servicenow-mcp-ai
An MCP server that lets an MCP client read, analyze, document, and (plan-first) modify a ServiceNow instance through its REST APIs.
Query and read records from any table (
servicenow_query_table,servicenow_get_record) with encoded queries, field selection, pagination, CSV output andfetchAll.Write records safely — create, update, delete (
servicenow_create_record,servicenow_update_record,servicenow_delete_record), plan-by-default with a non-mutating before/after preview unlessapply: true.Inspect schema and metadata with
servicenow_list_tablesandservicenow_describe_table(columns, types, references).Run server-side aggregates (count, avg, min, max, sum, grouping, HAVING) via
servicenow_aggregate, avoiding full row fetches.Manage attachments — list, read metadata, download (base64) and upload/delete files on records.
Configure credentials and profiles —
servicenow_set_credentials,servicenow_list_instances,servicenow_use_instanceto switch instances per call or session.Verify and audit the connection —
servicenow_test_connection,servicenow_get_status(auth mode, policy, telemetry, no secrets) andservicenow_check_capabilitiesfor readable sys_* tables.Go far beyond the core set (README's 97 tools): script intelligence and where-used, flow/event tracing, CMDB, Service Catalog, Change Management, Knowledge, Import Sets, Batch API, linting/code health, drift comparison, Mermaid diagram and docs generation, update sets, change history, ops/data health, directory lookups, ATF runs, journaled revert, and reusable prompts/skills.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@servicenow-mcp-aiShow me all open incidents with priority 1"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
servicenow-mcp-ai — ServiceNow MCP Server
A Model Context Protocol server that lets an MCP client (VS Code, Claude Desktop, etc.) run commands against a ServiceNow instance through its REST APIs — Table, Aggregate, Attachment, Import Set, Batch and CMDB, plus the Service Catalog, Change Management and Knowledge plugin APIs. Credentials are kept in a local env file and can be updated at runtime through a tool.
Upgrading from 1.x? v2.0 makes writes plan-by-default:
create/update/deleteand the other record-write tools return a non-mutating preview unless you passapply: true(or setSN_WRITE_MODE=applyto restore the v1 "execute immediately" behaviour). See the CHANGELOG → 2.0.0 for the full migration note.
Contents: Quick demo · Features · Requirements · Setup · Configure credentials · Run / debug · Develop · Tools · Resources · Prompts · Project structure · Security notes · Project documentation · Support
Built and maintained in my own time — if it helps, a GitHub Sponsors tip keeps it going. Full Support options are near the end.
Quick demo
Three things the platform makes hard, one call each. Point your MCP client at an instance (Setup) and ask:
1. "Where is this field actually used?" — every script, business rule, client script, UI policy/action and ACL that touches it, as JSON or a Mermaid graph. The IDE-grade find usages ServiceNow has no button for:
// servicenow_where_used
{
"kind": "field", // "table" | "field" | "script"
"name": "u_cost_center",
"mermaid": true, // also render a reference graph
}2. "What runs when I save this record?" — the full automation chain in execution order (display → before → after → async business rules, then flows, workflows and notifications), each with its condition — a logical test that runs nothing:
// servicenow_trace_table_event
{
"table": "incident",
"operation": "update", // insert | update | delete | query
}3. "What drifted between dev and prod?" — a Markdown diff of tables, columns, scripts (matched by sys_id then name, with a unified diff of every changed script) and plugins between two configured profiles — plus, on request, properties, choices, ACLs, notifications, flows, catalog items and roles — with a CI-friendly exit code so a pipeline can block a risky deploy:
servicenow-mcp-ai drift dev prod # report on stdout; exit 1 on drift, 0 if cleanAll three are read-only and work against any instance — including a free PDI — with the model and client of your choice.
Related MCP server: @onlyflows/servicenow-mcp
Features
Full Table API: query, read, create, update and delete records on any table, with encoded queries, field selection and pagination.
Extra ServiceNow APIs: Aggregate (Stats), Attachment (list/upload/download/delete), Import Set, Batch (many REST calls in a single request), plus table/column metadata (
sys_db_object,sys_dictionary).Process & plugin APIs: CMDB (class-aware CI CRUD + meta, relationship reads from
cmdb_rel_ci, IRE identify-and-reconcile with an identify-only plan), Service Catalog (browse/order items), Change Management (typed creation + conflict detection) and Knowledge (article search). Plugin-scoped APIs report clearly when not active on the instance.Script intelligence: read and search the instance's own code (business rules, script includes, client scripts, UI policies/actions, scheduled jobs, transform/REST scripts, ACLs, Service Portal widgets, UI pages/scripts/macros, processors, email/fix/ validation scripts, script actions, data sources, REST message functions, transform maps/entries, catalog client scripts and dictionary calculations / defaults) and get a table's full automation picture — all read-only over the Table API.
servicenow_search_codereturns every matching line per artefact (up to 20, with a line of context either side) and, likeservicenow_where_used, takes an optional applicationscope.servicenow_where_usedalso finds structural references — dictionary reference fields, list and form layouts, catalog variables, flow inputs and reports — in a separatestructuralsection.Flow tracing & code checking (Phase 8): deterministically trace what a table operation runs (
flowspackage — business rules, flows, workflows and notifications, in order, with a Mermaid flowchart), read Flow Designer flows and run history, explain Process Automation Designer playbooks (servicenow_explain_flowwithkind: "playbook"— lanes as Mermaid subgraphs, activities, triggers, variants), and lint scripts against a local rule set with an aggregate code-health report (codecheck;domains: trueadds the flow, Service Portal and legacy-workflow analysers). Run ATF tests via the CI/CD API (atf, opt-in, non-default — the run tools execute on the instance).Journal-based undo (
revert): list the local write journal and revert one applied create/update/delete — with a drift check against later edits.Generic artifact reads (
artifacts, opt-in): list and read any registered artifact type — UI policies with their actions, portal pages with their layout, flows, catalog items and more — with scope and SDK-managed status.Update-set awareness (
updatesets, opt-in): list update sets, summarise one set per artefact, compare it with another profile or a snapshot — and bind applied Table writes to a named update set (update_set/SN_UPDATE_SET), restoring the user's current set afterwards.Operations and data health (
ops, opt-in): bounded "why is it slow" reads of the system log, the scheduler queue, the outbound email queue and semaphores, plusservicenow_check_data_health— duplicate keys, orphaned and stale references for one table, from Aggregate API counts.Operations reads (opt-in): a record's change history from
sys_auditandsys_journal_field(history— including the comments and work notes the Table API reads back empty), system properties with masked secrets and a journaled, revertible set (properties), and user / group / role lookups with memberships (directory). ATF runs can wait for their result (wait_seconds), and Import Set inserts report the transform run and maps.Self-documentation: a local Markdown knowledge base (read/write/search) plus deterministic Mermaid generators (ER diagrams from references, record-lifecycle flowcharts from business rules) so the server builds durable, reusable context.
Prompts: ready-made workflows (incident triage, change impact analysis, document a table, diagnose a slow instance, safe write, drift review, schema impact, instance discovery) that orchestrate the tools; every plugin skill has a prompt twin for clients without the plugin.
Tool packages: load only the tool groups you need via
SN_TOOL_PACKAGES(default profilediscovery;allenables everything).Basic or OAuth 2.0 authentication over HTTPS; the password/token is never echoed back.
Least-privilege controls: table allow/deny lists and a global read-only mode.
Resilience: per-request timeout, retry with backoff and
Retry-After, SSRF guard, and a result-size guard.MCP tool annotations and resources, structured error payloads, and structured logging on stderr.
Credentials in an env file (project,
~/.config, orSN_ENV_FILE), updatable at runtime viaservicenow_set_credentials.
Requirements
Node.js 22.12+ (enforced:
engines+ a runtime guard with a clear message; the project targets the version in.nvmrc).
Setup
From source (for development):
npm install
npm run buildOr run the published package directly, without cloning:
npx servicenow-mcp-aiInstall in your MCP client
Every client launches the same stdio command, npx -y servicenow-mcp-ai (Node.js 22.12+),
under the server name servicenow. The one-click links and snippets below carry no
credentials: keep them in the env file (~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env, see
Configure credentials), run the one-time
npx servicenow-mcp-ai login for OAuth, or ask the assistant to call
servicenow_set_credentials once the server is connected. A real environment variable
set in a client config overrides the env file, so only add an env block when you
mean it — and never put SN_PASSWORD or other secrets into a client config you share
or commit (see SECURITY.md).
Client | One line | Config file |
VS Code (Copilot Chat) | Button above, or |
|
VS Code Insiders | Button above, or |
|
Claude Code |
|
|
Claude Desktop | — (edit the config file) |
|
Cursor | Button above, or the |
|
Windsurf | — (edit the config file) |
|
Cline | — (MCP Servers → Configure MCP Servers) |
|
Zed | — (edit settings) |
|
JetBrains AI Assistant | — (Settings → Tools → AI Assistant → Model Context Protocol) | JSON dialog ( |
Gemini CLI | — (edit settings) |
|
Codex CLI |
|
|
The zero-config route is the ServiceNow MCP extension from the Marketplace
(code --install-extension ivanbbaev.servicenow-mcp-ai); it registers the server in
Copilot Chat (agent mode) automatically, no mcp.json. Source: extension/.
Without the extension, add the server from a terminal (user profile):
code --add-mcp '{"name":"servicenow","command":"npx","args":["-y","servicenow-mcp-ai"]}'
code-insiders --add-mcp '{"name":"servicenow","command":"npx","args":["-y","servicenow-mcp-ai"]}'The raw deeplinks behind the buttons (paste into a browser address bar):
vscode:mcp/install?%7B%22name%22%3A%22servicenow%22%2C%22command%22%3A%22npx%22%2C%22args%22%3A%5B%22-y%22%2C%22servicenow-mcp-ai%22%5D%7D
vscode-insiders:mcp/install?%7B%22name%22%3A%22servicenow%22%2C%22command%22%3A%22npx%22%2C%22args%22%3A%5B%22-y%22%2C%22servicenow-mcp-ai%22%5D%7DOr a workspace file, .vscode/mcp.json:
{
"servers": {
"servicenow": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "servicenow-mcp-ai"]
}
}
}Plugin (zero-config — installs the server wired up):
/plugin marketplace add IvanBBaev/servicenow-mcp-ai
/plugin install servicenow-mcp-aiThe plugin also ships eight workflow skills, two read-only subagents and three hooks — see Plugin skills.
CLI — --scope user makes it available in every project; --env sets a
non-secret variable (the instance host) and leaves the secrets in the env file. A value set
this way wins over the env file, so drop --env if you switch instances with
servicenow_set_credentials:
claude mcp add servicenow --scope user --env SN_INSTANCE=your-instance.service-now.com -- npx -y servicenow-mcp-aiclaude_desktop_config.json — macOS ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/, Windows
%APPDATA%\Claude\ (Settings → Developer → Edit Config):
{
"mcpServers": {
"servicenow": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "servicenow-mcp-ai"]
}
}
}Restart Claude Desktop after saving.
Use the button above, or open the deeplink directly:
cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=servicenow&config=eyJjb21tYW5kIjoibnB4IiwiYXJncyI6WyIteSIsInNlcnZpY2Vub3ctbWNwLWFpIl19Or edit ~/.cursor/mcp.json (global) / .cursor/mcp.json (project) with the same
mcpServers block as Claude Desktop.
All three take the Claude Desktop mcpServers block unchanged:
Windsurf —
~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json(Cascade → MCP servers → View raw config), then refresh the server list.Cline — MCP Servers icon → Configure MCP Servers opens
cline_mcp_settings.json.JetBrains AI Assistant — Settings → Tools → AI Assistant → Model Context Protocol (MCP) → Add → As JSON, paste the block.
{
"mcpServers": {
"servicenow": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "servicenow-mcp-ai"]
}
}
}In Zed's settings.json (Zed → Settings → Open Settings):
{
"context_servers": {
"servicenow": {
"source": "custom",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "servicenow-mcp-ai"],
"env": {}
}
}
}~/.gemini/settings.json (user) or .gemini/settings.json (project):
{
"mcpServers": {
"servicenow": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "servicenow-mcp-ai"]
}
}
}Check it with /mcp inside a Gemini CLI session.
codex mcp add servicenow --env SN_INSTANCE=your-instance.service-now.com -- npx -y servicenow-mcp-aiOr ~/.codex/config.toml:
[mcp_servers.servicenow]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "servicenow-mcp-ai"]
# Optional, non-secret only — secrets stay in ~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env:
# env = { SN_INSTANCE = "your-instance.service-now.com" }Prefer a global install (npm install -g servicenow-mcp-ai)? Replace
"command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "servicenow-mcp-ai"] with
"command": "servicenow-mcp-ai" in any snippet. The
MCP Inspector works the same way:
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector npx -y servicenow-mcp-ai.
The one-click links are generated from package.json by scripts/install-links.mjs
(node scripts/install-links.mjs prints them); test/install-links.test.js fails if
this README or the docs site drift from the generated strings.
Install via MCP bundle (.mcpb)
An MCP bundle is one .mcpb file with the
server and its dependencies; Claude Desktop (or any MCPB host) installs it in one click, with
no npm / npx. Its form asks for the connection keys (only SN_INSTANCE is required) and
SN_TOOL_PACKAGES; secrets are marked sensitive (kept in the OS keychain). An empty field
falls back to the env file. Not published yet (O-22) — build it with npm run mcpb:pack
(dist/mcpb/; -- --validate runs the official validator).
Docker
The repository ships a multi-stage Dockerfile (distroless Node 22 runtime, non-root
uid 65532). The image contains exactly what npm pack publishes plus production
dependencies, and starts the HTTP transport on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default. No image
is published to a registry yet — build it locally:
docker build -t servicenow-mcp-ai .
