Action1 MCP Server

by ComTom777

Overview Schema Source Related Servers Discussions Admin

Python

Remote

list_vulnerabilities

Read-only

Retrieve CVEs detected in an organization, with paging and optional text filtering by CVE ID or product name.

Instructions

List vulnerabilities (CVEs) detected in an organization. Returns one page {total, offset, has_more, items} (limit default 20, max 200). contains is Action1's server-side text filter on the items' own fields (e.g. CVE id or product name for vulnerabilities) - check total before paging through everything.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "org_id": "<org_id>"
    },
    "name": "list_vulnerabilities"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`limit`	No
`offset`	No
`org_id`	Yes
`contains`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.1.0Oct 17, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With readOnlyHint=true already covering the safety profile, the description adds real context: the pagination envelope {total, offset, has_more, items}, the limit default 20 / max 200, and the fact that `contains` is a server-side filter on item fields. It omits auth requirements, rate limits, and item field shape, so it stops short of 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, zero filler, front-loaded with the resource and scope before the pagination and filter mechanics. Every clause (envelope shape, limit bounds, filter semantics, total-check tip) adds information an agent needs.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, and the description compensates by describing the return envelope and pagination contract, plus filter semantics. Missing only item-level field detail and ordering/authorization context, which is minor for a read-only list tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description carries the full burden and largely does: it documents `limit` (default 20, max 200), `offset` (implicitly via the paging envelope), and `contains` as a server-side text filter on item fields with examples. Only `org_id` is left unexplained, which is self-evident from the tool's stated organization scope.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('List vulnerabilities (CVEs)') plus scope ('detected in an organization'), which separates it from get_vulnerability and list_vulnerability_endpoints by implication. It does not explicitly name those siblings or contrast its per-CVE view with the per-endpoint view, so it falls short of full sibling differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Offers one genuine usage tip ('check `total` before paging through everything') and implies a paging workflow, but never states when to use this tool versus list_vulnerability_endpoints or get_vulnerability, and gives no prerequisites. Usage is implied rather than guided.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.