baseline is 4; there is nothing for the description to disambiguate. The description correctly implies a callable-with-no-arguments status probe rather than contradicting the empty schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Show which breach/leaked-data providers are available') plus an explicit scope limit ('without exposing keys'). An agent can immediately tell this is a provider-capability/status probe, not a lookup like breach_check or breach_catalog.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: the description makes clear it is a discovery/preflight surface for providers, so an agent can infer it should be called before running an actual breach check. But it names no alternatives and gives no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use rule (e.g. 'call this first to see which keyed providers are usable').

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.