HEROS-Firewall
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
HEROS-Firewall
Inline MCP security proxy for the OWASP Agentic Top 10 (ASI01–ASI10), with cryptographic human-approval challenges and Merkle-tree audit receipts.
An agent talks to the firewall over stdio. The firewall evaluates every
tools/call against a deterministic policy, forwards allowed calls to the
downstream MCP server, and records a hash-chained receipt. Destructive or
high-cost calls require an HMAC-signed, expiring, single-use human approval.
Layers
OWASP ASI policy engine — goal hijacking, tool misuse, identity/scope abuse, untrusted tools, code execution, memory poisoning, inter-agent exfiltration, resource exhaustion, human-trust gates, and rogue chains.
Human approval challenge — 128-bit token, HMAC-SHA256 signature, 5-minute TTL, single use, bound to the exact tool + arguments + principal hash.
Merkle audit receipts — input/output SHA-256, principal, tool, decision, approval signature, idempotency key, previous hash, and a per-prefix Merkle root with inclusion proofs.
Red-team harness — 1,000 adversarial payloads across all 10 categories plus 200 benign operations, measuring FNR, FPR, and p99 policy latency.
Related MCP server: evav-gateway
Quick start
npm test
npm run redteam
# Proxy stdio:
HEROS_APPROVAL_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
HEROS_DOWNSTREAM_BIN=node \
HEROS_DOWNSTREAM_ARGS="path/to/upstream-mcp.mjs" \
node bin/heros-firewall.mjs
# Human signing helper (run where the approval secret lives):
HEROS_APPROVAL_SECRET=... node bin/heros-firewall.mjs --sign-approval <token>The human submits the signature through the MCP method firewall/approve with
{ token, signature }. Inspect firewall/receipts and firewall/health for
the Merkle root and latency percentiles.
Policy examples
Attack | Decision | Category |
| deny | ASI01 |
| deny | ASI05 |
| deny | ASI03 |
unknown tool | deny | ASI04 |
| deny | ASI10 |
| challenge | ASI09 |
| deny | ASI06 |
Allowed domains and agents are explicit allowlists. Payload size and call rate are bounded.
Measured red-team results
npm run redteam (Node 26, Apple Silicon):
Adversarial | Benign | FNR | FPR | p99 policy latency |
1,000 | 200 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.103 ms |
This is policy-engine latency; downstream MCP/network time is not included. The sub-5ms target is met for the policy layer, not proven end-to-end.
Tests
npm test — 16 tests covering all ASI categories, benign allow paths, approval
signing/expiry/replay, Merkle verification and tampering, idempotency, the proxy
allow/deny/challenge/retry flow, receipts, and the red-team thresholds.
Status and limitations
The React/Next.js SSE drill-through dashboard is not built: the Mobbin MCP is unavailable in this environment. JSON receipts and health metrics are exposed over MCP instead.
No OCI k3s/Prometheus/Grafana deployment; no cloud credentials.
The proxy is an in-process policy library plus a stdio runner; the red-team suite exercises the policy engine directly.
Approval signatures are HMAC-based. A production deployment should use an asymmetric human-approval key or WebAuthn.
License
MIT. Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Soumya Debnath.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
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