get_vulnerability
Retrieve details of a specific CVE in an organization by providing the org ID and CVE ID.
Instructions
Get details of one CVE in an organization.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | Yes | ||
| org_id | Yes |
Retrieve details of a specific CVE in an organization by providing the org ID and CVE ID.
Get details of one CVE in an organization.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | Yes | ||
| org_id | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v0.1.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, so safety is covered. Beyond that, the description adds only the org-scoping constraint and says nothing about what a miss returns, whether the CVE must exist in the org, or any error semantics. Value added over structured fields is minimal.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single short sentence with the resource front-loaded and zero filler. It is arguably terse to the point of under-specification, but nothing in the sentence is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple two-param read tool with readOnlyHint and no output schema, the description is minimally viable. It omits any indication of what detail fields are returned or how a not-found CVE is surfaced, which would help an agent decide between this and the list/search siblings.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the schema documents nothing about cve_id or org_id. The description partially compensates by implying CVE identifier and organizational scope, which maps to both required params, but it gives no format (e.g., CVE-YYYY-NNNN) or org-id sourcing detail.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource combination: fetch details for exactly one CVE scoped to an organization. The singular 'one CVE' implicitly contrasts with list_vulnerabilities, though the sibling is never named. An agent can tell what it does without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no explicit routing to list_vulnerabilities for bulk retrieval or to list_vulnerability_endpoints for affected hosts. The agent must infer that this is the single-item lookup from the name alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.