# Secrets as files (Docker / Kubernetes secrets), mounted read-only
mkdir -p secrets && printf '%s' 'your-password' > secrets/sn_password
openssl rand -hex 32 > secrets/sn_http_token
docker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \
-e SN_INSTANCE=your-instance.service-now.com -e SN_USER=your.user \
-e SN_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/sn_password \
-e SN_HTTP_TOKEN_FILE=/run/secrets/sn_http_token \
-v "$PWD/secrets:/run/secrets:ro" -v sn-data:/data \
servicenow-mcp-aiSN_HTTP_TOKENis required for any non-loopback bind. The image binds0.0.0.0so the published port works; without a token (or OAuth) the server refuses to start (3.0, B6).SN_HTTP_REQUIRE_TOKEN=0lets it start with a warning, and then every client that reaches the port drives your instance with the configured credentials. Clients sendAuthorization: Bearer <token>; terminate TLS in front of the container.OAuth instead of a shared token (N-17): set
SN_HTTP_OAUTH_ISSUER(your OIDC provider) andSN_HTTP_OAUTH_RESOURCE(this server's public URL, e.g.https://mcp.example.com/mcp). Clients discover the issuer from/.well-known/oauth-protected-resourceand send its JWT access tokens; the token must name the resource as its audience. Optional:SN_HTTP_OAUTH_SCOPES,SN_HTTP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE,SN_HTTP_OAUTH_JWKS_URI. For an issuer that hands out opaque tokens, setSN_HTTP_OAUTH_INTROSPECTION_URIplus its client id and secret (RFC 7662). By default the instance is still called with the configured service account.Per-user ServiceNow access (N-17 phase 2): add
SN_HTTP_OAUTH_USER_TOKENS=true, a 32-byteSN_HTTP_OAUTH_TOKEN_KEY(base64 or hex, e.g.openssl rand -base64 32) and an OAuth client on the instance (SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID/SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, refresh tokens enabled) whose redirect URL is/oauth/servicenow/callbackon theSN_HTTP_OAUTH_RESOURCEorigin. The first call from a user returns a link to the instance's sign-in page (URL elicitation; a 2025 session gets-32042, a client without URL elicitation and a background task get an error carrying the link). After the user signs in, the server checks that the account'ssys_userfield matches the token's claim (SN_HTTP_OAUTH_USER_MATCH, defaultemail=email), keeps the refresh token AES-256-GCM encrypted inSN_HTTP_OAUTH_TOKEN_STORE, and from then on calls the instance as that user, so ServiceNow ACLs apply per user. A user drops their own links withDELETE /oauth/servicenow/link(their bearer token; answers{ unlinked, revoked }); the refresh tokens are also revoked on the instance, best effort. Replicas behind oneSN_HTTP_OAUTH_RESOURCEcan each complete a link when they shareSN_HTTP_OAUTH_TOKEN_KEYand the store. Limit: requests authorized withSN_HTTP_TOKENstill use the shared credential./dataholds the docs directory (SN_DOCS_DIR=/data/docs) and the env file (SN_ENV_FILE=/data/.env); mount a volume there to keep them.Every
<KEY>_FILEsecret source is described in Secrets from files.For an MCP client that spawns the container over stdio, pass
-i -e SN_TRANSPORT=stdio(docker run --rm -i -e SN_TRANSPORT=stdio -e SN_INSTANCE=… servicenow-mcp-ai).The
HEALTHCHECKis a TCP liveness probe.GET /healthz(liveness) andGET /readyz(credentials configured) answer without the token for orchestrator probes;GET /readyz?probe=1also calls the instance and sits behind the token, like every MCP route. SetSN_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTSto the name clients use so the Host header is checked on a0.0.0.0bind.smithery.yamldescribes the same image for Smithery (stdio, config keys mapped to theSN_*settings).
HTTP transport: sessions, probes and shutdown
With SN_TRANSPORT=http every MCP session (one initialize) gets its own server:
Per-session state. Enabled packages, the MCP logging level, list-changed notifications, plan tokens, tasks and write caps belong to the session. Connection pools, OAuth tokens and the schema cache are shared and keyed by profile + host.
servicenow_use_instanceis session-scoped over HTTP. It switches the profile of the calling session only; other sessions keep theirs and nothing is written. Passpersist: trueto also writeSN_ACTIVE_PROFILEto the env file (journaled) — that changes the default for sessions that have not switched. Over stdio the switch lasts until the process exits;persist: truewrites it there too (3.0, B12).Lifetime. A session ends on
DELETEor afterSN_HTTP_SESSION_TTL_SECidle (default 30 min); a request with an ended session id gets 404 and the client re-initializes. At mostSN_HTTP_MAX_SESSIONS(64) are open at once.DNS-rebinding protection. The
Hostheader must matchSN_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS(default: the loopback names on a loopback bind) and a browserOriginmust matchSN_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS(default: loopback origins); otherwise 403.Probes.
GET /healthz→200 {"status":"ok"}while serving.GET /readyz→ 200 when credentials are configured, 503 otherwise. Both answer without the token.GET /readyz?probe=1(behind the token) also reads onesys_userrow and returns 503 when the instance is unreachable; the result is cached for 5 s.Shutdown. On SIGTERM / SIGINT the listener stops accepting connections, new requests get 503, in-flight tool calls get up to 5 s to finish, then every session is closed and the process exits 0.
Keep-alive. Open SSE streams get a comment every
SN_HTTP_KEEPALIVE_MS(25 s).
Quickstart
The fastest path is three lines of Basic auth — set these (in the env file or the real environment) and you are connected:
SN_INSTANCE=dev12345.service-now.com
SN_USER=your.username
SN_PASSWORD=your-passwordEverything else is optional tuning; see the full Environment variables reference for the rest.
Past a quick try, prefer OAuth over a stored password. For anything shared or long-lived, run the one-time
npx servicenow-mcp-ai logininstead — it stores a refresh token, not your password. See Configure credentials → OAuth 2.1.
Verify your setup
Once the three variables are set, confirm the connection before you start:
Run the
servicenow_test_connectiontool — it reads onesys_userrecord and reportsok, HTTP status and latency.Run
servicenow_check_capabilities— it previews which admin-restrictedsys_*tables the connected user can actually read.
Or do both from the shell in one shot:
npx servicenow-mcp-ai doctor # checks credentials, reachability and capabilitiesPrefer to be asked? npx servicenow-mcp-ai init prompts for the instance, the
auth method and the credentials, writes the env file and runs doctor — see
Command-line interface.
Configure credentials
Credentials live in ~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env (or the file SN_ENV_FILE names):
SN_INSTANCE=your-instance.service-now.com
SN_USER=your.username@example.com
SN_PASSWORD=your-passwordSN_INSTANCE accepts dev12345, dev12345.service-now.com or a full https:// URL.
You can also set or change them at runtime by calling the
servicenow_set_credentials tool — the new values are written straight back to the env file.
Moving a configured profile to a different instance requires user and password in the same
call (the stored secrets are never sent to another host), and the change must be confirmed by
the client — clients without elicitation support are refused unless
SN_ALLOW_UNCONFIRMED_CREDENTIAL_CHANGE=1 is set.
The tool also sets the auth method (auth), the OAuth client id (oauth_client_id) and grant
(oauth_grant). Secrets — the API key and the OAuth client secret — are never tool arguments:
list them in request_secrets and the server asks for them through an elicitation prompt, so
they never appear in a logged tool call, the result or the write journal. A client without
elicitation support is refused (the opt-out above does not apply to secrets); set those keys in
the env file instead. The instance-change rule follows the resulting auth method: an API-key
profile needs a new API key, an OAuth client_credentials profile a new client secret, the
OAuth password grant user, password and client secret, Basic / none user and password;
bearer-token, refresh_token and jwt_bearer profiles cannot be moved with this tool.
servicenow_get_status (authWarnings), servicenow_list_instances and doctor evaluate each
profile against its own auth method — an API-key profile needs no password — and report the
method, the OAuth grant, the refresh-token state and the write mode, never a secret value. When
the refresh-token grant returns a rotated refresh token, it is written back to the env key it
was read from; if the env file cannot be written, the new token is kept in memory (lost on
restart) and a warning is logged and shown by get_status / doctor. Values the server writes
keep Windows paths literal (backslashes are single-quoted) and a CRLF env file stays CRLF. On
Windows the env file inherits its folder's ACL — restrict it yourself (for example
icacls .env /inheritance:r /grant:r "%USERNAME%:F"); the server only warns, it never runs
icacls.
The env file is resolved in this order: SN_ENV_FILE, then
~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env (XDG). A project-root .env is deprecated (3.0, B5):
if one exists while neither of the two is in use, it is still read and startup warns where to move it.
A global/npx install therefore writes to your user config rather than into
node_modules. Real environment variables always take precedence over the file.
First run: the model configures itself
At initialize the server sends instructions built from the live configuration: the enabled
packages and tool count, the write mode, the active profile and, when nothing is configured,
what is missing and how to fix it — plus pointers to the prompts, the reference resources
and large-result handling (paging, format "file"). Until then every instance tool fails with
code: "NOT_CONFIGURED" and a hint naming servicenow_set_credentials. A first session
with an empty env file looks like this (abridged):
instructions Credentials: NOT configured (missing instance, user, password). Instance tools
fail with code NOT_CONFIGURED until fixed. To configure: ask the user for
the instance and credentials, call servicenow_set_credentials, then
servicenow_test_connection. Never guess or echo a password.
user How many open P1 incidents do we have?
model Which instance, user and password should I connect with?
user dev12345, admin, ••••••
tool call servicenow_set_credentials { instance: "dev12345", user: "admin", password: … }
tool result { message: "Credentials saved", profile: "default", configured: true, password: "***" }
tool call servicenow_test_connection {}
tool result { ok: true, … }
tool call servicenow_aggregate { table: "incident", query: "active=true^priority=1" }
model There are 7 open P1 incidents.servicenow_get_status then shows the live state: server version, uptime and transport,
policy.summary, limits, redaction, the docs directory, write counters, the profile source and
profileDetails (per-profile auth mode, write mode and missing keys) — never a secret value.
OAuth 2.1 (Authorization Code + PKCE) — recommended
Register an Authorization Code OAuth API endpoint in ServiceNow with a
loopback redirect URL (e.g. http://localhost:53682/callback), set
SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID (and SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET for a confidential client),
then run the one-time interactive login:
npx servicenow-mcp-ai loginIt opens the browser, you approve, and the obtained refresh token is stored in your env file. The server then runs non-interactively (refresh_token grant) — no password is ever stored. PKCE (S256) is always used.
The OAuth 2.0 password grant (ROPC) is deprecated in OAuth 2.1 and disabled on many instances; prefer
login.client_credentialsandrefresh_tokengrants remain supported for service accounts. See .env.example.
Supported authentication methods
Every inbound REST auth method ServiceNow offers is covered:
Method |
| Set | Notes |
Basic |
|
| Default. |
OAuth 2.1 — Authorization Code + PKCE |
|
| Recommended. Interactive, stores a refresh token. |
OAuth — Client Credentials |
|
| Service-to-service. |
OAuth — Refresh Token |
|
| Set by |
OAuth — JWT Bearer |
|
| RS256 assertion; no password. |
OAuth — Password (ROPC) |
|
| Deprecated. |
API Key |
|
|
|
Bearer token |
|
| Pre-obtained token, used verbatim. A rejected token (401) re-reads |
Mutual TLS (client cert) |
|
| Cert maps to a user; needs optional |
Environment variables
All settings are read from the env file (SN_ENV_FILE, else
~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env) or the real process environment, which takes
precedence. Only the first three are required; the rest are optional tuning knobs.
See .env.example for a template. Every value is validated at
startup: an invalid one stops the server with an error that names every offending key
(3.0, B5), or — with SN_STRICT_SETTINGS=0 — is logged as a warning and the setting keeps
its default.
These tables are generated from the settings manifest
(src/core/settings-manifest.ts) — edit the manifest, then run
npm run docs:env.
