devx-address-poisoning-check
# Address Poisoning Check
**Is this the address you meant?** Address poisoning plants a lookalike address (same first and last characters, different middle) in a wallet's history with a zero-value, dust or fake-token transfer, and waits for the owner (or their AI agent) to copy it. Bitquery counted about **$76M stolen on Ethereum alone in the 12 months to July 2026**.
This repo has three pieces, all read-only (we never ask for keys and never move funds):
| | What | Cost |
|---|---|---|
| **CLI / stdio MCP** `devx-address-poisoning-check` | Offline: is the recipient a lookalike of any address you trust? Is its EIP-55 checksum valid? Nothing leaves your machine. | free |
| **Remote MCP** `https://address-poisoning-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcp` | Same offline check as a hosted MCP tool | free |
| **HTTP API** `GET /v1/check?from=<sender>&to=<recipient>` | On-chain: scans the sender's real transfer history (Ethereum + Base, optional Avalanche) and flags lookalikes of real counterparties, zero-value / dust / fake-token poisoning transfers (with tx hashes), recipients that only ever appeared through such transfers, and senders that were already poisoned. Returns `ok \| caution \| danger` and the address you probably meant. | 0.005 USDC via [x402](https://x402.org) on Base |
Live: https://address-poisoning-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev
## CLI
```sh
npx devx-address-poisoning-check 0xd9A1C3788D81257612E2581A6ea0aDa244853a91 --known 0xd9A1b0B1e1aE382DbDc898Ea68012FfcB2853a91
# DANGER: Looks like 0xd9a1...3a91 (same first 4 / last 6 hex chars) but is a different address. Classic address-poisoning lookalike.
```
Exit code `2` on danger, so it can gate scripts and agent payment flows.
## MCP
Claude Desktop / Cursor (stdio):
```json
{ "mcpServers": { "address-poisoning-check": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "devx-address-poisoning-check", "mcp"] } } }
```
Or remote (streamable HTTP): `https://address-poisoning-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcp`
Tools: `check_recipient_lookalike` (free), `onchain_check_info` (how to buy the on-chain check; does not pay).
## Paid on-chain check (x402)
```
GET https://address-poisoning-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/v1/check?from=0x...&to=0x...[&chains=ethereum,base,avalanche]
```
* Answers `402` with an x402 v1 body (`X-PAYMENT`, network `base`) and a v2 `PAYMENT-REQUIRED` header (`PAYMENT-SIGNATURE`, `eip155:8453`). Both work.
* 5000 atomic USDC (0.005 USDC) to `0xB3cDDccEe6B150c8efFD55B961afc0Ecefe7f247`, settled through the Coinbase CDP facilitator, listed in the CDP x402 Bazaar.
* Settled only **after** the report is produced; bad input or data-source errors are not charged.
* Data: Ethereum/Avalanche via the Routescan explorer API (last 300 token transfers + 150 transactions of the sender); Base via the Coinbase CDP SQL API (last 14 days of all ERC-20 transfers, including unknown/fake tokens), falling back to public RPC logs for a shorter window. Typical paid response: about 1-2 s. Data collection has a 3.5 s budget; if a source is slow you still get a report with `"partial": true` and the scanned window stated per chain in `chains[].window`. It is a heuristic over a window of public data: always confirm the full address with the payee.
Example (the May 2024 $68M WBTC case): `from=0x1E227979f0b5BC691a70DEAed2e0F39a6F538FD5&to=0xd9A1C3788D81257612E2581A6ea0aDa244853a91` returns `danger` / `possibly_already_poisoned`: the victim did send real value to that address, but it first appeared in their history through a zero-value transfer.
OpenAPI: [/openapi.json](https://address-poisoning-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/openapi.json) · Terms: [/terms](https://address-poisoning-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/terms)
## Related DevX tools
* [7702 Sweeper Check](https://github.com/devx-agent/7702-sweeper-check): is an EIP-7702 sweeper delegation set on a wallet?
* [Crypto Link Check](https://github.com/devx-agent/crypto-link-check): is a crypto URL a phishing / drainer lookalike?
* [Repo Run Check](https://github.com/devx-agent/repo-run-check): is a GitHub repo safe to clone and run?
## Layout
* `cli/`: npm package `devx-address-poisoning-check` (CLI + stdio MCP), `npm test`
* `worker/`: the Cloudflare Worker behind the hosted API (`npm run build`)
MIT. Made by [DevX](https://madebydevx.com) · madebydevx@gmail.com
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools have clearly separate roles: one performs the offline lookalike/checksum check, while the other only returns metadata about an optional paid on-chain service. Their names and descriptions make it hard to confuse the action tool with the informational tool.
Both names use snake_case and are descriptive, but they do not follow a uniform verb_noun pattern: check_recipient_lookalike is action-oriented, while onchain_check_info is an info getter. This is a minor deviation rather than inconsistent style.
Only two tools are provided, which feels thin even for a narrow pre-transfer address-checking server. The count is defensible because one tool does the main check and the other explains an optional paid alternative, but the surface is borderline minimal.
The core offline lookalike and checksum check is covered, but the on-chain history scan is not exposed as a callable tool, only as endpoint metadata. That is a notable gap for a server framed around address-poisoning detection, requiring an external paid workflow to complete the lifecycle.