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list_missing_updates

Read-only

Find missing OS and third-party updates across an organization, page through results, and filter by CVE or product name to target remediation.

Instructions

List missing OS/third-party updates across an organization. Returns one page {total, offset, has_more, items} (limit default 20, max 200). contains is Action1's server-side text filter on the items' own fields (e.g. CVE id or product name for vulnerabilities) - check total before paging through everything.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "org_id": "<org_id>"
    },
    "name": "list_missing_updates"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`limit`	No
`offset`	No
`org_id`	Yes
`contains`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.1.0Oct 17, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

readOnlyHint=true already signals a safe read, and the description meaningfully adds the paged return shape {total, offset, has_more, items}, the limit bounds (default 20, max 200), and that `contains` is a server-side filter over item fields. This goes beyond the annotation with concrete paging/filter behavior; only rate limits or auth needs are absent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, front-loaded with purpose before mechanics, and each sentence carries distinct information (purpose, return shape/bounds, filter semantics plus paging advice). No filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully describes the page envelope and the `total` field that gates paging, plus filter semantics. It is nearly complete; only the meaning of `offset`/`org_id` and the nature of returned items are left implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the param burden. It documents `limit` (default 20, max 200), implies `offset` via the paging guidance, and explains `contains` as a server-side text filter with examples; only `org_id` is left to its self-evident name.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a clear verb (List) and specific resource (missing OS/third-party updates) scoped 'across an organization', which implicitly separates it from endpoint-level siblings like list_endpoint_missing_updates. However, it never names an alternative tool, so the differentiation from list_vulnerabilities and the endpoint-scoped siblings is left to inference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides operational guidance ('check `total` before paging through everything') and explains what `contains` filters on, which implies how to page efficiently. It does not state when to prefer this org-wide listing over list_update_missing_endpoints or list_vulnerability_endpoints, so alternative-selection guidance is missing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.