Connection and authentication
The instance and its credentials. Only SN_INSTANCE is always required; the auth method is auto-detected from the keys present (API key -> bearer token -> OAuth -> Basic) unless SN_AUTH names it.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| yes | — | 1.0.0 | Instance name, host, or |
| yes | — | 1.0.0 | ServiceNow username for Basic auth. |
| yes | — | 1.0.0 | ServiceNow password. Never logged or returned by any tool. |
| no | auto | 1.1.0 | Auth method: |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | ServiceNow Inbound API Key, sent as the |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | A pre-obtained bearer token, sent verbatim as |
| no | — | next | File holding the bearer token (enables |
| no | — | next | ISO 8601 expiry of the bearer token. |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | OAuth client id (its presence enables OAuth). |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | OAuth client secret. |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | OAuth grant: |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Refresh token for the |
| no | 1.1.0 | Loopback redirect URL for the PKCE | |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Optional OAuth scope requested during |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | PEM private key for the |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Path to the PEM private key for the |
| no | client id | 1.1.0 |
|
| no |
| 1.1.0 |
|
| no |
| 1.1.0 |
|
| no | — | 1.1.0 |
|
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Lifetime of the JWT-bearer assertion in seconds. |
| no |
| next | H-2: operator opt-out — lets |
Secrets from files
Container secrets (D-5): FILE=/path loads from that file at startup (one trailing newline is trimmed). Setting both and FILE is a startup error; so is an unreadable or empty file. A value loaded this way is never written back to the env file. Per profile: SN_PROFILE_FILE for the ServiceNow secrets.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
| no | — | next | D-5: read |
Profiles and the env file
The bare SN_INSTANCE / SN_USER / SN_PASSWORD keys are the 'default' profile. More instances live under SN_PROFILE__* keys; switch with SN_ACTIVE_PROFILE or the servicenow_use_instance tool.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Named connection profiles: |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Which profile tools use. Switch at runtime with |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Explicit path to the env file to read/write. Otherwise the server uses |
Network, TLS and resilience
Timeouts, retries, the host allow-list, the outbound proxy, mutual TLS and the per-host queue and circuit breaker. They govern every REST client of the server. The proxy and mutual TLS need the optional undici package.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Per-request timeout in milliseconds. |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Retries for transient failures (429/5xx, network errors). Non-idempotent writes are only retried on connect errors. |
| no |
| next | Upper bound honoured for a |
| no | max(120000, 2 × | next | Total wall-clock budget for one logical request across retries, backoff, queue wait and OAuth re-auth. A retry that cannot fit into the remaining budget is not attempted — the call fails with code |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Comma-separated allow-list of permitted hosts (for custom or sovereign-cloud domains). When set, only matching hosts are contacted. When unset, only |
| no |
| next | Largest response body (bytes) read into memory; a larger declared or streamed body fails with |
| no | — | next | Outbound HTTPS proxy URL ( |
| no | — | next | Extra token appended to the |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Client certificate (PEM) for mutual TLS (or |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Path to the client certificate (PEM) for mutual TLS. |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Private key (PEM) for the client certificate (or |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Path to the private key (PEM) for the client certificate. |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Optional CA bundle (PEM) to trust (or |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Path to the CA bundle (PEM) to trust. |
| no |
| 1.1.0 |
|
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Maximum parallel HTTP requests to the instance (simple in-process semaphore). |
| no |
| next | Maximum requests waiting per host for a free slot beyond |
| no |
| next | Longest a request waits for a slot before failing with code |
| no |
| next | Opt-in per-host circuit breaker: after this many consecutive failed requests (transport error, deadline, 5xx) further requests fail fast with code |
| no |
| next | How long an open circuit breaker rejects requests before letting a trial request through; the first failure re-opens it, the first success closes it. |
Tool packages
Which tools are registered. The admin tools (set_credentials, get_status, use_instance) are always on.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no |
| 1.0.0 | Comma/space-separated tool packages or profiles to enable. Profiles: |
| no | — | 1.0.0 | Comma/space-separated packages to exclude even if enabled by |
| no | — | 1.0.0 | Comma/space-separated packages whose write tools are not registered; their read tools stay. Per-package complement to the global |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Opt in to the Code Search API ( |
| no |
| next | M-9, experimental: |
| no |
| next | N-50, MCP Apps (SEP-1865): |
| no |
| next | M-7 (B2), deprecated bridge for one minor cycle: every tool name renamed by the v3 naming convention is an alias of its new name — it dispatches to the new tool, accepts the old parameter names, and logs a one-time deprecation warning. Off (the default): the aliases still answer |
Access policy and write safety
Least-privilege table policy, plan-and-apply writes, destructive-write confirmation, per-session caps, prod profiles, update-set binding and the upload / email / SDK-managed-scope guards.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Comma-separated table allowlist; when set, only these tables are reachable. |
| no | — | 1.1.0 | Comma-separated table denylist; always wins over the allowlist. |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | When truthy, refuse every create/update/delete. |
| no |
| 2.0.0 |
|
| no |
| next | Upgrade bridge (owner, 2026-10-14): |
| no |
| next | H-3: confirmation for a destructive |
| no |
| next | H-3: lifetime of a |
| no |
| next | H-4: a |
| no |
| next | H-4: most sub-requests one |
| no |
| next | H-11: writes to the built-in protected tables (identity, roles, ACLs, |
| no |
| next | H-11: patterns ( |
| no | 500 per HTTP session, none on stdio | next | H-11: most applied instance writes per session (the process on stdio, one MCP session over HTTP; a batch counts its write sub-requests). Past it, writes fail with |
| no |
| next | H-11: most applied deletes per session ( |
| no |
| next | H-11: most write (non-GET) sub-requests in one |
| no | — | next | H-11: marks the default profile |
| no | — | next | H-11: |
| no | — | next | S-6: update set (sys_id or exact name) that applied Table-tool writes (create / update / upsert / delete) land in; a per-call |
| no | — | next | Recipient domains |
| no |
| next | Largest decoded attachment upload, checked on the base64 length before decoding ( |
| no | — | next | Optional allow-list of upload content types (exact, or |
| no | — | next | P-3: comma/space-separated application scopes (namespace such as |
| no |
| next | P-22: writes into an SDK-managed scope (a record whose |
| no | — | next | P-3: directories (separated by commas or the platform path delimiter) scanned read-only for SDK projects: each |
Results, redaction and exports
Result size budgets, output shaping, redaction of record values, the write journal and CSV export safety.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Hard cap on records returned by a |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Character budget for a tool result (48,000 since O-21 (b), under Claude Code's 50,000 threshold). A larger result goes to a file while |
| no |
| next | S-11 / N-61 (default on since O-21 (b)): write a |
| no |
| next | N-65 (default on, O-21 (c)): the large readers ( |
| no |
| next | N-39 (default on, O-21 (d)): tools with an output shape publish |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Reference fields come back without their |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Tool results are compact JSON by default (pretty-printing ~doubles tokens). Set |
| no | — | 2.0.0 | DF-5: mask these field values before records reach the model (comma/space-separated). |
| no |
| 2.0.0 | DF-5: also mask email/phone/national-id patterns inside string values. Since H-5 both redaction settings apply deeply to every tool result (success and error) and to the write journal. |
| no |
| next | H-5: size (bytes, default 20 MiB) at which |
| no |
| next | H-5: prefix CSV text cells that start with |
| no |
| next | H-5: prepend a UTF-8 BOM to |
Caching
The schema reads cache and the capability / plugin-API probes.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no |
| next | N-10: poll interval of a record-watch subscription ( |
| no |
| next | N-10: record-watch subscriptions one client session may hold; one more is refused with |
| no |
| next | N-10: record-watch subscriptions across the process (every session); one more is refused with |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | TTL for the near-static schema reads cache ( |
| no |
| next | Maximum entries in the schema reads cache; when full, the least-recently-used entry is evicted. Counters ( |
| no |
| next | How long a successful capability probe is cached — the |
| no |
| next | How long a failed capability probe (HTTP 401/403/404/5xx) or a missing plugin API is cached before it is tried again. Transport errors are never cached. |
Docs store and diagrams
The local Markdown docs store (also home of the write journal — keep it out of version control) and the generated Mermaid diagrams.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no |
| 1.0.0 | Directory the |
| no |
| next | Per-file size cap for the docs tools: larger writes are refused, reads return the first bytes with |
| no |
| next |
|
| no |
| next | Most matches |
| no |
| next | Node cap for the generated Mermaid diagrams (table flow, event trace, where-used; tables in a detailed ER diagram). Nodes past it fold into one |
HTTP transport
stdio (default, one local client) or Streamable HTTP for remote and agent clients. Securing the HTTP endpoint (TLS, auth, network) is the operator's job.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no |
| 2.0.0 | DF-6: |
| no |
| 2.0.0 | DF-6: TCP port for the http transport. |
| no |
| 2.0.0 | DF-6: bind address for the http transport (loopback by default). |
| no | — | 2.0.0 | DF-6: when set, http requests must send |
| no | — | next | N-17: issuer of the OAuth 2.1 / OpenID Connect authorization server whose JWT access tokens the http transport accepts (signature checked against its JWKS; |
| no | — | next | N-17: this server's canonical public URI (RFC 8707 resource indicator). A token is accepted only when its |
| no | — | next | N-17: extra |
| no | — | next | N-17: the issuer's JWKS URI. Unset = discovered from the issuer's OpenID Connect or RFC 8414 metadata. |
| no | — | next | N-17: the issuer's RFC 7662 introspection endpoint. Set = opaque (non-JWT) access tokens are accepted when it answers |
| no | — | next | N-17: this server's client id at the introspection endpoint (HTTP Basic, |
| no | — | next | N-17: this server's client secret at the introspection endpoint. |
| no | — | next | N-17: scopes every request's token must carry; published as |
| no | off | next | N-17: call ServiceNow as the OAuth subject instead of the shared profile credential. Each subject links its own ServiceNow account once (Authorization Code + PKCE through a URL elicitation, callback at |
| no |
| next | N-17: |
| no | — | next | N-17: the AES-256-GCM key (32 bytes, base64 or hex) that encrypts the per-user refresh tokens at rest. Rotating it drops every link. |
| no |
| next | N-17: the encrypted per-user token store (written 0600, its directory 0700). |
| no | on | next | H-7 / B6: refuse to start the http transport on a non-loopback |
| no |
| next | H-7: idle TTL of an http session in seconds; an idle session is closed and its runtime disposed. |
| no |
| next | H-7: cap on concurrent http sessions; a new session beyond it is refused with 503. |
| no |
| next | H-7: interval of the SSE keep-alive comment on an open stream (below common proxy idle timeouts). |
| no | — | next | H-7: |
| no | — | next | H-7: browser |
| no | off | next | E-5: HTTP transport only — serve Prometheus metrics at |
Logging
The stderr log, the optional log file and the log lines mirrored to the MCP client.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Log verbosity on stderr: |
| no |
| next | E-5: stderr log line format — |
| no | — | next | E-5: also append every log line (JSON Lines, redacted, mode 0600) to this file, with size-based rotation ( |
| no |
| next | E-5: rotation threshold for |
| no |
| next | M-8: log notifications per second and client session over the MCP logging capability (burst 50, or the rate if larger). Lines over it are counted and reported in one "N log messages suppressed" warning per minute; stderr is never throttled. |
| no | off | next | N-55: map the tool-call and HTTP |
| no | off | next | N-55: send W3C |
Settings validation
Every setting is validated at startup. An invalid safety value is a startup error; an invalid tuning value is logged as a warning and the setting keeps its default (see SN_STRICT_SETTINGS).
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no | safety settings only | next | E-4 / B5: which invalid setting values (a non-number, an unknown enum value, an out-of-range port…) stop the server with a startup error that names every offending key. Unset: only safety settings — connection, profiles, packages, policy, transport and the trust / privacy keys ( |
Standard variables
Conventional variables outside the SN_ namespace that the server also honours.
Variable | Required | Default | Since | Description |
| no | — | next | Standard proxy for HTTPS traffic, honoured when |
| no | — | next | Fallback proxy when |
| no | — | next | Hosts that bypass |
| no |
| 1.1.0 | Base directory of the default env file ( |
Secrets from files
Every secret setting can be read from a file, the convention of Docker, Compose / Swarm and Kubernetes secrets: set <KEY>_FILE to a path and the server loads <KEY> from it at startup. This covers SN_PASSWORD, SN_API_KEY, SN_BEARER_TOKEN, SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, SN_OAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN and SN_HTTP_TOKEN, plus the per-profile forms (SN_PROFILE_PROD_PASSWORD_FILE, SN_PROFILE_PROD_API_KEY_FILE, …).
One trailing newline is trimmed, so
echo secret > fileworks; other whitespace is kept.Setting both
<KEY>and<KEY>_FILEis a startup error that names the pair — the server never picks one silently.An unreadable or empty file is a startup error that names the setting and the reason, never the content.
A value loaded from a file is never written back to the env file:
servicenow_set_credentialsand OAuth refresh-token rotation refuse to persist it (a rotated refresh token stays in memory with a warning) — update the file.The existing file settings keep their meaning:
SN_TOKEN_FILE(bearer token re-read on a 401),SN_OAUTH_JWT_KEY_FILEand theSN_TLS_*_FILEPEM paths are paths the server reads itself, not<KEY>_FILEsources.
Two-axis access policy
Access is controlled on two independent axes: tables and tool packages.
Axis | Enable / deny / read-only | Example |
Tables |
|
|
Packages |
|
|
Since H-4 the plugin-backed tools (Change, Catalog, Knowledge, Email, ATF) and attachments (through the parent record's table) obey the table axis too; the package axis still removes whole surfaces. See Security notes for the full model (including how the Batch API obeys both axes).
List syntax: table lists (SN_TABLES_ALLOW / SN_TABLES_DENY) are
comma-separated; package lists (SN_TOOL_PACKAGES, SN_PACKAGES_DENY,
SN_PACKAGES_READONLY) accept commas or whitespace. Surrounding spaces are
trimmed in both, and table matching is case-insensitive — so
SN_TABLES_DENY=Change_Request, sys_user works. Since H-11 a table entry may be
a pattern (* any run, ? one character): SN_TABLES_DENY=sys_* blocks
sys_user and leaves incident alone. The order is: an exact deny, an exact
allow, a pattern deny, the protected tables (writes; since 3.0 they need the
call's own apply: true — SN_PROTECTED_TABLES_WRITE=confirm; deny refuses
them, allow lifts the rule), then the allowlist's
patterns. Ask
servicenow_explain_policy({table, action}) which rule decides, or read
servicenow://policy.
Run / debug
VS Code: open the Command Palette and start the server defined in .vscode/mcp.json, then use it from Chat.
MCP Inspector:
npm run inspectorDirectly:
npm start
Observability
Status.
servicenow_get_statuscarries anobservabilityblock: per-tool{count, errors, p50, p95, totalMs}(percentiles in ms over each tool's last 256 calls — memory stays bounded) plus result sizes{bytesTotal, textBytes, structuredBytes, bytesP50, bytesP95}(UTF-8 bytes of the text blocks and ofstructuredContent, the wire cost of each tool), schema-cache hits/misses, per-host retry counters, queue limits and occupancy, circuit-breaker state and the lastX-RateLimit-*headers each host sent. It never calls the instance.Logs. Logs go to stderr only (stdout is the MCP protocol).
SN_LOG_FORMAT=textswitches from JSON lines to a human-readable format;SN_LOG_FILEalso appends JSON lines to a size-rotated file. Credential-named fields (password,token,authorization, …) are masked in every sink, and theSN_REDACT_FIELDS/SN_REDACT_PIIrules and the secret-column masking apply on top.Tracing hooks. Every tool call and the request loop publish on
node:diagnostics_channel, so an OpenTelemetry (or any) subscriber can attach without a dependency on this server. Messages are built only while a channel has a subscriber:Channel
When
Message fields
servicenow-mcp:mcp.tool.call.starta tool call begins
id,tool,package,requestId, andsessionId/traceparent/tracestatewhen knownservicenow-mcp:mcp.tool.call.endit returned a successful result
the start fields plus
profile,outcome(ok),ms,resultBytesservicenow-mcp:mcp.tool.call.errorit returned an error result or threw
the start fields plus
profile,outcome(error/cancelled),ms, andcode/resultBytesorerrorNameservicenow-mcp:http.request.starta logical request begins
id,system,method,host,telemetryKey,url, andprofile/requestId/sessionId/tool/callId/traceparent/tracestatein a callservicenow-mcp:http.request.endit resolved with an OK response
the start fields plus
status,attempts,msservicenow-mcp:http.request.errorit failed
the start fields plus
attempts,ms,status,code,errorName,errorMessageservicenow-mcp:http.request.retryan attempt is replayed (backoff, 401 re-auth)
id,system,method,host,url,attempt,reason,waitMsurlnever includes the query string; headers, bodies and credentials are never published, anderrorMessagepasses through the redaction rules.Tool arguments and results are never published (only the result's byte count).
callIdon an HTTP message is theidof the tool call that made it.traceparent/tracestateare the W3C Trace Context the client sent in the call'sparams._meta; a malformed value is dropped.OpenTelemetry spans.
