atlasent-mcp
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- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables LLM agents to safely invoke enterprise MCP tools under an enforceable guard that applies allowlist policies, caller roles, parameter restrictions, human confirmation for destructive operations, and a correlated JSONL audit log.AGPL 3.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceStateless enterprise policy firewall & token-cost proxy for MCP. It enforces identity, policy, and budget on every tool call.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceGoverns AI agent tool calls by checking them against Agentic Control Plane policies, returning allow/deny/ask decisions with audit logging and identity attribution for MCP clients like Claude and ChatGPT. Exposes acp_check and acp_status tools for policy enforcement and connection verification.MIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceProvides a secure MCP boundary for AI agents, intercepting and validating tool calls, redacting secrets, and requiring human approval for sensitive actions with a tamper-evident audit trail.-
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceGates agent tool execution with human approval, audit trails, and replay-resistant permits, enabling safe use of tools in agent loops.MIT
- AlicenseAqualityAmaintenanceEnables MCP-speaking agents to execute tool calls through an authorization gate, producing signed decision records and reconciled effect rows for accountability.6Apache 2.0
TDQS
Scored across 45 tools
The set contains near-duplicate entry points (evaluate/atlasent_evaluate, verify_permit/atlasent_verify_permit) that are hard to distinguish, and several permit-related tools (get/check/verify/permit) overlap in semantics. Many other tools are distinct, but the duplicates create real misselection risk.
Most tools follow an atlasent_<verb>_<noun> pattern, but the pattern is broken by unprefixed evaluate, verify_permit, and deploy_service, plus generic names like atlasent_query and atlasent_permit. Still readable and mostly snake_case, so not chaotic.
45 tools is far above the well-scoped range, and several are redundant (duplicate evaluate/verify) or a demo (deploy_service). A leaner set could cover the same platform with fewer entry points.
Core policy/permit/decision workflows are well covered, but subdomains have gaps: SCIM groups are read-only, webhooks have create/delete but no list/get, and SIEM config has no delete. These are workable but notable omissions for an admin surface.