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solidity_assembly_yul_sanitizer

Detects uninitialized memory pointers, 64-bit clean corruption, and gas bomb risks in Solidity inline Yul assembly to prevent memory bugs and excessive gas costs.

Instructions

Scans inline Yul assembly in Solidity smart contracts for uninitialized memory pointer bugs, 64-bit clean memory corruption, and memory expansion gas bombs. (0.040 USDC on Base L2)

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
payloadYesInput parameters or JSON string payload for the tool execution
paymentSignatureNoBase L2 USDC micropayment signature or transaction hash for x402 settlement

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It only states that the tool scans and lists vulnerability categories; it does not disclose whether analysis is static, what output or report format is returned, what preconditions exist, or any side effects.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single dense, front-loaded sentence. It states the action, target, specific bug classes, and cost with no filler or repetition of schema details.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex domain tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description is incomplete: it does not explain what the result looks like, what form the input payload should take, or what conditions are needed for successful invocation. It supports tool selection but not reliable invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds the micropayment amount relevant to paymentSignature, but it does not clarify how the payload should be structured or what content the payload should contain beyond what the schema already says.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific action verb ('Scans') and a precise resource ('inline Yul assembly in Solidity smart contracts'), then names three concrete bug classes. This narrowly defines the tool's scope and makes it easy to distinguish from sibling security tools like smart_contract_reentrancy_auditor.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The intended use is implied by the scanning scope, but the description never explicitly says when to prefer this tool over alternatives or mentions any exclusions. An agent can infer usage, but the guidance is not explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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