SN_OTEL=1maps those channels to spans through@opentelemetry/api, an optional peer dependency (npm install @opentelemetry/apinext to the server, plus your SDK and exporter registered withnode --import). Without the package the server logs one warning and runs without spans; withSN_OTELoff the package is never loaded.Each tool call is a
SERVERspan namedtools/call <tool>, a child of the client'straceparentwhen it sent one. Attributes:mcp.method.name,gen_ai.operation.name(execute_tool),gen_ai.tool.name,jsonrpc.request.id,mcp.session.id,network.transport,error.type, plusservicenow_mcp.package/.profile/.outcome/.result.bytes.Each outbound request is a
CLIENTspan named after the method, a child of its tool span:http.request.method,server.address,url.full(no query string),http.response.status_code,http.request.resend_count,error.type, and oneretryevent per replay.The MCP and GenAI semantic conventions are still in development, so these names are provisional and may follow the spec when it changes.
SN_OTEL_PROPAGATE=1(off by default) also sendstraceparent/tracestateheaders on requests to the ServiceNow instance: the HTTP span's context whenSN_OTELis on, otherwise the client's context unchanged. It is opt-in because it hands trace ids to the instance; the OAuth token endpoint never gets them.
Prometheus. With the HTTP transport,
SN_METRICS=1andSN_HTTP_TOKENset,GET /metrics(same bearer token) serves the same figures in the Prometheus text format (servicenow_mcp_*families, labelled bytool/hostonly). Without a token the endpoint stays off and a warning is logged.
Command-line interface
The published servicenow-mcp-ai binary (run it directly, or via
npx servicenow-mcp-ai) starts the MCP server when it is given no command, and
otherwise runs one of the commands below and exits. Connection settings come from
environment variables / the env file (see Environment variables).
servicenow-mcp-ai --help lists everything; --version prints the version. An
unknown command or option prints the usage on stderr and exits 2 — it never
starts the server.
Command | Options | What it does | Exit codes |
| (none) | Starts the MCP server. The transport ( |
|
|
| Interactive setup: asks for the instance, the auth method and its credentials (secrets through a hidden prompt), writes the env file, then runs | the |
|
| Health check: credentials, a live connectivity probe and the capability preflight. The first line names the env file that was used. |
|
|
| One-time OAuth 2.1 Authorization Code + PKCE login: opens the browser, captures the loopback redirect, stores a refresh token. |
|
| (none) | DF-3 CI drift gate: compares the two instances and writes a Markdown diff report. |
|
|
| Writes one JSON file for a bug report and prints its path on stdout. |
|
|
| Carries 2.x settings (env file, MCP client |
|
init writes through the same atomic, owner-only (0600) env-file writer as
servicenow_set_credentials, to the file doctor names (by default
~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env). It asks, in order: the instance (dev12345
or a full host; a custom domain needs SN_ALLOWED_HOSTS), the auth method
(basic / oauth / apikey / token), then that method's settings — for
oauth the grant (client_credentials, password, or authorization_code,
which ends with a hint to run login). Secrets are never echoed or logged; the
summary lists key names only. With --profile qa the keys are written as
SN_PROFILE_QA_*. An existing profile is overwritten only after a y. The
answers can be piped, one per line, which is how CI and tests drive it:
printf 'dev12345\nbasic\nalice\n%s\n' "$SN_PASSWORD" | npx servicenow-mcp-ai initWithout a terminal and without piped answers, init refuses (exit 2) and
writes nothing.
doctor prints plain ASCII ([ok] / [x] instead of check marks) with
--ascii, when stdout is not a terminal, and on Windows outside Windows Terminal.
--json prints one JSON document instead: envFile, status, summary,
checks[] (name, ok, detail), config, connection, capabilities and
serverStatus (the servicenow_get_status payload) — for example
servicenow-mcp-ai doctor --json | jq .checks. The exit codes are the same.
support-bundle collects the doctor --json payload, every SN_* setting
with secrets masked as ***, npm ls --omit=dev (best effort), the tool
manifest summary (version, tool and package counts, active tools) and the last
200 lines of SN_LOG_FILE when one is set. Every masked value is also scrubbed
from the whole file. The default path is
./servicenow-mcp-ai-support-<timestamp>.json (mode 0600). Instance and user
names are not masked — review the file before you attach it to an issue.
migrate upgrades the settings of a 2.x install. It reads the env file the
server resolves (or --from <file>) without loading it, so a file 3.x would refuse
still migrates, and keeps every key, value and comment except:
a project-root
.env(deprecated, B5) or the--fromfile is copied to~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env(orSN_ENV_FILE); the original stays;a profile named
capabilities,docs,policy,profiles,reference,schemaorstatus(reserved, B13) becomes<name>_v2, with all itsSN_PROFILE_<NAME>_*keys andSN_ACTIVE_PROFILE, and its docs and write-journal folder<SN_DOCS_DIR>/<name>is renamed with it (a relativeSN_DOCS_DIRresolves against the directory you runmigratein; an existing<name>_v2folder is never overwritten);a value 3.x rejects at startup (B5) is commented out, so the default applies, as it did in 2.x;
a
KEY: valueline (accepted by the 2.x parser, skipped by 3.x) becomesKEY=value;SN_COMPAT=2is appended unless the file sets it or--v3-defaultsis given.
Settings in an MCP client's env block reach the server ahead of the env file,
so migrate also looks for this server in the Claude Desktop, Claude Code
(~/.claude.json, .mcp.json), Cursor, VS Code (user and .vscode/mcp.json)
and Windsurf config files, and applies the same rules to an env block that sets
SN_* keys (an invalid value is removed). A file with comments is reported, not
rewritten; a VS Code envFile is named so you can run migrate --from on it.
Restart the client after a rewrite.
With --write each file rewritten in place is first copied to <file>.v2.bak
(0600); an env file is 0600 too, a client file keeps its mode. Run it once
after the upgrade:
npx servicenow-mcp-ai migrate # review the plan
npx servicenow-mcp-ai migrate --write # apply itlogin operates on the active profile (SN_ACTIVE_PROFILE, default
default) and reads, for that profile:
SN_INSTANCE— required; the target instance.SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID— required; client id of an Authorization Code OAuth API endpoint.SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET— optional; for a confidential client.SN_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI— optional; loopback URL, defaulthttp://localhost:53682/callback. Must match the redirect registered on the endpoint.SN_OAUTH_SCOPE— optional; requested OAuth scope.
On success it writes SN_AUTH=oauth, SN_OAUTH_GRANT=refresh_token and
SN_OAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN back to the env file (profile-prefixed when the profile
is not default). The authorization URL is printed on stderr in case the browser
does not open automatically.
drift takes two positional profile names; each must resolve to a configured
profile (SN_PROFILE_<NAME>_*, or the bare SN_INSTANCE / SN_USER /
SN_PASSWORD keys for default). The Markdown report is written to stdout
(capture it as a CI artifact); a one-line drift summary goes to stderr.
CI drift gate (DF-3)
Compare two configured profiles and fail a pipeline on configuration drift:
servicenow-mcp-ai drift dev prod # report on stdout; exit 1 on drift, 0 if clean, 2 on errorThe report shows each changed script as a diff block. The CLI compares tables,
columns, scripts, plugins and apps; record sections (sections on
servicenow_compare_instances) are opt-in, so the exit codes are unchanged.
servicenow_snapshot_instance writes the same material to the docs folder, one
file per section, at most four sections at a time. An interrupted run is marked
partial in index.json; rerun it with resume: true to skip every section whose
files are unchanged.
Develop
npm run check # full gate: build, lint, format check, coverage-gated tests, tarball guard, prod audit
npm test # unit tests only (node:test; needs a prior npm run build)
npm run lint # ESLint (flat config + typescript-eslint)
npm run format # format with PrettierSee CONTRIBUTING.md for the conventions (one commit per task, tests ship with the change, generated docs).
Tools
The full reference — every parameter, the output fields, how each tool writes, and the error codes — is in docs/tools/, one page per package. docs/llms-full.txt bundles this README, SECURITY.md and that reference in one file for LLM context.
Every inputSchema and outputSchema in tools/list is written in JSON Schema 2020-12, the MCP default dialect, without a $schema field. The server supports no other dialect and never reads a schema from the client.
This table is generated from the tool registrations — edit the tool
definitions in src/tools/, then run npm run docs:readme. Every tool
name carries the servicenow_ prefix, left out below.
Package | Default | Read tools | Write tools |
yes |
|
| |
yes |
| — | |
yes |
| — | |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no | — |
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
| — | |
no |
|
| |
no |
| — | |
no |
| — | |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
|
| |
no |
| — | |
no | — |
| |
no | — |
| |
no |
| — | |
no |
| — | |
no |
|
| |
no |
| — | |
no |
| — | |
yes |
|
|
All tools carry MCP annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint,
idempotentHint) so clients can apply the right confirmation UX.
Tool names (v3)
Every tool is named servicenow_<verb>_<noun>. Parameters follow one
vocabulary: sys_id is a record id, table is a table name (the CMDB tools
still accept class_name as a deprecated alias), fields is the list of
columns to return, and values is a write payload. Version 3.0 renamed these
tools:
Generated from TOOL_RENAMES in src/mcp/naming.ts — run
npm run docs:readme after changing it.
v2 name | v3 name | Why |
|
| No verb. |
|
| No verb. |
|
| No verb. |
|
| No verb; parallels check_code_health. |
|
| Noun before verb. |
|
| Noun before verb. |
|
| Noun before verb. |
|
| Noun before verb. |
|
| No verb. |
|
| Merged with list_atf_tests (kind: suite). |
|
| Merged with list_atf_suites (kind: test). |
|
| Noun before verb. |
|
| Merged with run_atf_test (kind: suite). |
|
| Merged with run_atf_suite (kind: test). |
|
| No verb. |
A 2.x client keeps working: every old name still answers tools/call as a
hidden, deprecated alias of its new tool and accepts the old parameter names,
at no tools/list cost. Set SN_LEGACY_TOOL_NAMES=1 for one minor release to
also list the aliases in tools/list and accept the old parameter names (attachment_sys_id, item_sys_id,
catalog_sys_id, test_sys_id, suite_sys_id, staging_table, fields as
a write payload, attributes) are accepted. Each use logs one deprecation
warning. The tool manifest lists the renames (toolRenames) and each tool's
accepted aliases.
To keep every 2.x default while you migrate, set SN_COMPAT=2: unset
settings then behave as in 2.x (protected tables writable, no plan token,
unmapped batch rows allowed, old names listed, the core package set). An
explicit setting still wins.
Tool packages
Tools are grouped into packages so you can expose only what a given client needs
(fewer tools keep the model focused). Set SN_TOOL_PACKAGES to a comma/space
separated list of profiles or package names:
discovery(default) —table,schema,aggregate, plus the always-on admin tools;servicenow_find_toolsnames the package for anything else.core, the 2.x default, is discovery plusattachment(B20).all— every package below.Individual packages:
table,schema,aggregate,attachment,importset,batch,catalog,change,knowledge,cmdb,scripts,flows,codecheck,docs,instance,email,atf,revert,artifacts,updatesets,ops,history,properties,directory,ui.
The admin tools (servicenow_set_credentials, servicenow_get_status,
servicenow_enable_package and the rest of the admin package) are always
registered, regardless of the active packages. Unknown names are ignored.
servicenow_get_status reports the resolved enabledPackages.
# Only table + batch tools (plus the always-on admin tools)
SN_TOOL_PACKAGES=table,batchPresets
If you would rather not curate the list yourself, three named presets cover the
common roles. The admin tools are always on, so they are not listed. Each preset
also has a one-word alias — SN_TOOL_PACKAGES=reader|developer|admin — that
expands to the same package set.
Preset |
| For whom |
|
| First contact, analysts, a PDI play — read and query only. |
|
| The core segment: script intelligence, flow tracing, linting, docs and diagrams. |
|
| Everything, including the plugin and write-heavy packages. |
The developer preset builds on the reader set; the docs package includes the
Mermaid diagram generators. Use the alias for brevity or spell the packages out to
add or drop one.
Switching packages at runtime
A client can widen or narrow its surface without a restart:
servicenow_list_packages shows every package with its state for this
session (enabled, configured, denied, read-only, tool count), and
servicenow_enable_package / servicenow_disable_package toggle one. The
server announces the change with notifications/tools/list_changed (and the
prompts / resources equivalents when those change too), one per list per toggle.
A toggle never exceeds the policy axes: a package in SN_PACKAGES_DENY is
refused (PACKAGE_DENIED), a package in SN_PACKAGES_READONLY brings only its
read tools, and the admin tools cannot be disabled. Toggles last for the
session; an HTTP session that closes returns to SN_TOOL_PACKAGES. Nothing
changes unless a client calls these tools.
The server also declares resources.subscribe: after servicenow_use_instance
or servicenow_set_credentials it sends notifications/resources/list_changed
and, to subscribers, notifications/resources/updated for
servicenow://status.
