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vulnforge_audit_graphql

Audits GraphQL schemas, resolvers, queries, and server configurations for introspection exposure, cyclic query depth DoS, query batching attacks, field complexity bypass, and sensitive field leakage without authorization.

Instructions

Audits GraphQL schemas, resolvers, queries, and server configurations for introspection exposure, cyclic query depth DoS, query batching attacks, field complexity bypass, and sensitive field leakage without authorization.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sourceFileNoSource filename or endpoint identifier for reporting (optional)
queryPayloadNoClient GraphQL query string or batch array payload to analyze for depth and complexity (optional)
resolversCodeNoResolver definitions code (optional)
rawCodeOrQueryNoUnified raw GraphQL code, query, or server script if not pre-split (optional)
schemaOrTypeDefsNoGraphQL SDL schema or typeDefs string (optional)
serverConfigCodeNoServer initialization code for Apollo Server, Yoga, Express GraphQL, etc. (optional)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.19.0

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations exist, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It lists what it looks for but never says whether it is passive static analysis or actively sends payloads to a live endpoint, whether it mutates anything, what permissions it needs, or how findings are returned — critical for a security-scanning tool where an agent must know if execution is safe.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence, front-loaded with the verb and resource, with the vulnerability list serving as useful scope information rather than filler. Slightly long but every clause maps to a real audit dimension.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With six all-optional parameters, no annotations, and no output schema, the description should clarify whether zero arguments yields a useful result or whether at least one of schemaOrTypeDefs/resolversCode/rawCodeOrQuery is expected. It is silent on this and on how the split parameters relate to the unified rawCodeOrQuery fallback.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so all six parameters are already documented in the schema with optionality and purpose. The description's mention of schemas, resolvers, queries, and server configs loosely maps to the parameter set but adds no new syntax, format, or combination guidance. Baseline 3 applies when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb ('Audits') plus concrete resource types (GraphQL schemas, resolvers, queries, server configurations) and an enumerated list of vulnerability classes. This clearly separates it from generic siblings like vulnforge_audit_api, vulnforge_audit_web, and vulnforge_audit_db, since GraphQL is named outright.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies the usage context (you have GraphQL artifacts to inspect) but never states when to pick this over vulnforge_audit_api or vulnforge_full_scan, nor any prerequisites or exclusions. An agent must infer routing from the word 'GraphQL' alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.