Call this BEFORE performing any sensitive action. Returns a Decision: allow (verify the returned permit_token at the execution boundary before proceeding), deny (you MUST NOT proceed), or hold (do not proceed; route for review).

Call this AFTER evaluate returns allow and BEFORE the protected native side effect. It verifies the permit for the presented execution context. Proceed only when valid is true; expired, invalid, replayed, mismatched, or error outcomes must block the action.

Example protected tool. Every call is authorized AND its Permit is verified by AtlaSent before the deploy runs. Denied, held, expired, replayed, mismatched, or unverifiable calls are blocked and never touch the target system.

Evaluate an action against your published AtlaSent policies. Returns allow/deny/hold/escalate with a permitToken on allow. Use this when ATLASENT_MODE=remote and you need to gate an action against your hosted policy engine.

List all constraint bundles / policies for this organization.

Retrieve a single constraint bundle / policy by ID.

Retrieve recent evaluation events from the audit log.

Explain why a principal currently has (or lacks) authority for a scope. Answers 'why may principal P exercise scope/action A in organization O right now?' — strictly read-only, does not change /v1-evaluate, /v1-verify-permit, or any deny/hold/allow semantics; it explains the same facts those paths already read. Every matched authority mechanism (direct_grant, delegation, role_capability) is reported as its own path entry; every excluded or ambiguous relationship is reported as its own unresolved finding.

Audit the organization's authority graph for internal inconsistency and return the report verbatim. Strictly read-only; changes no policy, permit, or decision. THIS IS NOT A PASS/FAIL HEALTH CHECK and the tool synthesizes no verdict of its own. Each finding carries a three-way classification: defect is a genuine inconsistency; non_exercisable is frequently the CORRECT, healthy state (e.g. an expired grant that is supposed to be expired) and must not be read as a failure; unresolved means the proposition COULD NOT BE VERIFIED and must never be treated as clean. Read summary.audited_scope before drawing any conclusion from an empty findings list — a short decision window is not an absence of findings. If the audit cannot complete, the server refuses rather than returning a partial report, and this tool surfaces that as an error — never an empty report.

Create a new constraint bundle for an action. The bundle starts in 'draft' status — call update_policy to publish it.

Update a constraint bundle — change rules, title, or publish/archive it. Only fields you provide are updated; omitted fields are unchanged.

Permanently delete a constraint bundle. Prefer archiving over deleting.

Revoke a permit before it expires. The permit immediately becomes invalid for verify_permit calls.

List issued permit tokens for audit and monitoring.

Fetch one permit's record: status, actor, action, environment, issue/expiry/consume times and the decision that issued it. Never returns the permit token itself.

Check whether a permit is still usable without consuming it. Returns { valid, status } where status is active, revoked, consumed or expired. Use before a deferred action to avoid acting on a permit that was revoked meanwhile. This is a status read, not authorization: execute only after atlasent_verify_permit.

Fetch one authorization decision (execution evaluation) by id: the decision, deny code, actor, action, context and evidence fields. Set include_trace to also return its approval events, permit uses and webhook deliveries. Requires audit:read.

Manually issue a permit token for an action. Use for pre-authorized operations where a full evaluate call is not practical.

Verify a permit token with full binding inputs against the V1 endpoint. Use this at the execution boundary before the governed native effect; under-specified verification is a bypass vector.

Create an approval request for a held action. The request ID is returned in the evaluate response when decision is 'hold'. Submit resolution via atlasent_resolve_approval_request. Approval is an input to Authorization; it does not itself authorize or prove execution.

Approve or deny a pending approval request. Approval records a verified input; the protected action must still satisfy the current authorization/reevaluation path and Permit Verification before execution.

Record the outcome of an execution that was permitted by a prior evaluate call. Closes the evidence loop with the observed execution result; it does not replace pre-execution Permit Verification.

Register a webhook URL to receive evaluation events.

Remove a registered webhook.

Look up canonical action specifications from the Authorization Intelligence Library. Returns the permanent canon_id, gate flags (requires_human_approval, requires_mfa, requires_verified_actor, requires_state_snapshot), authorization pattern, risk posture, AI risk classification, regulatory mappings, evidence requirements, and the action's knowledge-graph relationships (what it requires and produces, and which frameworks / control objectives it satisfies) for every governed action type in the Canon. Use slug for an exact match (e.g. 'production.deploy') or query to describe what you want to do in plain language (e.g. 'deploy the api service to prod', 'grant admin access', 'close the books'). query is ranked offline against the vendored Canon and returns a retrieval block with confidence = confident | ambiguous | none — act only on confident; the tool never invents an action type, and a none result means the Canon has no such action (see the hint). Omit both to list the full Canon.