Upsert by key
servicenow_upsert_record({table, key, fields}) creates or updates one record
matched by key, an exact match on one or more field/value pairs (for example
{"u_external_id": "A-17"}; an empty string matches an empty field). No match
creates a record with the key and the fields, exactly one match updates it, and
more than one match is refused with AMBIGUOUS_KEY — so is a match the user
cannot read, since creating another would duplicate it.
The action is decided in the plan: without apply:true the tool returns
create or update (with the sys_id and the before values) plus
apply_with: {expected_action, expected_sys_id}. Pass those back with
apply:true; if the key now resolves differently (the record appeared, went
away or is another one) the call fails with STALE_RECORD and writes nothing.
The applied write is journaled as a create or an update, so
servicenow_revert_write undoes it like a direct create_record /
update_record.
Undo a write (journal-based revert)
Every applied write is recorded in the local, hash-chained write journal
(<SN_DOCS_DIR>/<profile>/write-journal.jsonl). The opt-in revert package
turns it into an undo:
servicenow_list_writes— the journal newest first, filtered byprofile,table,since(ISO date/time),resultandaction. Each row carries the entryidand whether the line alone allows a revert (revertible+reason).servicenow_revert_write—entry_id→ the inverse write through the Table API: an update writes its journaledbeforevalues back, a create is deleted, a delete is re-created from itsbeforerecord (system fields dropped, the originalsys_idrequested; the result reportssys_id_preserved). It follows plan/apply like every write tool: withoutapply:trueit returns the inverse, the record's current state and the drift check, and changes nothing.
Safety rules:
Drift check. The record's
sys_mod_countis compared with the value the journaled write left (after_mod_count, orbefore.sys_mod_count + 1); when no count is available, the written field values are compared instead. If the record changed since — or nothing could be compared — the revert is refused withSTALE_RECORD; passforce:trueto overwrite anyway (the revert's journal line then recordsforce: true).NOT_REVERTIBLE, with the reason, when the entry is unknown, the journal chain is broken, the write was notapplied, the line has nobeforestate, abeforevalue was redacted (SN_REDACT_FIELDS/SN_REDACT_PII), the entry was already reverted, or its origin has no safe inverse: attachment upload/delete,send_email, import set rows, catalog orders, Batch API sub-requests, ATF runs, CMDB creates (IRE may have matched an existing CI) and local/config entries. A redacted value is never restored as[redacted]: the whole entry is refused, with no partial revert — restore those fields by hand.The revert is itself journaled (
reverts: <entry_id>,tool: servicenow_revert_write), so reverting the revert is a redo. Policy applies as for a direct write:SN_READONLY, the table allow/deny lists and the package axes of both the original package andtable. PutrevertinSN_PACKAGES_READONLYto keeplist_writeswithout the undo.
Update sets
The opt-in updatesets package reads update sets (all three tools are
read-only and go through the table policy and redaction like every reader):
servicenow_list_update_sets— optionalstate,namefragment,application(scope namespace,globalor sys_id),query,limit/offset→ sets newest first, with the user's current set marked.servicenow_get_update_set—update_set(sys_id or exact name) → its customer updates (sys_update_xml) per artefact: type, target name, action, table, plus countsby_type/by_action. Payloads are omitted unlessinclude_payload: true; they are then parsed into field values, each capped atpayload_max_chars(default 500), with secret-looking fields masked.servicenow_compare_update_set—update_setpluswith_profile(read live) orwith_snapshot(aservicenow_snapshot_instancesnapshot) → per artefactsame/different(differing field names only) /missing/not_comparable/not_covered/unknown. Only fields in the update payload are compared; audit columns are ignored.
Writes: servicenow_create_record, servicenow_update_record,
servicenow_upsert_record and servicenow_delete_record take an optional
update_set (sys_id or exact name; default SN_UPDATE_SET). The plan
preview names the target set; applying switches the user's sys_update_set
preference (and the scope's updateSetForScope<scope> preference for a
scoped set), runs the write, and restores the previous value — the result
reports update_set: { bound, previous, restored } and the journal entry
records update_set. A set that is not in progress is refused
(UPDATE_SET_NOT_IN_PROGRESS); a data-row table (anything not extending
sys_metadata and without the update_synch attribute) is written without
switching, and the plan says so. Without the argument or the setting nothing
changes. Other write tools (batch, catalog, change…) are not bound.
Operations and data health
The opt-in ops package holds two read-only tools for "the instance is slow"
triage and data quality. Every section reads its own table; an unreadable
table (ACL, table policy, missing table) reports available: false with the
reason instead of failing the call, so a blank section never reads as healthy.
servicenow_read_ops—kind:overview— the counts of every section below in one call.syslog— entries of the lastminutes(default 60, max 1440) at or abovelevel(defaultwarning), optionalsourcefragment: counts by level, top sources and the newest rows (messages capped at 500 chars).jobs— the scheduler queue (sys_trigger) by state, the number of ready jobs more thanoverdue_minutespast their next action, and theoverdue(default),runningorqueuedjobs with their claiming node.email_queue— outboundsys_email: the send-ready backlog and its oldest entry, counts by type in the window and the recent send failures.semaphores—sys_semaphorerows, newest first.
Rows are capped by
limit(default 25, max 200).servicenow_check_data_health— the data twin ofservicenow_check_code_healthfor onetable, optionally scoped byquery(no^NQ/ORDERBY): duplicate groups overkey_fields(Aggregate API grouping, count > 1, capped bylimit), and per reference field (reference_fields, default the first 10 non-system ones) the orphaned references (target row missing) and — when the target has anactivecolumn andstaleis notfalse— the stale references (target inactive), each with the encoded query that lists the rows. Field names are checked against the dictionary first. A target row the user cannot read also counts as orphaned.
The servicenow_why_is_it_slow prompt walks through these reads and, with a
table, the logic that runs on its writes.
Record history, properties and directory
Three opt-in packages cover day-to-day operations questions. Every read goes through the table policy and redaction like every other reader.
servicenow_get_record_history(history) —table+sys_id→ field changes fromsys_auditand journal entries (comments, work notes) fromsys_journal_field, merged newest first.source(all/audit/journal),fields,since(YYYY-MM-DD[ HH:MM:SS]),limit(defaultand
value_max_chars(default 2000) narrow it. Audit rows that repeat a journal entry are skipped. If a source cannot be read (ACL or policy), it is reported undersourcesand the other one is still returned.
servicenow_get_properties(properties) — an exactnameor a nameprefix→sys_propertiesrows. Password-type or secret-looking properties come back as[redacted], and long values are truncated.servicenow_set_property(properties) — sets the value of one existing property. It runs as plan/apply: the plan shows the current and the new value, and apply is journaled.servicenow_revert_writecan undo it, except for secret properties, which are never journaled in clear. It honoursSN_READONLYandSN_PACKAGES_READONLY=properties. A missing property isPROPERTY_NOT_FOUND; the tool never creates one.servicenow_lookup_directory(directory) —kind(user/group/role) plus a searchtermor asys_id. Withinclude_detailsand exactly one match, the result adds:for a user, its roles and groups;
for a group, its members and roles;
for a role, its contained roles and the groups that grant it.
A detail table that cannot be read is listed in
details_unavailable. PutdirectoryinSN_PACKAGES_DENYto remove the user-data surface.
Instance discovery
servicenow_document_instance (docs) takes an optional depth that adds a
discovery folder, <SN_DOCS_DIR>/<profile>/discovery/, next to README.md.
The tiers are cumulative:
| Files |
|
|
| + |
| + one |
The scopes are the named apps, else every non-global sys_app scope, up to
the per-run target cap (the rest are listed as skipped). artifacts-<scope>.md
lists every artefact type with a Collected / not collected and why column:
collected (with a count), capped, unverified (the table is not readable here),
no such table, unreadable for this user, package off, or no records in this
scope. Every read goes through the same policy, redaction, capability preflight
and write journal as the other generators. Without depth the tool behaves as
before.
Plugin skills
The Claude Code plugin (/plugin install servicenow-mcp-ai) ships eight skills
under skills/. Each one only orchestrates this server's tools; none holds
credentials or calls ServiceNow on its own.
Skill | Use it to |
| Map an instance or its custom apps with |
| Investigate a failing record, flow or script (status, history, logic, logs) |
| Assess what a change to a table, field or script would touch (where-used, table logic) |
| Compare two instances or a saved snapshot, or review an update set |
| Make a record change with plan-and-apply, the write journal and a revert path |
| Review a UI Builder page: page map, what a change touches, data broker security, page weight |
| Review upgrade readiness: unresolved skipped records, base vs customer versions, store app updates |
| Explain why a user can or cannot reach a table, record or field; review ACLs, hardening and cross-scope access |
A test (test/plugin-skills.test.js) checks that every servicenow_* name in a
skill exists in the tool manifest. The skills are not part of the npm package.
Subagents
Two read-only subagents ship under agents/. Their tools allowlist names
only this server's read-only tools (readOnlyHint), so neither can plan,
apply, revert or switch the instance; test/plugin-agents.test.js enforces it.
Agent | Use it to |
| Answer a question about the instance (a record, a table's automation, where something is used, a failed flow) and return a short report with its evidence instead of raw records |
| Review a plan preview or an update set before it is applied — target records, table logic, where-used, lint, policy, history — and return a go / hold verdict |
The change reviewer has no servicenow_check_code_health (it writes a local
report); it recommends the scan when a change touches ACLs.
Hooks
hooks/hooks.json registers three plain Node scripts (no dependencies):
Event | Script | What it does |
|
| Adds the active profile, its instance host, the write mode (plan / apply, read-only, a held prod profile), the tool packages and the other profile names to the session. It reads only the environment and the local env file ( |
|
| Refuses a destructive |
|
| When a ServiceNow result says |
Using the skills with other agents
The eight skills are portable Agent Skills: their
SKILL.md frontmatter uses only name and description, and they name tools
by their bare MCP name (servicenow_query_table), so any client that has this
server configured can run them. Copy or symlink the folders under skills/
into a directory the client scans:
Client | Project | Personal |
VS Code (GitHub Copilot) |
|
|
OpenAI Codex |
|
|
Cursor |
|
|
.agents/skills/ works in all three. For example, from a clone of this
repository:
mkdir -p ~/.agents/skills
cp -R skills/sn-* ~/.agents/skills/ # or: ln -s "$PWD"/skills/sn-* ~/.agents/skills/In VS Code, the extension's ServiceNow MCP: Add Agent Skills to Workspace command copies the eight skills into one of the project folders above (it asks before replacing a skill that is already there).
The subagents and hooks are Claude Code plugin features and do not carry over.
Service Portal tree
servicenow_explain_portal (ui, opt-in) explains a Service Portal (portal:
url_suffix or sys_id) or one page (page: page id or sys_id) as a tree.
The tree runs page → container → row → column → widget instance → widget. Instance
widget_parameters are mapped onto the widget's option_schema, and each widget
lists its dependencies, JS / CSS includes, Angular providers and templates. The
theme, menu, header / footer and route maps are included. Nested rows are
followed to depth (default 3, max 6), and the layout is read for the first 5
pages. format is json, markdown, mermaid (layout tree) or file. A
Service Portal table that cannot be read becomes a caveat, not a failure.
UI Builder experience map
servicenow_explain_ui_experience (ui, opt-in) explains a UI Builder
experience or workspace (sys_id or path of sys_ux_page_registry) as a
page map. It reads the page properties, app config, routes, screens (with their
applicability) and each screen's macroponent. The macroponent's composition,
data resources, client state and event wiring are decoded with the
uib-composition decoder, and the tool lists its client scripts and its
transform / scriptlet data brokers, each with its ux_data_broker ACLs. It
also covers the workspace landing page, dashboards, list menus (categories,
lists, applicability) and form action layouts. Reads are bounded, the call
reports progress and can be cancelled. format is json, markdown,
mermaid (page map) or file. Every UI Builder table and field name, and
every macroponent JSON shape, is unverified (U) until it is checked on a live
instance, so results carry verified: false. A table that cannot be read
becomes a caveat, not a failure.
The cmdb package also has servicenow_list_ci_relations (a CI's
cmdb_rel_ci relationships in either direction, with the related CI's name and
class) and servicenow_identify_reconcile, which sends an IRE payload of items
and relations. In plan mode, servicenow_identify_reconcile calls the
identify-only endpoint and shows what IRE would match; when the endpoint is
missing, the plan is marked degraded. Apply is journaled but not revertible,
because IRE decides per item.
servicenow_run_atf (a test, or a suite with kind: "suite") takes
wait_seconds (0–300). The tool polls the CI/CD progress endpoint with progress
notifications, and cancelling the request stops the wait. A run that is still
going when the time is up returns wait.state: "running" with a tracker
for servicenow_get_atf_result.
servicenow_insert_import_set_row also returns import_set_run (the
sys_import_set_run row of the import set) and transform_maps (the staging
table's maps, the ones this row used marked used: true). If either follow-up
read fails, you get warnings instead of an error.
Generic artifact reads
The opt-in artifacts package reads any type in the artifact registry (the
servicenow://artifact-types resource lists them, with their tables, key
fields and child tables):
servicenow_list_artifacts—artifactTypeplus optionalscope(namespace or sys_id),active,queryandlimit→ summaries: sys_id, name, natural key, scope, active flag, SDK-managed verdict and the type's metadata. No script bodies.servicenow_get_artifact—artifactTypeplussys_idor the naturalkey→ the full record, its child records in registry order (a UI policy's actions; a portal page's containers, rows, columns and widget instances; a flow's action instances), its scope and whether that scope is SDK-managed.servicenow_explain_artifact— same identification → a structured explanation: a one-linesummary,whenit runs (the trigger fields that are set), its non-emptyfields, its child records as compactitems, the records itreferences, and its encoded JSON fieldsdecoded(widget parameters, UI Builder props and data, flow label caches). A value that cannot be decoded comes back raw withdecoded: falseand areason— one bad field never fails the call. Long values are capped againstSN_MAX_RESULT_CHARS(a value gets at most a twentieth of it, the whole explanation four fifths);truncatedFields,truncated/previewand a child'somittedcount say what was cut. Flow action values and UI Builder compositions are read with the plain JSON decoder until their dedicated decoders ship (via: "json"). Some types also get anexplanationwithlinesof prose: a state model lists its states andfrom -> totransitions with their conditions, a choice set or table its choices per element in sequence order, and a UI policy or data policy the effect on each field when its condition holds (and, with reverse-if-false, when it does not).servicenow_get_artifact_dependencies— same identification plusdirection(outbound/inbound/both, default),depth(1–3, default 1),limit(rows per inbound source, 1–100) andformat(jsonormermaid) → a dependency graph ofnodesandedges(fromdepends onto, withviaandfield). Outbound edges come from registry reference fields on the record and its children, decoded JSON (flow step values, widget options, UI Builder data) and script text (script-include calls,GlideAjaxclasses, literalGlideRecordtables). Inbound edges come from reverse reference queries and — for a script include — script callers, flow steps whose values call it and the structural pass of the where-used graph. The walk visits each node once (cycles are safe), stops at 150 nodes (truncated), and turns an unreadable source into anunavailableentry instead of an error.
