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list_vulnerability_endpoints

Read-only

List endpoints affected by a specified CVE in an Action1 organization. Filter results server-side with contains, check total, and page through items using offset and limit.

Instructions

List endpoints affected by a CVE. Returns one page {total, offset, has_more, items} (limit default 20, max 200). contains is Action1's server-side text filter on the items' own fields (e.g. CVE id or product name for vulnerabilities) - check total before paging through everything.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "org_id": "<org_id>",
      "cve_id": "<cve_id>"
    },
    "name": "list_vulnerability_endpoints"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`limit`	No
`cve_id`	Yes
`offset`	No
`org_id`	Yes
`contains`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.1.0Oct 17, 2026

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the read-only safety profile, so the bar is lower, and the description adds genuinely useful behavior: the exact page envelope {total, offset, has_more, items} even though there's no output schema, the default/max limit, and that `contains` is a server-side filter on items' own fields. It stops short of noting auth/org-scoping needs.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the purpose, then the return shape, then the filter tip in three tight sentences with no filler. The parenthetical pagination detail is dense but earns its place given the absence of an output schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 5-param read tool with no output schema, the description covers the return envelope, pagination limits, and the non-obvious `contains` filter well. It is only slightly incomplete on org_id/cve_id semantics, which are largely self-explanatory.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry parameter meaning. It explains `contains` in detail and gives the limit default (20) and max (200), but says nothing about offset, org_id, or cve_id semantics, leaving several parameters undefined in both places.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: list endpoints affected by a CVE. An agent can tell it apart from list_vulnerabilities and list_update_missing_endpoints by the resource being endpoints-of-a-CVE. It never names a sibling explicitly, so differentiation relies on inference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides an efficiency tip ('check total before paging through everything') that guides pagination usage. But it gives no when-to-use-vs-alternatives guidance relative to list_vulnerabilities, get_vulnerability, or list_endpoints, so selection between siblings is implicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.