Look up a canonical AtlaSent concept from the Knowledge Atlas — the compiled graph of the system's own vocabulary (Caller, Authority, Policy, Decision, Permit, Verification, Evidence, Audit Chain, Gate, Trust Root, ...). Returns the concept's canonical definition (its source-of-truth doc), its relationships (what it depends on and what depends on it), the surfaces that realize it, and its ADR / API / SDK / implementation anchors — so every AI host reasons from the same canonical knowledge instead of guessing. Use id for an exact concept id (e.g. 'permit', 'audit-chain', 'gate') or query for a case-insensitive substring search across id, term, and definition. Omit both to list every concept.

Evaluate up to 100 actions in a single request against your published AtlaSent policies. Returns decisions in input order. Optional batch_id (UUID) provides idempotency. Closed-by-default: 404 surfaces as a feature_not_enabled error tagged with the v2_batch tenant flag.

Evaluate up to 100 actions via the streaming endpoint. The tool buffers the SSE stream and returns the complete result set (same shape as atlasent_evaluate_many). Per-item RPC failures surface in the items array with { error }; the stream continues. Closed-by-default: 404 surfaces as a feature_not_enabled error tagged with the v2_streaming tenant flag.

Run a read-only GraphQL query against the AtlaSent V2 GraphQL endpoint. Wave A schema: recentEvaluations(limit), activeBundle. Body limit 1MB, depth limit 8, one operation per request (enforced server-side). Closed-by-default: 404 surfaces as a feature_not_enabled error tagged with the v2_graphql tenant flag.

List provisioned users via SCIM 2.0 (RFC 7643) for an organization. Supports filter expressions (e.g. 'userName eq "alice"') and startIndex/count pagination.

Retrieve a single provisioned SCIM user by ID.

Provision a new user via SCIM 2.0. Adds the user to the AtlaSent directory and makes them available for policy evaluation.

Update a provisioned user using RFC 7644 SCIM PatchOp operations. Each operation has op (add/remove/replace), an optional path, and a value.

Deprovision a SCIM user. Removes them from the AtlaSent directory. This is irreversible — prefer disabling (patch active=false) over deleting.

List provisioned groups via SCIM 2.0 for an organization.

Retrieve the SIEM export configuration for an organization. Enterprise plan required. The credential field is never returned.

Create or update the SIEM export configuration for an organization. Enterprise plan required. destinationUrl must be HTTPS. The credential field is stored securely and never returned by GET.

Send a test event to the configured SIEM destination and report the result. Returns { success, statusCode, durationMs, error? }. Returns 409 if SIEM is not configured or is disabled.

List compliance evidence bundles for an organization. Enterprise plan required. Each record includes status and SHA-256 hash.

Retrieve a specific compliance evidence bundle by ID. Includes status, SHA-256 hash for tamper verification, and download URL when complete.

Generate a compliance evidence bundle for audit regimes (SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA, GDPR). Enterprise plan required. Returns SHA-256 for tamper verification. Default window is the past 90 days; use date_from/date_to to narrow it.

Score a constraint bundle against the 6 VQP criteria (access_control CC6.1, audit_coverage CC7.2, escalation_paths CC7.4, deny_specificity CC8.1, hold_conditions CC6.3, override_governance CC5.2). Stores a tamper-evident snapshot with a SHA-256 prompt_hash in vqp_snapshots. Verdicts: qualified (≥85, no fails), conditionally_qualified (≥60), not_qualified. Requires ATLASENT_SUPABASE_URL and ATLASENT_SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY.

Re-derive the VQP prompt from current bundle data and verify it matches the stored SHA-256 prompt_hash. Detects tampering (hash_match: false) and optionally re-runs the AI model to detect score drift (score_delta, verdict_changed). Writes a vqp_audit_log row for SOC 2 CC7.2 / 21 CFR Part 11 evidence. Requires ATLASENT_SUPABASE_URL and ATLASENT_SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY.

Retrieve a summary of VQP audit activity — hash match rates, drift event counts, and verdict changes — from the BCCAE compliance report. Use for SOC 2 evidence collection and monitoring dashboards.

List VQP snapshots where the re-run AI score drifted by ≥10 points or the verdict changed (e.g. qualified → not_qualified). Use for compliance investigation and QA-VQP-002 § 7 deviation reporting.