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devx-address-poisoning-check

devx-address-poisoning-check

Check a recipient for address poisoning

check_recipient_lookalike
Read-onlyIdempotent

Compares an EVM recipient address with trusted addresses and checks its EIP-55 checksum to catch address-poisoning lookalikes before you send funds.

Instructions

Compares the EVM address you are about to pay with addresses you trust and checks its EIP-55 checksum, to catch address-poisoning lookalikes before a transfer. Address poisoning: attackers send tiny or zero-value transfers from an address that shares the first and last hex characters with one of your real payees, hoping you copy it from your history. Use this tool before every transfer to an address that was pasted or copied, especially from wallet or explorer history. Offline and deterministic: nothing leaves the machine, no RPC calls, no keys, no signing. Rules: a lookalike shares at least 3 leading and 3 trailing hex characters with a trusted address (or 8 in total with at least 2 on each side) but is not identical. A mixed-case address whose EIP-55 checksum fails is treated as altered or mistyped. All-lowercase or all-uppercase input has no checksum (checksum_valid null). Returns: verdict (match = identical to a trusted address; danger = lookalike of a trusted address or invalid checksum: do not send; unknown = no match and no lookalike, which only means it is not similar to the addresses you supplied), a note, checksum_valid, compared, matches, lookalikes (address, shared_prefix, shared_suffix, shown_as) and onchain_check (URL of the paid history-based check). This tool only knows the addresses you pass in. To scan the sending wallet's real on-chain transfer history for poisoning transfers, see onchain_check_info.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "to": "<to>"
    },
    "name": "check_recipient_lookalike"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toYesThe recipient you are about to send to: 0x followed by 40 hex characters. Pass it exactly as copied, keeping its letter case, so the EIP-55 checksum can be checked.
knownNoUp to 200 addresses you trust, for example the address book and previous real payees, each 0x + 40 hex. With an empty list only the checksum is checked.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toYesrecipient, lowercased
noteYes
matchesYes
verdictYes
comparedYesnumber of trusted addresses compared
lookalikesYes
onchain_checkYes
checksum_validYestrue valid, false invalid, null when the input has no checksum (single case)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changedv1.1.0
    • changedInput schema / properties / known / description
      Previous value: -"trusted addresses: address book, previous real payees"New value: +"Up to 200 addresses you trust, for example the address book and previous real payees, each 0x + 40 hex. With an empty list only the checksum is checked."
    • changedInput schema / properties / to / description
      Previous value: -"recipient you are about to pay"New value: +"The recipient you are about to send to: 0x followed by 40 hex characters. Pass it exactly as copied, keeping its letter case, so the EIP-55 checksum can be checked."
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": false,
      +  "properties": {
      +    "checksum_valid": {
      +      "description": "true valid, false invalid, null when the input has no checksum (single case)",
      +      "type": [
      +        "boolean",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "compared": {
      +      "description": "number of trusted addresses compared",
      +      "type": "number"
      +    },
      +    "lookalikes": {
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": false,
      +        "properties": {
      +          "address": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "shared_prefix": {
      +            "type": "number"
      +          },
      +          "shared_suffix": {
      +            "type": "number"
      +          },
      +          "shown_as": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "required": [
      +          "address",
      +          "shared_prefix",
      +          "shared_suffix",
      +          "shown_as"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "matches": {
      +      "items": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "note": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "onchain_check": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "to": {
      +      "description": "recipient, lowercased",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verdict": {
      +      "enum": [
      +        "match",
      +        "danger",
      +        "unknown"
      +      ],
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "to",
      +    "checksum_valid",
      +    "compared",
      +    "matches",
      +    "lookalikes",
      +    "verdict",
      +    "note",
      +    "onchain_check"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well past the annotations by disclosing that the tool is offline and deterministic with no RPC, keys, or signing, and by spelling out detection rules (3 leading + 3 trailing shared hex, or 8 total with 2 per side) and how a failed mixed-case checksum is treated. It also explains the epistemic limit of the 'unknown' verdict, which prevents a false sense of safety — context the readOnly/idempotent annotations cannot supply.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose, then the threat model, then the call-to-action, then rules and return values — a logical order. The 'Returns:' sentence enumerating verdict, note, checksum_valid, compared, matches, lookalikes and onchain_check is largely redundant with the output schema and could be trimmed to just the verdict semantics.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter safety tool, everything needed to call it correctly and interpret the result is present: checksum caveats for lowercase/uppercase input, the meaning of each verdict, and the explicit boundary that the tool only compares against supplied addresses. No output-schema explanation is required, and the description still clarifies the semantics of the key verdict field.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3; the description adds real meaning by framing `known` as the trusted-address set (address book, prior real payees) and by stating that the result's usefulness is bounded by what was supplied there, which shapes how the agent populates the list. Case preservation is repeated from the schema, so it is not a full 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete verb and resource — comparing the recipient EVM address against trusted addresses and checking the EIP-55 checksum — plus the risk it defends against (address poisoning). It is clearly separable from the only sibling, onchain_check_info, because the scope ('only knows the addresses you pass in') is stated explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit trigger ('before every transfer to an address that was pasted or copied, especially from wallet or explorer history'), the exclusion ('only knows the addresses you pass in'), and routes the agent to the alternative ('To scan the sending wallet's real on-chain transfer history ... see onchain_check_info'). Nothing is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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