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vulnforge_audit_model_supply_chain

Audits AI model supply chains, Safetensors tensor headers, PyTorch pickle opcodes (CWE-502), and model hub provenance configs across 8 critical vectors (CWE-502, CWE-345, CWE-20, CWE-494, CWE-295, CWE-829, CWE-200, CWE-778) with automated…

Instructions

Audits AI model supply chains, Safetensors tensor headers, PyTorch pickle opcodes (CWE-502), and model hub provenance configs across 8 critical vectors (CWE-502, CWE-345, CWE-20, CWE-494, CWE-295, CWE-829, CWE-200, CWE-778) with automated patch synthesis and canary sandbox verification.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
formatNoModel artifact format override (auto-detected if omitted)
contentNoRaw Safetensors header JSON, PyTorch model loader script, or Hugging Face model config
filePathNoFile path or model artifact name (e.g. model.safetensors, config.json, loader.py) (optional)
commitShaNoPinned git commit SHA for immutable revision verification (optional)
modelRepoIdNoHugging Face or model hub repository identifier (e.g. meta-llama/Llama-3-8B) (optional)
disallowRemoteCodeNoFlag and disallow trust_remote_code=True (default: true)
maxHeaderSizeBytesNoMaximum permitted Safetensors header size in bytes (default: 104857600)
enforceSafetensorsOnlyNoDisallow pickle formats and mandate Safetensors (default: true)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.19.0

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does disclose something beyond the schema — that the tool performs 'automated patch synthesis and canary sandbox verification' — which signals non-trivial side behavior (patch generation, sandbox execution), but it never states whether patches are merely emitted or applied, what permissions are needed, or how long/expensive the sandbox step is.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is a single front-loaded sentence that leads with the core action and scope before the supporting detail. The eight-CWE enumeration is somewhat dense and reads as marketing padding, but the sentence still earns most of its length and has no redundant clauses.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 8-parameter, zero-required-parameter audit tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers what is inspected but leaves the response shape, severity/score semantics, and whether findings are reported only or also patched entirely unexplained. It is minimally adequate, not complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every one of the 8 parameters (format enum, content, filePath, commitSha, modelRepoId, the three policy flags) is already documented with defaults and examples. The description adds no additional parameter meaning such as precedence between filePath and content or how the enforcement flags interact with the format override, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb ('Audits') and a tightly scoped resource set — AI model supply chains, Safetensors tensor headers, PyTorch pickle opcodes, and model hub provenance configs — which cleanly separates it from the many sibling audit tools (ebpf, IAM, SBOM, container, CI/CD) that cover other domains. An agent can route model-artifact auditing here without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: the enumerated artifacts (Safetensors headers, pickle loaders, HF configs) suggest when to reach for this tool, but there is no explicit 'use this when…' statement, no exclusions (e.g. when to prefer vulnforge_audit_sbom or vulnforge_full_scan instead), and no prerequisites such as requiring a repo ID or pinned commit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.