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vulnforge_verify_patch

Executes isolated Node.js vm canary sandbox verification of defensive patches against dual attack and benign functional payloads to prove exploit mitigation with zero regressions.

Instructions

Executes isolated Node.js vm canary sandbox verification of defensive patches against dual attack and benign functional payloads to prove exploit mitigation with zero regressions.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
vulnTypeNoVulnerability type (SQL_INJECTION, DOM_XSS, SECURITY_HEADERS, GRAPHQL_INTROSPECTION, GRAPHQL_RESOLVER_AUTH, etc.). Auto-inferred if omitted.
timeoutMsNoExecution timeout in milliseconds (default: 2000)
patchedCodeYesThe synthesized defensive patched code snippet
originalCodeYesThe original vulnerable source code snippet
attackPayloadNoCustom attack payload to verify containment against (optional)
benignPayloadNoCustom benign functional payload to verify lack of regression (optional)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.19.0

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It does add real behavioral context the schema cannot: execution happens in an isolated Node.js vm sandbox, and it runs two payload classes (attack for containment, benign for regression). It omits what a failure looks like, whether code execution has side effects outside the sandbox, and runtime prerequisites.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single sentence with the verb front-loaded and zero filler. It is dense with jargon ('vm canary sandbox', 'dual attack and benign functional payloads') but each clause contributes distinguishing information rather than restating the name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a six-parameter, no-output-schema verification tool, the description covers the mechanism but not the outcome: it never says whether the result is a pass/fail verdict, per-payload diagnostics, or a regression report. Given there is no output schema, that gap should have been filled in prose.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the six parameters are already documented, giving a baseline of 3. The description reinforces that verification is dual-purpose (attack payload vs benign payload), which explains why attackPayload and benignPayload are optional custom overrides, but adds no format or syntax detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb ('Executes ... verification') and a precise resource ('defensive patches'), and adds distinguishing methodology (isolated Node.js vm canary sandbox, dual attack + benign payloads). It clearly separates itself from audit_* and inject_patch siblings by being a post-patch verification step, though it never names a sibling explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: the phrase 'to prove exploit mitigation with zero regressions' suggests it belongs after a patch is synthesized (i.e., after vulnforge_inject_patch), but no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or prerequisite is stated. An agent can infer the place in the workflow but must guess at ordering and inputs.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.