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vulnforge_audit_cosign

Audits Artifact Cosign signatures, Sigstore keyless attestation proofs, Rekor transparency log SET inclusion, in-toto SLSA Build Level 3 provenance, and Kyverno/Gatekeeper container admission verification policies against 8 core supply…

Instructions

Audits Artifact Cosign signatures, Sigstore keyless attestation proofs, Rekor transparency log SET inclusion, in-toto SLSA Build Level 3 provenance, and Kyverno/Gatekeeper container admission verification policies against 8 core supply chain vulnerability vectors (CWE-347, CWE-295, CWE-353, CWE-829, CWE-298, CWE-327, CWE-1104, CWE-284).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
contentNoRaw Cosign payload, Sigstore bundle JSON, Kyverno policy YAML, Gatekeeper constraint, or container manifest
filePathNoFile path of manifest or policy (optional)
requireSlsaNoRequire in-toto SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestation (default: false)
strictRekorNoEnforce strict Rekor transparency log proof check (default: true)
keylessConfigNoPermitted OIDC issuers and SAN identity constraints for Sigstore keyless verification
policyContentNoAlternative alias for Kyverno or Gatekeeper admission policy YAML
imageReferenceNoContainer image reference to audit (e.g. ghcr.io/org/app:latest)
manifestContentNoAlternative alias for container workload manifest or compose specification

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.19.0

TDQS

C2.8/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden and does not meet it: it never says whether the audit is read-only, whether verification contacts live Sigstore/Rekor endpoints, whether any artifacts are mutated, or what a pass/fail result looks like. It also omits that all 8 parameters are optional, leaving unclear what happens if only imageReference (or nothing) is supplied.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is a single front-loaded sentence with no filler, which is efficient. However, it is a dense wall of acronyms (CWE lists, SET, SLSA, SAN) with no structural breakdown, so the actionable scope is harder to scan than a two- or three-clause version would be.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with 8 optional parameters, a nested keylessConfig object, three overlapping raw-content inputs, no annotations, and no output schema, the description is thin. It never clarifies which input field to prefer for a given artifact type, what minimum input is required, or what the audit produces — a significant gap the agent cannot fill from structured fields alone.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3: each parameter already carries its own description, including the keylessConfig sub-fields. The prose adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the schema — it does not explain the aliasing among content/policyContent/manifestContent or how the strictRekor and requireSlsa defaults change behavior.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (audits) and a precise resource set: Cosign signatures, Sigstore keyless attestations, Rekor SETs, SLSA Build L3 provenance, and Kyverno/Gatekeeper admission policies, plus the eight CWE vectors checked. An agent can tell this is the signature/attestation/admission auditor rather than the SBOM or generic container auditor. It falls short of 5 because it never names the overlapping siblings (vulnforge_audit_intoto, vulnforge_audit_container, vulnforge_audit_sbom) or the boundary between them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance, no exclusions, and no mention of alternatives among the ~20 sibling audit tools. The description only describes what the tool inspects, leaving the agent to infer that it should be chosen for signed-artifact or admission-policy inputs rather than for adjacent supply chain audits.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.