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Set SwOS Password

set_swos_password
Destructive

Change a SwOS switch's admin password using a server-stored secret instead of exposing it in chat; dry-run defaults to true for safe prechecks.

Instructions

Change a SwOS switch's admin password, as the web UI's Password Change does. The new password comes from the server secret MIKROMCP_PASSWORD_, never from the conversation; the current one is the router's configured credential. Passwords are ASCII, at most 15 characters. After the change this call's client keeps working with the new password, but the server rebuilds the client from the router's configured credential ({PREFIX}_PASS) after any authentication failure or restart, so that variable must be updated right away. On SwOS Lite the switch does not answer the change; the result is confirmed by logging in with the new password. dryRun defaults to true.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dryRunNoCheck the secret and the switch without changing the password.
routerIdNoRouter ID; omit to use the default router.
confirmationTokenNoToken from a prior APPROVAL_REQUIRED response. Re-submit the identical call with this token to confirm the destructive action.
newPasswordSecretYesName of the server secret holding the new password: NAME for MIKROMCP_PASSWORD_<NAME>. The password itself never passes through the conversation, and a switch config cannot reference it.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.14.1

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Far exceeds the annotations (destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false). It discloses that the client keeps working after the change, that the server rebuilds the client from {PREFIX}_PASS on auth failure or restart (a real footgun), and that SwOS Lite gives no change confirmation so success must be verified by logging in with the new password. This is exactly the hidden-behavior disclosure that matters for a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the purpose, then layers caveats in a dense but information-bearing sequence with no filler sentences. It is long and semicolon-heavy, but nearly every clause carries a distinct operational fact, so the length is justified.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive credential-changing tool with no output schema, the description covers the confirmation workflow, the dryRun default, secret resolution, the post-change client-rebuild hazard, and how to verify success on SwOS Lite. An agent has everything needed to call it safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents dryRun, routerId, confirmationToken, and newPasswordSecret, including the MIKROMCP_PASSWORD_<NAME> convention. The description largely restates the schema's secret-name semantics rather than adding new per-parameter meaning, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Change a SwOS switch's admin password') and anchors it to a known reference point ('as the web UI's Password Change does'), which cleanly separates it from the broader SwOS config siblings like apply_swos_config or write_swos_blob.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives strong operational context: the password must be supplied via a server secret, dryRun defaults to true (so the agent must explicitly opt into the mutation), and it explains the follow-up requirement of updating {PREFIX}_PASS. It does not name any sibling alternative to prefer, so it stops short of explicit when/when-not routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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