Every table read obeys SN_TABLES_ALLOW / SN_TABLES_DENY; a denied child
table comes back as redacted: true instead of failing the read, and
SN_REDACT_FIELDS / SN_REDACT_PII apply as everywhere. Types whose tables
are not yet confirmed on a live instance carry verified: false and a
caveat; when the instance rejects such a table the result is empty with a
degraded reason instead of an error, plus available: false when
sys_db_object shows that the table does not exist on the instance.
Artifact writes
servicenow_upsert_artifact({artifactType, key, fields, children?}) plans a
primary record and its child records as one unit (S-8 create / update /
noop per record), then applies them parent first, each journaled with one
shared artifact_write id so servicenow_revert_write undoes every line. The
H-11 table policy, the P-22 SDK guard and the H-3 plan token cover every
record of the plan.
Nested children. A child that hangs off another child names it by position with
parent(an earlier index inchildren): a portal page'ssp_container→sp_row→sp_column→sp_instancetree, a catalog variable'squestion_choicerows, a catalog UI policy's actions. A child key may be{sys_id}, so aservicenow_get_artifactresult round-trips unchanged. A wrong or missingparentisCHILD_PARENT_INVALID.SDK pre-flight. Portal widgets, pages, templates, dependencies, providers, headers / footers and portals, and catalog items, record producers, variables, variable sets and categories are checked at plan time the way the ServiceNow SDK checks them:
sp_widget.id(across every table extending it),sp_page.id,sp_portal.url_suffix,sp_dependencyname / module andsp_ng_template.idmust be unique on the instance and within the plan (DUPLICATE_UNIQUE_FIELD, 409); a catalog variable name must be a valid identifier (PREFLIGHT_INVALID); a create into a scoped application whose id lacks the<scope>_prefix gets aSCOPE_PREFIXwarning.Flows. A
flowaccepts only{active}on an existing flow — any other field, a child or a create isFLOW_ACTIVE_ONLY. This is unverified until O-5: that togglingactivethrough the Table API leavesmaster_snapshotunchanged has not been confirmed on a live instance, and every flow plan carries anUNVERIFIEDwarning.
The portal and catalog write fields are unverified until O-5 (verified: false in the registry).
Examples
Query the 5 most recent active incidents:
// servicenow_query_table
{
"table": "incident",
"query": "active=true^ORDERBYDESCsys_created_on",
"fields": ["number", "short_description", "priority", "state"],
"limit": 5,
}Create an incident:
// servicenow_create_record
{
"table": "incident",
"values": {
"short_description": "Printer on 3rd floor is down",
"urgency": "2",
"impact": "2",
},
}Update credentials at runtime:
// servicenow_set_credentials
{
"instance": "dev98765.service-now.com",
"user": "admin",
"password": "••••••",
}Resources
Read-only metadata is also exposed as MCP resources, so clients can attach it declaratively instead of calling a tool:
URI | Description |
| Connection status, auth mode, access policy (never includes the password). |
| Capability preflight: which admin-restricted |
| List of tables from |
| Columns of a table from |
| Configured connection profiles: name, host, user, read-only flag, credential completeness. |
| Columns of a table read through a specific named connection profile. The v2 URI |
| A Markdown document from the local docs store (nested paths allowed), wrapped in an untrusted-content block. |
| A file a |
| Artifact types the generic artifact tools accept: table, name / key / scope fields, child tables, SDK API, verified flag ( |
| Encoded-query reference: syntax, |
| The tool manifest as Markdown: every tool by package, read / write, and whether this session registered it under the package policy. |
| One tool in full: description, annotations, the published input and output schema, an example call, package and registration state. |
| One record through a named profile, masked like |
Resources are package-gated like tools: status, capabilities and the tool
reference are always on; encoded-query and the record template come with the table package, tables/schema with the schema package, instances/per-profile
schema with instance, and docs with the docs package. exports is on
unless docs is denied (SN_PACKAGES_DENY=docs).
The three templates support completion and listing: {table} completes from
the tables already in the schema cache plus a short seed list of common
tables, {profile} from the configured profiles, and {path} from the docs
manifest (index.json) by prefix and under the active profile's folder.
resources/list shows the cached tables and the documents (generated ones
first, titled from the manifest; at most 100 per template, with the docs
index.md always last). Lists and completions never call the instance.
Prompts
Ready-made workflows are exposed as MCP prompts; they orchestrate the tools and
insist on reading real values from the instance. table and profile
arguments complete like the resource templates. Arguments (at most 200
characters) reach the model inside an untrusted-content block, and every prompt
tells the model to treat instance data as data, not instructions. A prompt is
listed only when the packages its tools live in are enabled (triage: table;
change impact: change or table; document table: docs and scripts;
why is it slow: ops; security posture: codecheck; UIB page review: ui;
safe write: table; drift review: instance; schema impact: scripts;
discover instance: docs; the instance overview uses admin tools only and is
always listed). The safe-write, drift-review, schema-impact and
discover-instance prompts mirror the plugin skills sn-safe-write, sn-drift,
sn-impact and sn-discover (triage, UIB review, upgrade review and security posture mirror
sn-triage, sn-uib, sn-upgrade and sn-security). The list follows servicenow_enable_package /
servicenow_disable_package live, with notifications/prompts/list_changed:
Prompt | Argument | Purpose |
|
| Summarize, assess priority, categorize and recommend next steps. |
|
| Affected CIs, schedule conflicts and a go/no-go call. |
|
| Runs |
|
| System log, scheduler backlog, email queue and semaphores ( |
|
| Explains the UI Builder experience ( |
|
| Capability matrix ( |
|
| ACL scan and hardening compliance ( |
|
| Write mode first, then read → plan → apply after approval → verify → revert path. In apply mode ( |
|
| Snapshot the reference profile, compare two profiles (or one with its snapshot), review an update set, then drill into differences; security-relevant drift first. |
|
| Upgrade history, the unresolved skipped records of an upgrade, one skip's base vs customer versions, store apps with an update ( |
|
| Where-used (structural and text), the logic and events on the table, an optional ER diagram → dependants and a risk call. |
|
| Runs |
Project structure
.
├── .env # credentials (git-ignored; or ~/.config/servicenow-mcp-ai/.env)
├── .env.example # template
├── .github/workflows/ # CI matrix, CodeQL, npm / MCP Registry / Marketplace publishing
├── .vscode/mcp.json # VS Code MCP server registration
├── bin/ # CLI launcher (servicenow-mcp-ai.cjs, incl. the doctor command)
├── extension/ # VS Code extension (thin wrapper that registers the server)
├── docs/ # GitHub Pages site
├── scripts/ # generators + guards (README tools table, tool manifest, coverage guard)
├── src/
│ ├── index.ts # bootstrap: load env, register, connect transport
│ ├── core/ # HTTP client (auth, retry, SSRF guard), OAuth/JWT/mTLS, policy,
│ │ # settings, logging, config store, write journal, request
│ │ # context (profiles)
│ ├── api/ # one module per REST area: table, aggregate, attachment,
│ │ # importset, batch, catalog, change, knowledge, cmdb, scripts,
│ │ # flows, codecheck, atf, email, docs, diagrams, meta, doctor,
│ │ # history, properties, directory, portal…
│ ├── mcp/ # MCP surface: package registry/manifest, tool definition,
│ │ # resources, prompts, result envelopes, redaction, write mode
│ │ # (plan/apply), CSV export, stdio + HTTP transports
│ └── tools/ # tool registrations, one file per package (28 packages)
├── test/ # node:test suite (406 tests): unit, mock-fetch api, MCP smoke, doc guards
└── build/ # compiled output (after npm run build)Note on names: the npm package and the GitHub repository are both
servicenow-mcp-ai(the unscopedservicenow-mcpwas already taken on npm); the local working folder isservicenow-mcp. The difference is cosmetic and does not affect the build or runtime.
Security notes
The env file is git-ignored — do not commit real credentials.
The env file is written owner-only (
0600) — it holds a plaintext password.The server uses the stdio transport and only logs to
stderr; secrets and raw encoded queries are never logged.The password/token is never returned by any tool.
Secret columns are always masked. A column whose dictionary type is
password,password2orglide_encrypted(column-level encryption) comes back as[redacted]from every record-returning tool (query_table,get_record, batch, compare, exports, …) and is never stored in the write journal, whateverSN_REDACT_FIELDSsays. The types are read once per profile fromsys_dictionaryand cached like other schema (SN_SCHEMA_CACHE_TTL_SEC); when the dictionary is not readable, a list of OOTB secret column names (password,user_password,client_secret, …) applies instead, and the read goes on. This masking cannot be turned off.Hosts are restricted: without
SN_ALLOWED_HOSTS, only*.service-now.cominstances are contacted (internal/loopback blocked unless an allow-list entry names the host exactly), so a mistyped host cannot silently receive credentials. Redirects are never followed (REDIRECT_BLOCKED) and response bodies are capped bySN_MAX_BODY_BYTES. SetSN_ALLOWED_HOSTSto opt in a custom or sovereign-cloud domain. An explicit non-443 port or an IPv6 literal in the instance value is accepted only when an allow-list entry names it (host:8443,[2001:db8::1]).Every request — including OAuth token requests — carries the identifying
User-Agent: servicenow-mcp-ai/<version> (node/<major>; <transport>; <client>)so the instance's transaction log can attribute the traffic; extend it withSN_USER_AGENT_SUFFIX. Proxy URLs (SN_HTTPS_PROXY,HTTPS_PROXY) are honoured for every request but their credentials are never logged.Prefer OAuth 2.0 over Basic where possible (
SN_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID).Apply least privilege with
SN_TABLES_ALLOW/SN_TABLES_DENYandSN_READONLY=truefor read-only deployments.Table policy does not cover plugin APIs.
SN_TABLES_DENY=change_requestblocks the Table API path, but the Change Management API (sn_chg_rest) can still read/write changes. To restrict the plugin-backed surfaces useSN_PACKAGES_DENY(drop the whole package) orSN_PACKAGES_READONLY(register only its read tools). The Batch API obeys both axes too: a sub-request to a denied package's path is refused, and writes to a read-only package are blocked — a batch cannot be used to bypass the package policy.
Project documentation
Document | Contents |
Layered architecture, Mermaid diagrams (modules, request lifecycle, security model, auth, packages), condensed ADRs | |
Current product state: API coverage map, quality status, history timeline, roadmap | |
Forward plan: the shipped phases, the 2.x hardening line, the proposed 3.0 milestone, optional and deferred items | |
The proposed v3.0 execution tracker (correctness, governance, reach at scale) / the five-lens review its items are built on | |
The 2026-09-09 second pass over the v3.0 plan: nine narrower lenses, 67 findings each with design, acceptance criteria and tests, mapped to tracker items | |
The 2026-09-23 pass on instance documentation: the docs store, the Mermaid generators, the | |
The 2026-09-25 second pass on instance documentation: dispositions of the first 17 findings after the docs store, artefact registry, artefact readers and security scan landed, plus 12 new findings (ID-18 … ID-29) with design, acceptance criteria and tests, mapped to S-15, S-16, M-4, M-8, S-7, E-6, E-7 | |
Positioning vs the official ServiceNow MCP Server Console: comparison, where it structurally lags, the Phase 9 boost plan, and platform risks | |
Detailed specs for the upcoming phases (harness 2.0, multi-instance, flow testing) | |
Completed work with commit refs / remaining decisions | |
Detailed work journal / user-facing changelog | |
Dev setup, gates and conventions / security model and reporting |
Support
This project is built and maintained in my own time. If it saves you or your team time, please consider supporting its continued development — sponsorship directly funds new tools, bug fixes and keeping pace with ServiceNow's REST surface.
GitHub Sponsors — one-off or recurring, with no platform fee taken out (the preferred option).
Ko-fi — quick one-off support; it also accepts PayPal, so it's the fallback for anyone without a GitHub account.
Donate (Donatree) — a no-account donation page (card, PayPal and more) for a one-off tip.
Trademark
servicenow-mcp-ai is an independent, community-built project. It is not
affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by ServiceNow, Inc.
"ServiceNow", the ServiceNow logo, "Now", and related marks are trademarks or registered trademarks of ServiceNow, Inc. in the United States and other countries. They are used in this project's name and documentation only nominatively — to identify the platform this software interoperates with — and no affiliation or endorsement is implied. All other product names and marks are the property of their respective owners.
This project is licensed under the MIT License; that license covers the source code and does not grant any rights to use the ServiceNow trademarks.
