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Glama

domain_breach_exposure

Assess a domain's breach exposure without returning employee emails; returns breach counts, names, data classes, and affected website domains only, and requires authorization.

Instructions

Assess a whole domain's breach exposure without returning employee emails.

Combines LeakCheck public aggregate metadata, exact matches in the public HIBP breach catalogue, and (when an HIBP key is configured and the domain is verified) HIBP's breached-domain and stealer-log-by-email-domain aggregates. Returns counts, breach names, data classes and affected website domains only; aliases/addresses are never returned. Requires authorized=True.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "domain": "<domain>"
    },
    "name": "domain_breach_exposure"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
domainYes
refreshNo
authorizedNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.0

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations exist, so the description carries the full burden and does substantial work: it discloses the source aggregation, the privacy guarantee that aliases/addresses are never returned, the `authorized=True` consent gate, and the conditional degradation when no HIBP key is present. It stops short of describing cost/quota implications of triggering external provider lookups or what happens on error.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The scope and privacy constraint are front-loaded, and the follow-on sentences about sources and return shape each add information. It is dense but tight, with no filler; a slightly clearer separation between the source list and the return-value clause would improve it.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no annotations and no output schema, the description covers what an agent needs: what is queried, what is deliberately excluded, what the response contains (counts, breach names, data classes, affected domains), and the prerequisites/fallback behavior. The only omission, `refresh`, is minor relative to the rest.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it only partly does. It explains `domain` (whole-domain scope) and gives real meaning to `authorized` as a consent gate, but `refresh` is never mentioned in the description or the schema, leaving one of three parameters semantically empty.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence gives a specific verb and resource ("Assess a whole domain's breach exposure") plus an explicit scope boundary ("without returning employee emails"). It then names the three data sources combined, so an agent can tell this apart from an email-level check or a passive breach catalogue lookup without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage context is clear: this is the aggregate, domain-wide assessment rather than a per-address lookup, and it states the two gating conditions (HIBP key configured, domain verified) that determine whether the richer sources contribute. It never explicitly names an alternative sibling to use for single-email checks, so it falls short of a full when/when-not routing statement.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.