devx-address-poisoning-check
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| check_recipient_lookalikeA | Free, offline: is the recipient a lookalike (same first/last hex chars, different middle) of any trusted address, and is its EIP-55 checksum valid? Call before every transfer to a pasted or copied address. |
| onchain_check_infoA | How to buy the hosted on-chain check that scans the sender's real transfer history (Ethereum, Base, Avalanche) for poisoning transfers and lookalikes: x402, 0.005 USDC on Base. Does not pay. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools do genuinely different things: one performs an offline lookalike/checksum check, the other only returns purchasing instructions. The name 'onchain_check_info' and the explicit 'Does not pay' note reduce, but do not fully eliminate, the risk that an agent calls it expecting an actual check to run.
Both names are snake_case, so there is no style clash, but the patterns differ: 'check_recipient_lookalike' is verb_object while 'onchain_check_info' is a noun-phrase/prefix form. Readable, but not a predictable convention an agent can generalize from.
Two tools is thin for a security-check server, and one of the two is purely informational rather than functional. The scope is narrow, so it is defensible, but the surface feels borderline under-built.
The free path covers only a single-address lookalike and EIP-55 check, with no batch checking, no trusted-address list management, and no offline screening against known poisoned addresses. The advertised on-chain scan is a dead end: the server exposes only purchase instructions, so an agent cannot actually execute it.