Available Tools
19 toolsservicenow_aggregateAggregate ServiceNow recordsARead-only
Compute server-side aggregates (count, avg, min, max, sum) over a table via the Stats API, with optional grouping. Avoids pulling individual rows.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| count | No | Include a record count (sysparm_count). | |
| query | No | Encoded query to filter rows before aggregating. | |
| table | Yes | Table name, e.g. 'incident'. | |
| having | No | HAVING clause to filter groups (sysparm_having). | |
| group_by | No | Fields to group by. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. | |
| avg_fields | No | Numeric fields to average. | |
| max_fields | No | Fields to take the maximum of. | |
| min_fields | No | Fields to take the minimum of. | |
| sum_fields | No | Numeric fields to sum. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already mark readOnlyHint=true, and the description adds useful behavioral context: computation happens server-side, uses the Stats API, supports grouping, and avoids downloading rows. This meaningfully extends the structured metadata without contradicting it.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose, and no redundant words. The efficiency cue 'Avoids pulling individual rows' earns its place by informing agent decision-making.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 10-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers the essential behavioral contract: what it computes, how it computes it, and why it is preferable to row-level queries. The main gap is not spelling out the return shape, but annotations and schema coverage reduce the burden considerably.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema already documents all 10 parameters. The description adds only the high-level concept of 'optional grouping', which is consistent with group_by and having but does not deepen parameter-level meaning beyond what the schema provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Compute'), a clear resource ('a table'), and the exact operations ('count, avg, min, max, sum') via the Stats API. 'Avoids pulling individual rows' distinguishes it from row-returning sibling tools like servicenow_query_table.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description clearly implies when to use this tool: when server-side aggregates are needed instead of fetching individual rows. It does not name the alternative explicitly or list exclusion conditions, but the context is strong enough for an agent to route correctly.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_check_capabilitiesCheck achievable capabilitiesARead-only
Preflight which admin-restricted sys_* tables the connected user can actually read, and report which higher-level capabilities (schema reads, script intelligence, ACL audit) are achievable. Run this before relying on the scripts/flows/codecheck tools on a governed instance — on a least-privilege account those reads may be silently empty.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already mark the tool as read-only and open-world, and the description adds useful behavioral context: it reports achievable capabilities and warns that reads may be silently empty in restricted environments. It does not describe exact output structure, but the warning adds meaningful transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loads the purpose, and adds a concrete usage warning. Every sentence contributes useful information without fluff or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only preflight tool with one optional parameter, annotations, and a clear description, the definition is complete. It states what it checks, when to use it, and the key risk it mitigates, so an agent can select and invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The only parameter, 'instance', is fully described in the schema as the connection profile with a default and a pointer to servicenow_list_instances. With 100% schema coverage, the description doesn't need to add parameter details, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb ('Preflight') and names the concrete resource (admin-restricted sys_* tables) plus the higher-level capabilities being checked. This clearly distinguishes the tool from record/query/attachment siblings, which perform different operations.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly says to run this before relying on scripts/flows/codecheck tools on a governed instance, and warns about silently empty reads on least-privilege accounts. This gives clear contextual guidance, though it does not explicitly list when NOT to use the tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_create_recordCreate ServiceNow recordB
Create a new record in a table with the given field values.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| apply | No | Execute the change. In the default plan mode, omitting this returns a non-mutating before/after preview; set true to apply. SN_WRITE_MODE=apply makes execution the default. | |
| table | Yes | Table name, e.g. 'incident'. | |
| fields | Yes | Field name/value pairs for the new record, e.g. { "short_description": "Printer down", "urgency": "2" }. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
There are no annotations, so the description carries the disclosure burden. It says a record is created but does not mention that the default plan mode can return a non-mutating preview unless 'apply' is true, nor does it disclose side effects or write-mode requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A short, front-loaded single sentence with no filler. Every word earns its place, and the core operation is stated immediately.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, and the description does not explain return behavior, the apply/preview default, or error conditions. For a mutation tool with a notable 'apply' nuance, this is too sparse to fully enable a correct call.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the input schema fully documents 'table', 'fields', and 'apply'. The description adds little beyond the phrase 'given field values', which loosely maps to the 'fields' parameter without providing extra semantic value.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Create') and a clear resource ('a new record in a table with the given field values'). It is unambiguous and distinguishes itself from siblings like servicenow_update_record, servicenow_query_table, and servicenow_delete_record.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is given on when to choose this tool over alternatives, prerequisites, or conditions such as write mode or an existing table. The only usage signal is the verb itself, which implies the purpose but does not explicitly route the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_delete_attachmentDelete ServiceNow attachmentBDestructiveIdempotent
Delete an attachment by its sys_id.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| apply | No | Execute the change. In the default plan mode, omitting this returns a non-mutating before/after preview; set true to apply. SN_WRITE_MODE=apply makes execution the default. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. | |
| attachment_sys_id | Yes | The sys_id of the attachment to delete. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It only says 'Delete' and does not mention irreversibility, permissions, or the plan-mode preview behavior described in the apply parameter.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence with no filler, front-loading the action and target. It is appropriately sized for the minimal information it conveys.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a destructive mutation with no annotations and no output schema, the description is too sparse. It misses prerequisites, side effects, and execution-mode caveats; only the schema's apply and instance fields partially fill this gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
All three parameters have meaningful descriptions in the schema, so the baseline is 3. The description's 'by its sys_id' adds little beyond what the schema already states for attachment_sys_id.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states the exact operation (delete), the resource (attachment), and the selection method (by sys_id). This is clearly distinct from sibling tools like servicenow_delete_record and the other attachment-related operations.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives, nor does it mention how to obtain the required sys_id. It relies on the schema for context but provides no exclusion or alternative references.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_delete_recordDelete ServiceNow recordBDestructiveIdempotent
Delete a record from a table by its sys_id.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| apply | No | Execute the change. In the default plan mode, omitting this returns a non-mutating before/after preview; set true to apply. SN_WRITE_MODE=apply makes execution the default. | |
| table | Yes | Table name, e.g. 'incident'. | |
| sys_id | Yes | The sys_id of the record to delete. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It does not mention that deletion may be irreversible, that permissions are required, or the plan-mode nuance where omitting apply returns a non-mutating preview. The schema's apply parameter hints at this, but the description itself adds no behavioral context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient, front-loaded sentence with no filler. However, it is very sparse and leaves out important caveats like the plan-mode behavior, so while it is concise, it is not as informative as a top-tier description could be.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The schema is rich and documents apply and instance, which helps an agent understand the mechanics. But with no annotations and no output schema, the description leaves out the destructive/preview caveat and does not clarify what response or side effects to expect. It is minimally adequate but has clear gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already provides high-coverage descriptions for all four parameters (apply, table, sys_id, instance), so the baseline is 3. The description only mentions sys_id in passing and adds no meaning about table names, the apply flag, or connection profiles beyond what the schema states.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action (Delete), targets a concrete resource (a record in a ServiceNow table), and identifies the lookup key (sys_id). This clearly distinguishes it from sibling tools such as servicenow_get_record, servicenow_update_record, and servicenow_delete_attachment.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance about when to use this tool versus alternatives, no exclusions, and no mention of cases where a non-destructive operation or an attachment deletion would be more appropriate. The intended usage is only implied by the tool name and title.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_describe_tableDescribe ServiceNow tableARead-only
List a table's columns (name, label, type, mandatory, reference) from sys_dictionary.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| table | Yes | Table name to describe, e.g. 'incident'. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, so the read-only nature is covered. The description adds useful behavioral context by naming the exact source table and the fields returned, but it does not describe error behavior, instance resolution, or any external network implications despite openWorldHint=true.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single sentence that front-loads the action and resource, then compacts the output fields into a parenthetical list. There is no filler or redundant phrasing.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only describe operation with one required parameter, the description provides sufficient context: what it lists, where it reads from, and which columns are returned. The absence of an output schema is mitigated by the explicit field list in the description.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, with both 'table' and 'instance' clearly described. The description adds mild context by clarifying that the output comes from sys_dictionary, but the parameters themselves are already well documented in the schema, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('List') and resource ('a table's columns') and identifies the data source ('from sys_dictionary'). It clearly distinguishes this tool from siblings like servicenow_list_instances or servicenow_get_status, which serve different purposes.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use the tool: when you need table column metadata from sys_dictionary. It does not explicitly state when-not-to-use or name alternative tools for related tasks, but the sibling context makes the intended use reasonably clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_download_attachmentDownload ServiceNow attachmentARead-only
Download an attachment's bytes, returned as base64. Large files are refused (see SN_MAX_RESULT_CHARS).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. | |
| attachment_sys_id | Yes | The sys_id of the attachment to download. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, but the description adds valuable behavioral detail: the output is base64 and large files will be refused referencing SN_MAX_RESULT_CHARS. This goes beyond what annotations provide and sets clear expectations for the agent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise, using two short sentences. The primary action and output format are front-loaded, and the key limitation is stated without ambiguity. Every word contributes to understanding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple download operation with only one required parameter and no output schema, the description covers all essential aspects: what it does, the return format, and a critical size limitation. No additional context is needed for an agent to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema provides complete descriptions for both parameters (instance and attachment_sys_id), so the description does not need to add param-level detail. It does indirectly reference a size constraint via SN_MAX_RESULT_CHARS, but this is not tied to a specific parameter. This aligns with the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states a specific action ('Download') on a specific resource ('an attachment's bytes') and specifies the return format ('base64'). This distinguishes it from sibling tools like credential management or instance listing, making its purpose unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context for when the tool is appropriate (downloading attachments) and includes a critical limitation ('Large files are refused') that guides usage. It does not explicitly name alternatives, but no direct alternative exists among the listed siblings, so this is sufficient.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_get_attachmentGet ServiceNow attachment metadataARead-only
Read a single attachment's metadata by its sys_id.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. | |
| attachment_sys_id | Yes | The sys_id of the attachment record. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=true, and the description does not contradict them. It adds useful scope ('single attachment', 'metadata'), but it does not disclose output shape or any edge-case behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One sentence with the action and object front-loaded and no filler. Every word contributes to the meaning.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only, two-parameter tool, the description plus schema and annotations cover what an agent needs to invoke it. There is no output schema, but 'metadata' conveys the return type at a useful level; more detail about returned fields would be a minor enhancement.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already provides complete descriptions for both parameters, including a reference to servicenow_list_instances for the instance parameter. The tool description echoes 'by its sys_id' but adds no significant meaning beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb 'Read', a specific resource 'a single attachment's metadata', and the method 'by its sys_id'. This clearly differentiates it from sibling tools, which are about instance management, status, and connection testing.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description clearly implies the prerequisite: you must have an attachment_sys_id and want metadata for one attachment. It does not explicitly name alternatives or exclusions, but none of the listed sibling tools perform attachment operations.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_get_recordGet ServiceNow recordBRead-only
Read a single record from a table by its sys_id.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| table | Yes | Table name, e.g. 'incident'. | |
| fields | No | Columns to return. Omit to return all columns. | |
| sys_id | Yes | The sys_id of the record to read. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the operation is a read, but does not describe the response format, behavior for missing records, required permissions, or any other runtime behavior beyond the core action.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single focused sentence that communicates the essential operation immediately. There is no redundant wording or filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is simple and the schema covers parameters well, but there is no output schema and the description does not explain return conventions or error behavior. For a basic read operation this is close to sufficient, but some edge-context detail is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already documents all four parameters thoroughly, including examples and default behavior for fields and instance. The description adds no extra parameter detail, which is acceptable because schema coverage is effectively complete.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action (Read), the resource (a single record from a table), and the key identifier (sys_id). It is distinct from sibling tools like servicenow_aggregate or servicenow_list_attachments, though it does not explicitly name any alternative.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies use when a specific sys_id is known and a single record is needed, but it provides no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus siblings such as servicenow_get_attachment or servicenow_aggregate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_get_statusGet ServiceNow connection statusARead-only
Show the configured instance, user, auth mode and access policy, and whether credentials are complete. The password is never revealed.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| user | Yes | |
| authMode | Yes | |
| instance | Yes | |
| profiles | Yes | |
| readOnly | Yes | |
| telemetry | Yes | |
| configured | Yes | |
| pluginApis | Yes | |
| passwordSet | Yes | |
| deniedTables | Yes | |
| activeProfile | Yes | |
| allowedTables | Yes | |
| deniedPackages | Yes | |
| enabledPackages | Yes | |
| readOnlyPackages | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds a meaningful behavioral trait beyond the readOnlyHint annotation: explicitly stating that the password is never revealed. It also clarifies the scope of output (configuration and credential completeness, not secrets), which is valuable for an agent deciding whether to call this tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences with zero filler. The first sentence front-loads what is shown; the second preempts a likely security concern. Every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only status tool with an output schema present and a single optional parameter documented in the schema, the description covers the essential behavioral and security context. It lacks nothing critical for an agent to use the tool correctly, though a touch more detail about how the optional instance parameter affects results could push it higher.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% for the single optional parameter, with the schema already explaining that 'instance' selects a connection profile. The description adds no additional parameter-level detail, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Show') and enumerates the exact resource and fields (configured instance, user, auth mode, access policy, credential completeness), making it unmistakably distinct from siblings like servicenow_query_table and servicenow_check_capabilities.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The purpose implies when to use it (e.g., before other ServiceNow operations, to verify connection configuration), but it offers no explicit guidance about situations where a sibling would be better, nor does it name alternatives. The usage context is inferred rather than stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_list_attachmentsList ServiceNow attachmentsARead-only
List attachment metadata, optionally scoped to a specific record (table + sys_id).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| table | No | Table the record belongs to, e.g. 'incident'. | |
| sys_id | No | sys_id of the record whose attachments to list. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already provide readOnlyHint=true, so the safe read behavior is covered. The description adds the useful distinction that only metadata is returned, not file content, and that scoping is optional. However, it discloses nothing about pagination, result size limits, or behavior when no scope is provided.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single, front-loaded sentence states the core purpose immediately and adds the scoping detail without fluff. Every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only listing tool, the description, schema, and annotations together cover the essential who/what/where. It could be more explicit about whether table and sys_id are required together and whether listing without them returns all attachments, but the 'optionally scoped' phrasing and schema descriptions largely fill those gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
All three parameters (table, sys_id, instance) have descriptive text in the schema, so the description adds no additional parameter meaning. With high schema coverage, a baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('List') and resource ('attachment metadata'), and clarifies the optional scoping by table + sys_id. This clearly differentiates it from sibling upload/delete tools without ambiguity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives context about optional scoping but provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like servicenow_upload_attachment or servicenow_delete_attachment. No exclusions or conditional routing are mentioned.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_list_instancesList connection profilesARead-only
List the configured ServiceNow connection profiles (instances): name, host, user, read-only flag and whether credentials are complete. Passwords are never included.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The readOnlyHint annotation already establishes that no mutation occurs, and the description adds meaningful behavioral context: passwords are explicitly never included, a read-only flag is returned, and credential completeness is reported. This valuable detail goes beyond what the annotations alone provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, with the primary purpose front-loaded and a security-relevant note appended without excess. Every clause earns its place, and there is no repetitive or boilerplate language.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple, read-only listing tool with zero required parameters and no output schema, the description names all meaningful output fields and explicitly covers the password-exclusion guarantee. It is nearly complete, though a note about the return container or pagination would fully remove ambiguity for agents expecting an array shape.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The only parameter, instance, is fully documented in the schema with its default behavior and a reference to this tool. The description itself does not add further parameter-level guidance, so the schema carries the burden and the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('List') and a clear resource ('configured ServiceNow connection profiles (instances)') and enumerates the returned fields: name, host, user, read-only flag, and credential completeness. This clearly distinguishes the tool from the inline-invocation siblings that check credentials or capabilities.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies this is the tool to inspect available connection profiles, and the parameter schema notes the active-profile default. However, it never explicitly states when to use this tool instead of the sibling tools, nor does it mention any exclusions or prerequisites for calling it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_list_tablesList ServiceNow tablesARead-only
List tables from sys_db_object, optionally filtered by a name or label fragment.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| filter | No | Case-insensitive fragment to match in name or label. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so the description only needs to add context beyond that. It does add the specific source (sys_db_object) and the filtering behavior, but it does not disclose pagination, result shape, or the fact that unfiltered calls may return a large list. This is adequate but not rich.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence that front-loads the core action and resource, then adds the optional filtering detail. There is no filler or redundancy; every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple listing tool with two optional parameters, full schema coverage, and read-only annotations, the description is nearly complete. The only minor gap is the absence of any return-shape or pagination notes, but the tool name and 'list' verb strongly imply a table list, so this is not a significant omission.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% — both parameters already have descriptions. The description adds semantic context for 'filter' by explaining it matches a fragment in name or label, which goes slightly beyond the schema's bare description. The 'instance' parameter is covered fully by the schema, so no further description is needed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('List') and a concrete resource ('tables from sys_db_object'), and clearly distinguishes the metadata-listing purpose from sibling record-manipulation tools like servicenow_query_table and servicenow_get_record. The optional filter by name or label is also explicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description conveys a clear context: use this tool to discover available ServiceNow tables from the system metadata table. It does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, but the sibling set makes the intended use obvious, and the mention of an optional filter implies its use for narrowing discovery.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_query_tableQuery ServiceNow tableARead-only
Read records from any ServiceNow table through the Table API. Supports encoded queries, field selection and pagination.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Maximum number of records to return (default 10). | |
| query | No | Encoded query (sysparm_query), e.g. 'active=true^priority=1^ORDERBYDESCsys_created_on'. | |
| table | Yes | Table name, e.g. 'incident', 'sys_user', 'change_request'. | |
| fields | No | Columns to return. Omit to return all columns. | |
| format | No | Output format: 'json' (default), or 'csv' for a spreadsheet-friendly export. | |
| offset | No | Number of records to skip, for pagination. | |
| fetchAll | No | When true, page through all matching records (up to the server's SN_MAX_RECORDS cap) instead of a single page. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. | |
| displayValue | No | Return display values ('true'), raw values ('false', default) or both ('all'). |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The readOnlyHint and openWorldHint annotations already communicate that this is a safe read operation, which the description's 'Read records' wording confirms. The description adds some value by mentioning Table API support, encoded queries, field selection, and pagination, but it does not disclose behavior like response shape, server-side caps, or what happens with fetchAll. This is adequate given the annotations but not richly transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two tight sentences, front-loading the core purpose ('Read records from any ServiceNow table') and then summarizing the key capabilities without redundancy. No words are wasted, and every clause earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with 9 parameters and no output schema, the description gives a useful high-level overview but leaves several contextual details to the schema, such as defaults, limits, and formatting options. It does not describe the return structure or differentiate from close siblings. It is sufficient but not complete enough to guide an agent without consulting the schema heavily.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema already documents all 9 parameters in detail with examples, defaults, and enums. The description's reference to 'encoded queries, field selection and pagination' maps to query, fields, and limit/offset/fetchAll, but it adds no meaning beyond what the schema already provides. A baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Read records') and the resource ('any ServiceNow table through the Table API'), which identifies the tool's purpose. It does not explicitly differentiate from siblings like servicenow_get_record or servicenow_aggregate, but the combination of plural records, encoded queries, and pagination makes its query-oriented role reasonably clear.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use the tool through 'Supports encoded queries, field selection and pagination' and the phrase 'any ServiceNow table.' However, it does not explicitly say when not to use it or mention alternatives such as servicenow_get_record for single-record lookups or servicenow_aggregate for aggregate queries. The usage context is implied rather than stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_set_credentialsSet ServiceNow credentialsAIdempotent
Save or update the ServiceNow connection credentials. Values are persisted to the env file and used for all subsequent requests. Provide any subset of fields.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| user | No | ServiceNow username. | |
| profile | No | Connection profile to write (default: the active one). Use a new name to create a profile. | |
| instance | No | Instance host, e.g. 'dev12345' or 'dev12345.service-now.com'. | |
| password | No | ServiceNow password. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the idempotentHint annotation, the description discloses the practical side effect: values are persisted to the env file and affect all later requests. The 'provide any subset' clause also signals partial updates. This adds meaningful behavioral context not present in the annotations alone.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences deliver purpose, persistence behavior, and the partial-update rule with no fluff. The most important information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple configuration tool with four fully documented optional parameters and no output schema, the description covers purpose, side effects, and usage scope. Nothing essential is missing for an agent to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so each parameter is already well documented. The description adds only the global hint that any subset of fields can be provided, which is useful but does not deepen per-parameter semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb-resource pair: 'Save or update the ServiceNow connection credentials.' It clearly distinguishes this configuration tool from the data-operation siblings by noting persistence and use across subsequent requests.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context: credentials are persisted to the env file and used for all subsequent requests, implying this should be called to configure the connection before other operations. It does not explicitly name alternatives or exclusion cases, but the intended use is unambiguous.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_test_connectionTest ServiceNow connectionARead-only
Verify that the configured credentials actually work: reads one sys_user record and reports ok/status/latency. Auth and connectivity problems are returned structurally (ok:false), not as errors.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | Yes | |
| user | No | |
| status | Yes | |
| message | No | |
| latencyMs | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation, the description adds valuable behavioral context: it reads exactly one sys_user record, and it explicitly states that auth and connectivity problems are returned structurally (ok:false) rather than as errors. This gives an agent accurate expectations about failure modes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two concise sentences with no wasted words. The primary purpose is front-loaded, and the error-handling caveat is placed second, which is natural and useful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter tool with a readOnly annotation and an output schema, the description is nearly complete. It covers purpose, behavioral scope, and error semantics. The only missing piece is explicit differentiation from sibling tools, but that is a minor gap given the tool's simplicity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% for the single optional parameter, so the schema already handles parameter documentation. The tool description itself adds no parameter details, though the schema pointing to servicenow_list_instances is helpful. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: verifying configured credentials by reading one sys_user record and reporting ok/status/latency. This distinct focus on credential verification differentiates it from siblings like get_status and check_capabilities, and includes a specific resource and behavior.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context for when to use it ('verify that the configured credentials actually work'). However, it does not explicitly mention when not to use it or how it compares to sibling tools, so it stops short of full alternative routing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_update_recordUpdate ServiceNow recordAIdempotent
Update fields on an existing record identified by its sys_id.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| apply | No | Execute the change. In the default plan mode, omitting this returns a non-mutating before/after preview; set true to apply. SN_WRITE_MODE=apply makes execution the default. | |
| table | Yes | Table name, e.g. 'incident'. | |
| fields | Yes | Field name/value pairs to change on the record. | |
| sys_id | Yes | The sys_id of the record to update. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=false, indicating a mutating but non-destructive operation. The description adds no additional behavioral context, such as permissions, reversibility, or the preview/plan mode behavior encoded in the 'apply' parameter. It is consistent with annotations but adds little beyond them.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence with no redundant words. It immediately names the action, target, and key identifier, making it efficient and easy to parse.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the rich schema (which covers parameters and the apply/preview behavior) and the annotations covering mutation safety, the concise description is sufficient for an agent to understand the tool's core purpose. It does not explain the preview mode, but that is fully documented in the apply parameter description, so nothing critical is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema fully documents all five parameters, including table, sys_id, fields, and the apply flag. The description itself adds no parameter-level meaning, so a baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Update'), a resource ('fields on an existing record'), and the identifier ('sys_id'). This clearly distinguishes it from creating, deleting, querying, or fetching records, so an agent can select it without ambiguity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is for modifying existing records (as opposed to creating or deleting), but it does not explicitly mention alternatives or state when not to use it. No prerequisites or exclusions are given, so the guidance is adequate but not explicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_upload_attachmentUpload ServiceNow attachmentA
Attach a file (provided as base64) to a record identified by table + sys_id.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| apply | No | Execute the change. In the default plan mode, omitting this returns a non-mutating before/after preview; set true to apply. SN_WRITE_MODE=apply makes execution the default. | |
| table | Yes | Table the record belongs to. | |
| sys_id | Yes | sys_id of the record to attach to. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. | |
| file_name | Yes | File name to store, e.g. 'log.txt'. | |
| content_type | No | MIME type, e.g. 'text/plain'. Defaults to octet-stream. | |
| content_base64 | Yes | File contents, base64-encoded. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already signal that this is a mutating, non-destructive operation (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false). The description adds the base64 input format and record-targeting behavior, but does not disclose whether repeated uploads create duplicates, size limits, permission requirements, or side effects associated with openWorldHint=true. No contradiction exists.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that front-loads the action and key parameters. Every word contributes meaning, and there is no redundant or filler content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The core operation is clear, but there is no output schema and the description does not indicate what the tool returns upon success/failure, any prerequisites, or potential side effects. Given the seven-parameter schema and openWorldHint, slightly more context would help an agent confidently invoke the tool and interpret the result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all seven parameters, including the plan-mode 'apply' nuance and base64 encoding of content. The description reinforces table + sys_id as the record locator but adds little beyond the schema, matching the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a clear verb ('Attach'), a specific resource ('a file'), and the target ('a record identified by table + sys_id'), making the tool's action unambiguous. It is naturally distinguishable from sibling attachment tools like get_attachment, download_attachment, and delete_attachment.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description clearly implies the use case: upload an attachment to an existing ServiceNow record using its table and sys_id. It does not explicitly discuss when not to use it or name alternative tools, but the phrasing gives enough context that an agent can route to this tool for uploads.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
servicenow_use_instanceSwitch connection profileAIdempotent
Switch the active ServiceNow connection profile (persisted to the env file). All identity-scoped caches (OAuth tokens, schema, plugin availability) are cleared.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | Profile to activate, e.g. 'default' or 'dev'. | |
| instance | No | Connection profile to use for this call (default: the active profile). See servicenow_list_instances. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds meaningful side-effect context beyond the annotations: it discloses persistence to the env file and clearing of identity-scoped caches (OAuth tokens, schema, plugin availability). This is useful behavioral disclosure even though destructiveHint=false; clearing caches is not presented as destructive to persistent data.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences. The primary action is front-loaded, and the side-effect detail is presented in a compact second sentence with no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple profile-switching tool, the description, paired with parameter schema and annotations, covers the essential behavior, persistence, and cache effects. It does not mention return values or error conditions, but the absence of an output schema and the tool's simple state-changing nature make this a minor gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Both schema parameters already have clear descriptions: 'name' indicates the profile to activate and 'instance' explains the per-call override with a pointer to servicenow_list_instances. Since schema coverage is high, the description does not need to add parameter detail, and it does not.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Switch') and resource ('active ServiceNow connection profile'), and specifies it is persisted to the env file. This clearly differentiates it from sibling tools like servicenow_list_instances or servicenow_set_credentials.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is used when you want to change the active ServiceNow profile, but it does not explicitly compare with alternatives or state when not to use it. The schema references servicenow_list_instances for discovering profiles, but the description itself gives no usage guidance beyond the core action.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
19 tool updates
v2.0.1- First observed
servicenow_aggregate - First observed
servicenow_check_capabilities - First observed
servicenow_create_record - First observed
servicenow_delete_attachment - First observed
servicenow_delete_record - First observed
servicenow_describe_table - First observed
servicenow_download_attachment - First observed
servicenow_get_attachment - First observed
servicenow_get_record - First observed
servicenow_get_status - First observed
servicenow_list_attachments - First observed
servicenow_list_instances - First observed
servicenow_list_tables - First observed
servicenow_query_table - First observed
servicenow_set_credentials - First observed
servicenow_test_connection - First observed
servicenow_update_record - First observed
servicenow_upload_attachment - First observed
servicenow_use_instance
TDQS
Scored across 19 tools
Each tool targets a distinct resource and action: record CRUD, schema discovery, aggregation, attachments, and connection management. Even within attachments, list vs get vs download vs upload vs delete are clearly separated by operation. There is no meaningful overlap between tools.
All tools follow the consistent servicenow_verb_noun pattern in snake_case. Verbs like query, get, create, update, delete, list, describe, aggregate, download, upload, set, use, test, and check are all used uniformly with clear object nouns.
At 19 tools, the server sits in the borderline heavy range (16-25). Each tool has a distinct purpose, but the count is high for a single connector and could potentially be consolidated without losing clarity.
The surface covers the full lifecycle of records (create/read/update/delete/query), schema exploration, server-side aggregation, attachment management (list, get metadata, download, upload, delete), and connection profiling. No obvious dead ends or missing core operations for the stated ServiceNow domain.
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